Share count
59Mpeak FY2025
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SEDG, SolarEdge Technologies Inc.
We are a global smart energy technology company that changed the way power is harvested and managed in photovoltaic systems.
Our direct current ("DC"), optimized inverter system maximizes power generation while lowering the cost of energy produced by the PV system for improved return on investment, or ROI.
Additional benefits of the DC optimized inverter system include: comprehensive and advanced safety features, improved design flexibility, efficient integration (DC coupled) with SolarEdge storage solutions, and improved operation and maintenance, or O&M, with remote monitoring at the module-level.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+31.4% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Revenue $311M +41.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −17.7% yr-ago −46.8%
Net income ($57M) yr-ago ($99M)
Net margin −18.5% yr-ago −44.9%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Optimizers (38%) and Inverters (26%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −190% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Optimizers at 38%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Optimizers38%$490M
- Inverters26%$334M
- Batteries22%$285M
- Other Products4%$53M
- Energy Storage Systems1%$16M
- Communication0%$6M
- Mobility Components And Telematics0%$167K
By geographyUnited States56%Europe25%Others12%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $490M | $607M | $937M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $901M | $1.2B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 31% | 35% | 34% | 34% | 32% | 32% | 27% | 24% | −97% | 17% | 19% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 16% | 9% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 7% | 9% | 9% | 9% | 11% | 11% | 9% | 11% | 31% | 19% | 16% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $72M | $91M | $139M | $190M | $143M | $207M | $166M | $40M | ($1.7B) | ($302M) | ($254M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.6% | 15.0% | 14.9% | 13.3% | 9.8% | 10.5% | 5.3% | 1.4% | −189.5% | −25.5% | −19.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $77M | $84M | $129M | $147M | $140M | $169M | $442M | $34M | ($1.8B) | ($405M) | ($364M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -6% | 16% | 7% | 19% | 14% | 10% | 16% | 57% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $53M | $137M | $189M | $259M | $223M | $214M | $31M | ($180M) | ($313M) | $104M | $95M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $4M | $7M | $11M | $17M | $22M | $40M | $50M | $57M | $60M | $31M | $24M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($37M) | $28M | $18M | $35M | ($7M) | ($97M) | ($606M) | ($422M) | $1.3B | $387M | $354M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $16M | $21M | $39M | $73M | $127M | $149M | $169M | $171M | $108M | $23M | $17M | CapexCapex |
| 3.2% | 3.5% | 4.1% | 5.1% | 8.7% | 7.6% | 5.4% | 5.7% | 12.0% | 2.0% | 1.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $49M | $130M | $178M | $242M | $200M | $175M | ($18M) | ($237M) | ($373M) | $81M | $78M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 10.0% | 21.4% | 19.0% | 17.0% | 13.7% | 8.9% | −0.6% | −8.0% | −41.4% | 6.8% | 6.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $37M | $115M | $150M | $186M | $96M | $65M | ($138M) | ($351M) | ($421M) | $81M | $78M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.5% | 19.0% | 16.1% | 13.1% | 6.6% | 3.3% | −4.4% | −11.8% | −46.8% | 6.8% | 6.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $95M | $38M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $17M | $10M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $50M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 39% | 33% | 34% | 26% | 15% | 13% | 7% | 1% | -189% | -78% | -39% | ROICROIC |
| 27% | 21% | 23% | 18% | 13% | 13% | 20% | 1% | -274% | -95% | -89% | Return on equityROE |
| 27% | 21% | 23% | 18% | 13% | 13% | 20% | 1% | −274% | −95% | −89% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $223M | $344M | $381M | $435M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $628M | $493M | $542M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $71M | $110M | $174M | $298M | $219M | $456M | $905M | $622M | $160M | $267M | $223M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $67M | $83M | $142M | $171M | $332M | $380M | $729M | $1.4B | $646M | $553M | $597M | InventoryInvent. |
| $34M | $69M | $107M | $157M | $162M | $252M | $460M | $386M | $108M | $272M | $405M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $104M | $123M | $208M | $312M | $388M | $584M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $699M | $548M | $415M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $340M | $477M | $677M | $933M | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $70M | $130M | $226M | $437M | $436M | $525M | $890M | $893M | $1.1B | $803M | $897M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.8× | 3.7× | 3.0× | 2.1× | 3.9× | 3.3× | 3.3× | 3.7× | 1.9× | 2.2× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | $35M | $130M | $140M | $130M | $31M | $43M | $48M | $50M | $50M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $425M | $641M | $964M | $1.5B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $2.6B | $2.2B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | $11M | $16M | $573M | $622M | $624M | $627M | $330M | $332M | $622M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | ($370M) | ($419M) | ($545M) | ($559M) | ($1.0B) | ($640M) | ($298M) | ($162M) | $80M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | 55.0× | 39.5× | 26.7× | 342.4× | 108.6× | 31.7× | -1477.8× | -219.2× | -184.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $289M | $397M | $562M | $812M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $658M | $427M | $411M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.9% | 2.9% | 3.3% | 4.2% | 4.6% | 5.2% | 4.7% | 5.0% | 15.2% | 7.8% | 6.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 44.4M | 45.4M | 48.0M | 50.2M | 52.8M | 56.0M | 58.1M | 57.2M | 57.1M | 59.0M | 60.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.04 | $13.36 | $19.53 | $28.40 | $27.64 | $35.09 | $53.53 | $52.00 | $15.79 | $20.09 | $21.08 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.73 | $1.85 | $2.69 | $2.92 | $2.66 | $3.02 | $7.60 | $0.60 | $-31.64 | $-6.88 | $-6.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.10 | $2.85 | $3.70 | $4.82 | $3.79 | $3.12 | $-0.32 | $-4.15 | $-6.54 | $1.37 | $1.29 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.83 | $2.54 | $3.14 | $3.71 | $1.82 | $1.16 | $-2.38 | $-6.13 | $-7.38 | $1.37 | $1.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.35 | $0.47 | $0.80 | $1.45 | $2.40 | $2.67 | $2.91 | $2.98 | $1.89 | $0.40 | $0.28 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.51 | $8.75 | $11.72 | $16.17 | $20.57 | $23.41 | $37.46 | $42.14 | $11.53 | $7.25 | $6.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.9%/yr | −6.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +2.5%/yr | −18.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.3%/yr | −30.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.2%/yr | −18.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−78%low FY2024
Gross margin
17%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-2.0×peak FY2019
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$81Mowner earningsvs.($405M)net incomelow FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $405M loss into $81M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($405M) | ($1.8B) | $34M | $442M | $169M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$31M | +$60M | +$57M | +$50M | +$40M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$93M | +$137M | +$150M | +$146M | +$103M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$387M | +$1.3B | −$422M | −$606M | −$97M |
| Cash from operations | $104M | ($313M) | ($180M) | $31M | $214M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$23M | −$60M | −$57M | −$50M | −$40M |
| Owner earnings | $81M | ($373M) | ($237M) | ($18M) | $175M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$48M | −$113M | −$120M | −$110M |
| Free cash flow | $81M | ($421M) | ($351M) | ($138M) | $65M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | -41% | -8% | -1% | 9% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $93M), owner earnings is nearer ($12M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K/A · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -219.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($302M) ÷ interest expense $1M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $455M + ST investments $38M − debt $622M
What this means
Netting $493M of cash and short-term investments against $622M of debt leaves $128M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 82 + DIO 204 − DPO 100 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -189%–39%; -40% latest = NOPAT ($238M) ÷ invested capital $594MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -40% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -41%–21%; latest $81M = operating cash $104M − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $93M of SBC) leaves ($12M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($405M) · cash from operations $104M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $81M
What this means
Of $81M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.77×HarvestingCapex $23M ÷ depreciation $31M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $622M vs $936M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −852%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-11.93/share (latest year $-6.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 15% → −71% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to −71% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Worst year 2024 · −189.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Furthermore, AI technology and services are highly competitive, rapidly evolving, and require significant investment, including technical infrastructure, development and operational costs, to meet the changing needs and expectations of our existing users and attract new users.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.8B
- Cash & short-term investments$542M
- Receivables$223M
- Inventory$597M
- Other current assets$456M
Current liabilities$897M
- Debt due within a year$3M
- Accounts payable$405M
- Other current liabilities$489M
Current ratio2.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$919Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $542M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+41.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.1× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$354Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$58M$51M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$352Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $716M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$896M · 125%
- Buybacks$50M · 7%
- Returned to owners$50M
12% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $50M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$230M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $230M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: the long-term investment portfolio drew down $44M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $50M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count36.4%
The diluted count rose from 44M to 61M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$57M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$160Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $896M of capital spent building
$92M written down across 2 years (2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 58% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$93M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why SolarEdge Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−14.2% vs 16.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.8% early in the record and −14.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.4%
Diluted shares grew 36.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $50M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?28% → 64% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $138M to $820M while revenue grew 160%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (28% of revenue then, 64% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENPHEnphase Energy | $1.5B | 41% | 13.2% | 16% | 22% |
| PENGPenguin Solutions Inc. | $1.4B | 23% | 4.0% | 7% | 5% |
| CRDOCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd | $1.3B | 63% | -11.5% | -6% | -19% |
| ARRYArray Technologies Inc. | $1.3B | 23% | -1.7% | -2% | 7% |
| SEDGSolarEdge Technologies Inc. | $1.2B | 31% | 10.2% | 14% | 9% |
| VIAVViavi Solutions Inc. | $1.1B | 58% | 5.6% | 5% | 8% |
| SYNASynaptics | $1.1B | 43% | 4.1% | 8% | 12% |
| SMTCSemtech Corporation | $1.0B | 60% | 11.8% | 9% | 16% |
| Group median | — | 42% | 4.9% | 8% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SolarEdge Technologies Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $78M on 61M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $80M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SolarEdge Technologies Inc. (SEDG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SEDG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SEB its page in the Manual SEE →
Industry order: ← RMBS the Semiconductors chapter SHLS →