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SVC, Service Properties Trust
We are a REIT formed in 1995 under the laws of the State of Maryland.
As of December 31, 2025, we owned 760 service-focused retail net lease properties with an aggregate of 13,601,902 square feet located in 42 states and 94 hotels with an aggregate of 21,243 rooms or suites located in 31 states, the District of Columbia, Ontario, Canada, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.
As of December 31, 2025, our net lease portfolio was occupied by 181 tenants with a weighted average (by annual minimum rent) lease term of 7.4 years, operating under 140 brands in 21 distinct industries.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have shrunk (−29% a year). Debt is 91% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| $223M | $215M | $186M | $260M | ($311M) | ($545M) | ($132M) | ($33M) | ($276M) | ($202M) | ($237M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $580M | $592M | $589M | $529M | $185M | ($70M) | $221M | $308M | $90M | $28M | ($20M) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 54% | 57% | 59% | 67% | 51% | — | 17% | 43% | 112% | 24% | — | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $8.7B | $9.4B | $9.5B | $11.4B | $11.2B | $10.2B | $9.6B | $9.8B | $9.6B | $7.9B | $7.9B | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $6.6B | $7.2B | $7.2B | $9.0B | $8.7B | $9.2B | $7.5B | $7.4B | $7.1B | $6.5B | $6.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| 39% | 45% | 50% | 59% | 71% | 67% | 76% | 77% | 82% | 85% | 91% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $5.3B | $6.1B | $6.1B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $5.5B | $5.5B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $5.3B | $6.1B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.5B | $5.7B | $5.2B | $5.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.4× | 2.1× | 2.0× | 1.7× | -0.2× | -0.6× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 1.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.1B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $852M | $646M | $494M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 156M | 164M | 164M | 164M | 164M | 165M | 165M | 165M | 165M | 166M | 166M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.72 | $3.61 | $3.58 | $3.22 | $1.13 | $-0.43 | $1.34 | $1.87 | $0.54 | $0.17 | $-0.12 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $2.01 | $2.07 | $2.11 | $2.15 | $0.57 | $0.04 | $0.23 | $0.80 | $0.61 | $0.04 | $0.04 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $20.05 | $16.78 | $15.81 | $15.25 | $12.80 | $9.45 | $8.43 | $7.43 | $5.15 | $3.89 | $2.97 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.0%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −35.2%/yr | −41.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.3%/yr | +26.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | −16.6%/yr | −21.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $0.17 per shareNet income ($202M) + depreciation $315M − gains on sale $84M
What this means
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Lightly coveredDividends $7M ÷ FFO $28MIndustry peers: median 40%
What this means
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 87%HeavyTotal debt $5.7B ÷ assets $6.5BIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Thin(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $414MIndustry peers: median 3.5×
What this means
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“RMR incorporates artificial intelligence into some of its business workflows and processes, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, legal liability, and increased regulatory costs and could adversely affect our results of operations.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $424k | $299k | ($45M) |
| 2022 | $106k | $83k | $139M |
| 2022 | $255k | $174k | $139M |
| 2023 | $135k | $191k | $285M |
| 2024 | $147k | −$39k | ($164M) |
| 2025 | $437k | $353k | ($107M) |
| 2025 | $810 | −$25k | ($107M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Does management own its misses?1 plain admission in this year's filing
“We compute depreciation expense using the straight line method over estimated useful lives of up to 40 years for buildings and improvements, and up to 12 years for personal property.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Hotel & lodging REITs
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HSTHost Hotels & Resorts Inc. | $6.1B | 26% | 11.2% | 40% | 34% |
| RHPRyman Hospitality Properties | $2.6B | 22% | 9.3% | 51% | 65% |
| SVCService Properties Trust | $1.8B | 16% | 3.6% | 54% | 69% |
| PEBPebblebrook Hotel Trust | $1.5B | 13% | 2.7% | 28% | 39% |
| APLEApple Hospitality REIT | $1.4B | 27% | 7.1% | 69% | 29% |
| RLJRLJ Lodging Trust | $1.3B | 19% | 4.8% | 44% | 46% |
| DRHDiamondrock Hospitality Company | $1.1B | 20% | 6.1% | 40% | 34% |
| INNSummit Hotel Properties Inc. | $729M | 18% | 4.6% | 22% | 48% |
| Group median | — | 20% | 5.5% | 42% | 42% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← SUPN its page in the Manual SVCO →
Industry order: ← SUI the REITs — Specialty & Diversified chapter TCI →