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SWBI, Smith & Wesson Brands Inc.
Revenue is Handguns (75%), Long Guns (17%) and Other Products and Services (7%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
- Situation
- Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 6% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 9.0% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 4.5% to 30% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Handguns is 75% of revenue, with Long Guns the other meaningful line at 17%.
- Handguns75%$394M
- Long Guns17%$90M
- Other Products And Services7%$39M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $903M | $607M | $481M | $530M | $1.1B | $864M | $479M | $536M | $475M | $524M | $524M | RevenueRevenue |
| 42% | 32% | 30% | 31% | 42% | 43% | 32% | 30% | 27% | 27% | 27% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 13% | 17% | 14% | 12% | 7% | 8% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $200M | $27M | $44M | $50M | $320M | $252M | $48M | $47M | $24M | $29M | $29M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 22.1% | 4.5% | 9.0% | 9.5% | 30.2% | 29.1% | 10.1% | 8.8% | 5.0% | 5.6% | 5.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $128M | $20M | $18M | ($61M) | $252M | $194M | $37M | $41M | $13M | $18M | $18M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 33% | — | 34% | — | 23% | 23% | 24% | 20% | 30% | 26% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $124M | $62M | $57M | $95M | $315M | $138M | $17M | $107M | ($7M) | $114M | $114M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $50M | $52M | $29M | $32M | $32M | $30M | $31M | $33M | $32M | $31M | $31M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($63M) | ($18M) | $3M | $122M | $27M | ($91M) | ($57M) | $27M | ($60M) | $56M | $56M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $35M | $18M | $31M | $12M | $22M | $24M | $90M | $91M | $22M | $24M | $24M | CapexCapex |
| 3.9% | 3.0% | 6.4% | 2.3% | 2.1% | 2.8% | 18.7% | 16.9% | 4.6% | 4.5% | 4.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $89M | $43M | $26M | $82M | $293M | $114M | ($73M) | $16M | ($29M) | $90M | $90M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.8% | 7.1% | 5.4% | 15.5% | 27.7% | 13.2% | −15.2% | 3.0% | −6.1% | 17.3% | 17.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $89M | $43M | $26M | $82M | $293M | $114M | ($73M) | $16M | ($29M) | $90M | $90M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.8% | 7.1% | 5.4% | 15.5% | 27.7% | 13.2% | −15.2% | 3.0% | −6.1% | 17.3% | 17.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $211M | $23M | $2M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $8M | $15M | $18M | $22M | $23M | $23M | $23M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $50M | — | — | $0 | $110M | $90M | $0 | $10M | $25M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 40% | 7% | 7% | 15% | 161% | 81% | 11% | 11% | 5% | 6% | 4% | ROICROIC |
| 33% | 5% | 4% | -16% | 95% | 54% | 10% | 10% | 4% | 5% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | −16% | 92% | 50% | 5% | 5% | −3% | −1% | −1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $62M | $49M | $41M | $125M | $113M | $121M | $54M | $61M | $25M | $28M | $28M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $108M | $57M | $85M | $61M | $67M | $63M | $55M | $59M | $56M | $40M | $40M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $61M | $91M | $108M | $60M | $22M | $58M | $94M | $83M | $116M | $86M | $86M | InventoryInvent. |
| $53M | $34M | $36M | $31M | $57M | $30M | $37M | $42M | $27M | $35M | $35M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $116M | $115M | $158M | $90M | $32M | $91M | $112M | $101M | $145M | $91M | $91M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $318M | $270M | $299M | $393M | $268M | $328M | $292M | $287M | $277M | $241M | $241M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $151M | $101M | $111M | $130M | $126M | $89M | $87M | $94M | $67M | $75M | $75M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 2.7× | 2.7× | 3.0× | 2.1× | 3.7× | 3.3× | 3.0× | 4.2× | 3.2× | 3.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $169M | $191M | $182M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $19M | $19M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $788M | $745M | $767M | $730M | $446M | $497M | $541M | $577M | $560M | $513M | $513M | Total assetsAssets |
| $393M | $422M | $444M | $387M | $266M | $361M | $385M | $400M | $372M | $377M | $377M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.0% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | $10M | $99M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $99M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 56.9M | 54.8M | 55.2M | 55.7M | 55.4M | 47.7M | 46.2M | 46.2M | 44.9M | 44.9M | 44.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.88 | $11.07 | $8.72 | $9.51 | $19.14 | $18.11 | $10.38 | $11.59 | $10.56 | $11.66 | $11.66 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.25 | $0.37 | $0.33 | $-1.10 | $4.55 | $4.08 | $0.80 | $0.89 | $0.30 | $0.41 | $0.41 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.56 | $0.79 | $0.47 | $1.48 | $5.30 | $2.39 | $-1.58 | $0.35 | $-0.64 | $2.01 | $2.01 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.56 | $0.79 | $0.47 | $1.48 | $5.30 | $2.39 | $-1.58 | $0.35 | $-0.64 | $2.01 | $2.01 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.15 | $0.32 | $0.40 | $0.48 | $0.51 | $0.52 | $0.52 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.61 | $0.34 | $0.56 | $0.22 | $0.40 | $0.50 | $1.94 | $1.96 | $0.48 | $0.53 | $0.53 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.91 | $7.70 | $8.05 | $6.95 | $4.81 | $7.55 | $8.33 | $8.65 | $8.29 | $8.38 | $8.38 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −3.4%/yr | −9.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +2.9%/yr | −17.6%/yr |
| EPS | −17.2%/yr | −38.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | +28.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.6%/yr | +5.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +2.2%/yr | +11.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $18M of profit into $90M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $18M | $13M | $41M | $37M | $194M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$31M | +$32M | +$33M | +$31M | +$30M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$8M | +$8M | +$6M | +$5M | +$5M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$56M | −$60M | +$27M | −$57M | −$91M |
| Cash from operations | $114M | ($7M) | $107M | $17M | $138M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$24M | −$22M | −$91M | −$90M | −$24M |
| Owner earnings | $90M | ($29M) | $16M | ($73M) | $114M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 17% | -6% | 3% | -15% | 13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $82M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“In fiscal 2025, we identified a material weakness in our control over financial reporting that was remediated in fiscal 2026, and in fiscal 2020 we identified a material weakness in our control over financial reporting that was remediated in fiscal 2021.”
“The Revolving Line bears interest at either the Base Rate (as defined in the Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement) or the Adjusted Term SOFR rate (as defined in the Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement), plus an applicable margin based on our…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $29M ÷ interest expense $14M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $138M · 4.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $28M − debt $167M
What this means
Netting $28M of cash and short-term investments against $167M of debt leaves $138M owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (5.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 28 + DIO 82 − DPO 33 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–161%; 4% latest = NOPAT $22M ÷ invested capital $515MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -15%–28%; latest $90M = operating cash $114M − maintenance capex $24MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $82M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $114M ÷ net income $18M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $23M ÷ Owner Earnings $90M
What this means
Of $90M Owner Earnings, $23M (26%) went back to shareholders, $23M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.76×HarvestingCapex $24M ÷ depreciation $31M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $524M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.20×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $167M vs $166M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −56%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.55/share (latest year $0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.42/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 12% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 6% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth −8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 4.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our use of AI technology may adversely impact our business (i) by potentially posing risks to our confidential or proprietary information; (ii) by potentially giving rise to legal actions or reputational damage; (iii) if employees misuse AI; or (iv) if we fail to timely and appropriately adopt AI to remain competitive.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$28M
- Receivables$40M
- Inventory$86M
- Other current assets$88M
- Accounts payable$35M
- Other current liabilities$41M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$368M · 36%
- Dividends$110M · 11%
- Buybacks$286M · 28%
- Retained (debt / cash)$257M · 25%
- Returned to owners$396M
61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $110M as dividends and $286M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $286M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−21.0%
The diluted count fell from 57M to 45M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.52/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($266M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $27M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$109M written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 46% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Brian D. Murphy | $206k | $2.1M | $293M |
| 2021 | Mark P. Smith | $2.7M | $4.4M | $293M |
| 2022 | Mark P. Smith | $2.8M | $1.7M | $114M |
| 2023 | Mark P. Smith | $2.3M | $694k | ($73M) |
| 2024 | Mark P. Smith | $3.6M | $5.9M | $16M |
| 2025 | Mark P. Smith | $3.7M | −$1.3M | ($29M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 29% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$129M · 25% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For fiscal 2026, sales to two of our customers represented 24.7 % of our total net sales, and, as of April 30, 2026, two customers accounted for 30.2 % of our total accounts receivable.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Aerospace & Defense
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRSTriMas Corporation | $646M | 24% | 9.4% | 5% | 8% |
| BWBabcock & Wilcox Enterprises Inc. | $588M | 24% | -2.3% | -18% | -15% |
| MECMayville Engineering Company Inc. | $546M | 11% | 3.0% | -1% | 5% |
| RGRSturm Ruger & Company Inc. | $546M | 28% | 14.1% | 26% | 9% |
| PRLBProto Labs Inc. | $533M | 48% | 11.0% | 7% | 15% |
| SWBISmith & Wesson Brands Inc. | $524M | 32% | 9.3% | 11% | 8% |
| NPKNational Presto Industries Inc. | $504M | 22% | 13.2% | 11% | 7% |
| XPELXPEL Inc. | $476M | 38% | 14.4% | 31% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 26% | 10.2% | 9% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $90M on 45M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-06-15; net debt $134M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SW its page in the Manual SWIM →
Industry order: ← SARO the Aerospace & Defense chapter TATT →