Share count
440Mpeak FY2018
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SUPV, Grupo Supervielle S.A.
Banks financial
Grupo Supervielle is an Argentine financial group built around a bank that takes deposits and lends to individuals and businesses. It earns the spread between what it pays depositors and what it charges borrowers, and adds fee income from services that include a digital brokerage, IOL invertironline, through which customers buy and sell investments. In short, it is a peso-denominated lender and financial-services shop in Argentina.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
ARS 969.0B
+4.6% YoY · 91% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue ARS 969.0B 5-yr avg ARS 637.6B
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- A bank is bought on two things: the cost and stickiness of its deposit funding, and the discipline of its lending — so watch whether it gathers cheap deposits people leave in place, and whether loan losses stay contained when borrowers are pushed into refinancing agreements. Both sit inside Argentina, where inflation, the peso, and a Central Bank that can cap credit when it judges growth excessive govern the result more than anything management does; the bad case is a macro shock that erodes the spread and the loan book at once. Fee lines like the brokerage can soften that, but the franchise question is whether deposits and credit quality hold through the cycle — the record below carries the figures.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -10%, above 12% in only 3 of 8 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, charted
FY2017–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
ARS 969.0Blow FY2017
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 13%StrongNet income ARS 104.5B ÷ equity ARS 797.7BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill ARS 58.9B − intangibles ARS 166.0B)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 62%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 17.7%Well capitalizedEquity ARS 797.7B ÷ assets ARS 4.51T
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 70%Deposit-fundedDeposits ARS 3.17T ÷ assets ARS 4.51T
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPMJPMorgan Chase & Co. | $182.4B | 13% | 16% | 57% | 2.0% |
| BACBank of America Corp. | $113.1B | 10% | 13% | 64% | 1.8% |
| CCitigroup Inc. | $85.2B | 7% | 8% | 62% | 2.3% |
| WFCWells Fargo & Co. | $83.7B | 11% | 13% | 67% | 2.5% |
| COFCapital One Financial Corporation | $53.4B | 8% | 12% | 54% | 6.0% |
| USBU.S. Bancorp | $28.7B | 12% | 17% | 59% | 2.5% |
| PNCPNC Financial Services Group Inc. (The) | $23.1B | 10% | 12% | 63% | 2.4% |
| SUPVGrupo Supervielle S.A. | ARS 969.0B | -10% | -13% | 25% | 16.7% |
| Group median | — | 10% | 12% | 61% | 2.4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing 5 Class”; Grupo Supervielle S.A. reports in ARS, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at ARS 1 = $0.001 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in ARS.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Grupo Supervielle S.A.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered107%/yr’19→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity−13%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $388M on 88M shares, a −13% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Grupo Supervielle S.A. (SUPV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SUPV, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SU its page in the Manual SUPX →
Industry order: ← STT the Banks chapter SYBT →