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ARRY, Array Technologies Inc.

Semiconductors asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a leading global provider of solar tracking technology and fixed-tilt systems to utility-scale and distributed generation customers who construct, develop, and operate solar photovoltaic sites.

With solutions engineered to withstand harsh weather conditions, Array's high-quality solar trackers, fixed-tilt systems, software platforms, foundation solutions, and field services combine to optimize energy production and deliver value to our customers for the entire lifecycle of a project.

Trackers move solar panels throughout the day to maintain an optimal orientation to the sun, which significantly increases their energy production.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ARRY · Array Technologies Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.3B

+40.2% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 21%

Operating margin −4.1% 5-yr avg −3.5%

ROIC −15% 5-yr avg −17%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Array U.S. Operations (83%) and STI Operations (17%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 14% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −2.3%) on a 23% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 3 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Array U.S. Operations is 83% of revenue, with STI Operations the other meaningful segment at 17%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Array U.S. Operations83%$1.1B
STI Operations17%$214M

By geographyUnited States81%Spain11%Brazil5%Australia2%Remainder1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$291M	$648M	$873M	$853M	$1.6B	$1.6B	$916M	$1.3B	$1.2B	RevenueRevenue
4%	23%	23%	8%	13%	26%	33%	23%	24%	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	6%	6%	9%	9%	10%	18%	15%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
—	—	—	—	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($61M)	$83M	$95M	($25M)	($18M)	$214M	($227M)	($29M)	($49M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−21.0%	12.9%	10.9%	−2.9%	−1.1%	13.6%	−24.8%	−2.3%	−4.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($61M)	$40M	$59M	($50M)	$4M	$137M	($240M)	($52M)	($67M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	38%	24%	—	—	23%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
($12M)	$386M	($122M)	($263M)	$141M	$232M	$154M	$102M	$85M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$28M	$27M	$27M	$26M	$101M	$39M	$36M	$26M	$29M	DepreciationDeprec.
$21M	$318M	($214M)	($252M)	$21M	$41M	$348M	$112M	$107M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$2M	$1M	$3M	$11M	$17M	$7M	$22M	$27M	CapexCapex
0.7%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	1.1%	0.8%	1.7%	2.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($14M)	$384M	($124M)	($267M)	$131M	$215M	$147M	$80M	$58M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−4.7%	59.3%	−14.2%	−31.2%	8.0%	13.6%	16.0%	6.2%	4.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($14M)	$384M	($124M)	($267M)	$131M	$215M	$147M	$80M	$58M	Free cash flowFCF
−4.7%	59.3%	−14.2%	−31.2%	8.0%	13.6%	16.0%	6.2%	4.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$0	$0	$374M	$0	$0	$165M	$165M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	101%	30%	-7%	-2%	24%	-91%	-10%	-15%	ROICROIC
—	13%	—	—	4%	53%	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
—	13%	—	—	4%	53%	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$41M	$310M	$108M	$368M	$134M	$249M	$363M	$244M	$201M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$96M	$119M	$236M	$421M	$332M	$276M	$272M	$292M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$148M	$118M	$206M	$233M	$162M	$201M	$150M	$168M	InventoryInvent.
—	$130M	$83M	$92M	$170M	$119M	$172M	$144M	$142M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$115M	$154M	$350M	$484M	$375M	$304M	$278M	$318M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$620M	$375M	$852M	$831M	$832M	$999M	$869M	$879M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$591M	$289M	$245M	$465M	$336M	$438M	$377M	$390M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.0×	1.3×	3.5×	1.8×	2.5×	2.3×	2.3×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$70M	$70M	$70M	$416M	$436M	$160M	$135M	$135M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$924M	$656M	$1.1B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total assetsAssets
—	$56M	$428M	$715M	$759M	$682M	$677M	$669M	$666M	Total debtDebt
—	($254M)	$320M	$348M	$625M	$433M	$314M	$425M	$466M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.2×	4.4×	6.3×	-0.7×	-0.5×	4.8×	-6.5×	-1.1×	-2.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	$305M	($81M)	($69M)	$124M	$259M	($118M)	($206M)	($214M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.1%	0.6%	1.6%	0.9%	0.9%	1.1%	1.2%	1.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	—	—	—	$236M	$103M	$103M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
									Per share
120M	120M	122M	130M	150M	152M	152M	153M	153M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.42	$5.40	$7.18	$6.56	$10.93	$10.37	$6.03	$8.42	$7.88	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.51	$0.33	$0.49	$-0.39	$0.03	$0.90	$-1.58	$-0.34	$-0.44	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.12	$3.20	$-1.02	$-2.05	$0.87	$1.41	$0.97	$0.52	$0.38	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.12	$3.20	$-1.02	$-2.05	$0.87	$1.41	$0.97	$0.52	$0.38	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.01	$0.01	$0.03	$0.07	$0.11	$0.05	$0.14	$0.18	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	$2.54	$-0.67	$-0.53	$0.83	$1.71	$-0.78	$-1.35	$-1.40	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+19.5%/yr	+3.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+35.4%/yr	+67.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

153Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−10%low FY2024

Gross margin

23%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

5.3×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$80Mowner earningsvs.($52M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $52M loss into $80M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($52M)	($240M)	$137M	$4M	($50M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$26M	+$36M	+$39M	+$101M	+$26M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$16M	+$10M	+$15M	+$15M	+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$112M	+$348M	+$41M	+$21M	−$252M
Cash from operations	$102M	$154M	$232M	$141M	($263M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$22M	−$7M	−$17M	−$11M	−$3M
Owner earnings	$80M	$147M	$215M	$131M	($267M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	16%	14%	8%	-31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $64M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($29M) ÷ interest expense $27M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $425M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $244M − debt $669M

What this means
Netting $244M of cash and short-term investments against $669M of debt leaves $425M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 80d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 77 + DIO 56 − DPO 53 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range -91%–101%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($23M) ÷ invested capital $218M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range -31%–59%; latest $80M = operating cash $102M − maintenance capex $22M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $64M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $102M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($52M) · cash from operations $102M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.84×

Maintaining

Capex $22M ÷ depreciation $26M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.31×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $669M vs $492M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −508%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.34/share (latest year $-0.34), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.34/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −4% lately, median −2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −21%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth −7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · −24.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“AI could disrupt the business models, operational processes, and markets in which we operate and subject us to increased competition, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$879M

Cash & short-term investments$201M
Receivables$292M
Inventory$168M
Other current assets$218M

Current liabilities$390M

Debt due within a year$9M
Accounts payable$142M
Other current liabilities$239M

Current ratio2.25×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.82×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$489Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $201M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−26.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($574M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($328M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$720M$54M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$170Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $618M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$65M · 11%
Retained (debt / cash)$553M · 89%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $160M.
Net change in share count27.5%
The diluted count rose from 120M to 153M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$374M26% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$539Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $65M of capital spent building

$339M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 63% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$4.3M	$571k	($267M)
2022	$2.1M	$3.0M	$131M
2022	$5.8M	$7.3M	$131M
2023	$5.7M	$5.1M	$215M
2024	$8.9M	−$1.3M	$147M
2025	$6.8M	$11.4M	$80M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Array Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?12.0% vs 13.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 13.5% early in the record and 12.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?27.5%
Diluted shares grew 27.5% over 2018–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DIODDiodes	$1.5B	35%	11.8%	11%	9%
ENPHEnphase Energy	$1.5B	41%	13.2%	16%	22%
PENGPenguin Solutions Inc.	$1.4B	23%	4.0%	7%	5%
CRDOCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd	$1.3B	63%	-11.5%	-6%	-19%
ARRYArray Technologies Inc.	$1.3B	23%	-1.7%	-2%	7%
SEDGSolarEdge Technologies Inc.	$1.2B	31%	10.2%	14%	9%
VIAVViavi Solutions Inc.	$1.1B	58%	5.6%	5%	8%
SYNASynaptics	$1.1B	43%	4.1%	8%	12%
Group median	—	38%	4.9%	8%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Array Technologies Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Array Technologies Inc. earns about $91M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($91M) Net of stock comp (−$17M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($63M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25−7%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $58M on 154M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $466M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($27M) runs well above depreciation ($29M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $63M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ARRY against another business →

The owners of ARRY: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Array Technologies Inc. (ARRY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ARRY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ARR its page in the Manual ARTNA →

Industry order: ← ARM the Semiconductors chapter ASX →