Owner Scorecard


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SYNA, Synaptics

Semiconductors asset-light CyclicalSerial acquirer

Synaptics designs and delivers AI-enabled edge solutions that bring AI closer to end users and transform how we engage with intelligent connected devices, whether at home, at work or on the move.

We are a strategic partner for many global original equipment manufacturers, ("OEM"), offering custom silicon and software platforms for edge AI, wireless connectivity and human interface technologies.

Our Synaptics Astra AI-native and Veros wireless solutions combine embedded compute, connectivity and multimodal sensing to support intuitive, secure and seamless digital experiences.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SYNA · Synaptics
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+12.0% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.3B
Gross margin 44% 5-yr avg 49%
Operating margin −6.4% 5-yr avg 4.6%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 44% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 41% and operating margin about 3.8% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 20% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

99% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • China46%$493M
  • Taiwan29%$307M
  • Japan13%$138M
  • South Korea7%$72M
  • Other5%$57M
  • United States1%$7M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.7B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$1.7B$1.4B$959M$1.1B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
35%30%29%34%41%46%54%53%46%45%44%Gross marginGross mgn
10%8%9%9%10%11%10%13%17%17%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
19%17%22%23%23%23%21%26%35%32%32%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$75M$65M($62M)($6M)$69M$147M$350M$154M($102M)($94M)($75M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.5%3.8%−3.8%−0.4%5.2%11.0%20.1%11.4%−10.6%−8.8%−6.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$72M$49M($124M)($23M)$119M$80M$258M$74M$126M($48M)($48M)Net incomeNet inc.
4%20%25%28%20%42%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$257M$153M$145M$154M$222M$319M$463M$332M$136M$142M$139MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$31M$33M$39M$36M$27M$22M$24M$27M$28M$29M$30MDepreciationDeprec.
$96M$9M$159M$83M$27M$152M$80M$109M($136M)$48M$11MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$29M$31M$34M$24M$16M$21M$31M$34M$34M$26M$42MCapexCapex
1.7%1.8%2.1%1.6%1.2%1.6%1.8%2.5%3.5%2.4%3.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$228M$122M$111M$131M$206M$298M$432M$297M$102M$116M$97MOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.7%7.1%6.8%8.9%15.4%22.3%24.8%21.9%10.6%10.8%8.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$228M$122M$111M$131M$206M$298M$432M$297M$102M$116M$97MFree cash flowFCF
13.7%7.1%6.8%8.9%15.4%22.3%24.8%21.9%10.6%10.8%8.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$397M$0$627M$501M$16M$0$201M$2MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$241M$88M$94M$119M$30M$0$0$184M$0$128MBuybacksBuybacks
12%9%-6%-1%33%20%20%7%-5%-4%-3%ROICROIC
10%7%-17%-3%15%8%20%6%9%-3%-4%Return on equityROE
10%7%−17%−3%15%8%20%6%9%−3%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$352M$368M$301M$328M$763M$836M$876M$934M$877M$453M$422MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$253M$255M$289M$230M$195M$228M$322M$164M$142M$130M$163MReceivablesReceiv.
$146M$131M$131M$159M$102M$82M$170M$137M$114M$140M$161MInventoryInvent.
$173M$136M$157M$98M$61M$98M$142M$46M$88M$99M$78MAccounts payablePayables
$226M$251M$263M$290M$237M$213M$350M$255M$169M$171M$246MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$780M$792M$740M$731M$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$752M$755MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$351M$310M$284M$254M$244M$787M$463M$260M$277M$271M$248MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×2.6×2.6×2.9×4.4×1.5×3.0×4.9×4.2×2.8×3.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$207M$207M$373M$373M$361M$570M$807M$816M$816M$872M$872MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.7B$2.2B$2.9B$2.6B$2.8B$2.6B$2.5BTotal assetsAssets
$236M$217M$451M$468M$100M$394M$982M$978M$973M$835M$843MTotal debtDebt
($117M)($151M)$150M$141M($663M)($442M)$106M$44M$96M$382M$420MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
15.7×10.8×-2.8×-0.3×3.1×5.0×11.6×2.8×-1.6×-2.4×-1.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$705M$740M$729M$656M$819M$967M$1.3B$1.2B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.4%3.6%4.4%4.0%3.7%4.9%5.8%9.0%12.4%10.5%12.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
37.9M35.6M34.2M34.6M34.8M38.3M40.7M40.2M39.7M39.3M38.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$43.98$48.26$47.67$42.55$38.33$34.98$42.74$33.71$24.17$27.34$30.13Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.91$1.37$-3.63$-0.66$3.41$2.08$6.33$1.83$3.16$-1.22$-1.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.02$3.41$3.24$3.77$5.91$7.78$10.60$7.40$2.57$2.96$2.49Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.02$3.41$3.24$3.77$5.91$7.78$10.60$7.40$2.57$2.96$2.49Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.75$0.88$1.00$0.68$0.47$0.55$0.76$0.85$0.85$0.66$1.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.60$20.79$21.32$18.97$23.54$25.25$31.12$30.93$36.95$35.49$34.93Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.1%/yr−6.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−7.6%/yr−12.9%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.5%/yr+7.0%/yr
Book value / share+7.4%/yr+8.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
39Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−4%low FY2018
Gross margin
45%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.3×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$116Mowner earningsvs.($48M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $48M loss into $116M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($48M)$126M$74M$258M$80M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$29M+$28M+$27M+$24M+$22M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$113M+$119M+$122M+$101M+$66M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$48M−$136M+$109M+$80M+$152M
Cash from operations$142M$136M$332M$463M$319M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$26M−$34M−$34M−$31M−$21M
Owner earnings$116M$102M$297M$432M$298M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%11%22%25%22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $113M), owner earnings is nearer $3M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($94M) ÷ interest expense $40M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $392M + ST investments $61M − debt $841M
    What this means

    Netting $453M of cash and short-term investments against $841M of debt leaves $388M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $20M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $369M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 44 + DIO 86 − DPO 61 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -6%–33%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($74M) ÷ invested capital $1.8B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 7%–25%; latest $116M = operating cash $142M − maintenance capex $26M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $113M of SBC) leaves $3M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($48M) · cash from operations $142M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $128M ÷ Owner Earnings $116M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $116M of Owner Earnings, $128M (110%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $128M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $113M stock comp, the real buyback was about $16M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.89×
    Maintaining
    Capex $26M ÷ depreciation $29M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.78×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $841M vs $481M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.31/share (latest year $-1.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −3% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −10.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Some of our current and potential competitors may offer bundled solutions; introduce new products with disruptive technologies and AI-enhanced features; or benefit from greater brand recognition, longer operating histories, larger customer bases and more extensive resources in sales, R&D, and manufacturing.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$755M
  • Cash & short-term investments$404M
  • Receivables$163M
  • Inventory$161M
  • Other current assets$27M
Current liabilities$248M
  • Debt due within a year$6M
  • Accounts payable$78M
  • Other current liabilities$165M
Current ratio3.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.39×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$507Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $404M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.2× → 3.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$277Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($408M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$885M$43M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$280M · 12%
  • Buybacks$883M · 38%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 50%
  • Returned to owners$883M

    43% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $883M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $607M and cash and short-term investments rose $52M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$82.05

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $312M, about $82.05 each.

  • Net change in share count2.6%

    The diluted count rose from 38M to 39M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $280M of capital spent building

$30M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership0.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio171:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$113M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Synaptics is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$236M → $843M

    Debt rose from $236M to $843M while owner earnings went from about $153M to $172M — about 1.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ARRYArray Technologies Inc.$1.3B23%-1.7%-2%7%
SEDGSolarEdge Technologies Inc.$1.2B31%10.2%14%9%
VIAVViavi Solutions Inc.$1.1B58%5.6%5%8%
SYNASynaptics$1.1B43%4.1%8%12%
SMTCSemtech Corporation$1.0B60%11.8%9%16%
IPGPIPG Photonics Corporation$1.0B46%17.9%10%16%
MTSIMACOM Technology Solutions Holdings Inc.$967M52%11.7%4%20%
ICHRIchor Holdings$948M15%5.2%11%4%
Group median44%7.9%9%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Synaptics has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Synaptics earns about $132M on its 12.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−26%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $97M on 39M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $420M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($42M) runs well above depreciation ($30M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $113M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Synaptics (SYNA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SYNA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SYM its page in the Manual SYY →

Industry order: ← SWKS the Semiconductors chapter TE →