← All companies ← TSN Manual TT → ← TRI Professional Services

TSSI, TSS Inc.

Professional Services capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

TSS Inc. provides a comprehensive suite of services for the integration of complex Artificial Intelligence technologies, planning, design, deployment, maintenance and refresh of end-user and enterprise systems, including the mission-critical facilities in which they are housed.

We provide a single source solution for enabling technologies in data centers, operations centers, network facilities, server rooms, security operations centers, communications facilities and the infrastructure systems that are critical to their function.

Our services consist of technology consulting, design and engineering, project management, systems integration, systems installation, facilities management and IT procurement services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TSSI · TSS Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$246M

+65.9% YoY · 40% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $202M 5-yr avg $101M

Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 20%

Operating margin 2.9% 5-yr avg 1.2%

ROIC 20% 5-yr avg 69%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Procurement Revenues (80%), System Integration Services (16%) and Facilities (3%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 13% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 1.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −3.0% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −56 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Procurement Revenues is 80% of revenue, with System Integration Services the other meaningful segment at 16%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Procurement Revenues80%$197M
System Integration Services16%$40M
Facilities3%$8M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$27M	$18M	$22M	$33M	$45M	$27M	$31M	$54M	$148M	$246M	$202M	RevenueRevenue
—	—	38%	20%	15%	23%	29%	20%	15%	13%	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
30%	35%	29%	18%	15%	24%	25%	16%	9%	8%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($633K)	$1M	$3M	$480K	($400K)	($831K)	$914K	($221K)	$6M	$6M	$6M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−2.3%	6.0%	12.8%	1.5%	−0.9%	−3.0%	3.0%	−0.4%	3.9%	2.6%	2.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1M)	$766K	$2M	$126K	$79K	($1M)	($73K)	$74K	$6M	$15M	$14M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	1%	1%	25%	39%	—	—	45%	3%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$2M	($45K)	$2M	$3M	$10M	($10M)	$15M	($8M)	$15M	$35M	($702K)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$602K	$481K	$385K	$370K	$529K	$536K	$383K	$320K	$608K	$1M	$1M	DepreciationDeprec.
$2M	($1M)	($1M)	$2M	$9M	($10M)	$14M	($9M)	$7M	$15M	($20M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$290K	$212K	$242K	$594K	$396K	$64K	$536K	$257K	$8M	$33M	$18M	CapexCapex
1.1%	1.2%	1.1%	1.8%	0.9%	0.2%	1.7%	0.5%	5.7%	13.3%	9.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2M	($257K)	$2M	$3M	$10M	($11M)	$14M	($9M)	$15M	$34M	($2M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.1%	−1.4%	7.4%	8.1%	21.3%	−38.4%	46.8%	−15.7%	9.9%	13.7%	−0.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M	($257K)	$2M	$2M	$10M	($11M)	$14M	($9M)	$7M	$2M	($19M)	Free cash flowFCF
7.1%	−1.4%	7.4%	7.4%	21.3%	−38.4%	46.3%	−15.7%	4.6%	0.9%	−9.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1K	$4K	$6K	$158K	$174K	$197K	$134K	$40K	$4M	$5M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	98%	4%	2%	-59%	-2%	2%	84%	20%	18%	Return on equityROE
—	—	98%	4%	2%	−59%	−2%	2%	84%	20%	18%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2M	$2M	$6M	$9M	$19M	$8M	$20M	$12M	$23M	$86M	$66M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$2M	$990K	$727K	$4M	$915K	$2M	$3M	$4M	$16M	$13M	$11M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$59K	$134K	$108K	$1M	$197K	$847K	$862K	$2M	$18M	$16M	$8M	InventoryInvent.
$4M	$1M	$944K	$8M	$13M	$5M	$20M	$12M	$36M	$46M	$23M	Accounts payablePayables
($1M)	($289K)	($109K)	($3M)	($11M)	($3M)	($16M)	($7M)	($2M)	($18M)	($5M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$5M	$4M	$7M	$14M	$21M	$12M	$24M	$19M	$58M	$119M	$89M	Current assetsCur. assets
$9M	$5M	$5M	$12M	$18M	$12M	$24M	$18M	$57M	$73M	$41M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×	0.7×	1.6×	1.2×	1.2×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.6×	2.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M	$2M	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	$780K	GoodwillGoodwill
$9M	$7M	$9M	$18M	$24M	$19M	$31M	$26M	$97M	$185M	$154M	Total assetsAssets
$1M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$0	$0	$8M	$18M	$17M	Total debtDebt
($1M)	($612K)	($4M)	($7M)	($17M)	($6M)	($20M)	($12M)	($15M)	($67M)	($49M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.7×	3.4×	7.1×	1.5×	-1.1×	-1.9×	1.0×	-0.1×	2.1×	—	1.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1M)	($305K)	$2M	$3M	$3M	$2M	$3M	$4M	$7M	$77M	$79M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	0.4%	1.1%	1.1%	0.9%	1.7%	1.7%	1.1%	0.8%	1.6%	2.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
15.4M	16.5M	18.7M	20.9M	21.0M	18.4M	20.1M	22.0M	25.1M	27.2M	29.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.78	$1.11	$1.20	$1.57	$2.15	$1.49	$1.53	$2.47	$5.91	$9.03	$6.88	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.07	$0.05	$0.13	$0.01	$0.00	$-0.07	$-0.00	$0.00	$0.24	$0.56	$0.49	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.13	$-0.02	$0.09	$0.13	$0.46	$-0.57	$0.71	$-0.39	$0.59	$1.24	$-0.06	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.13	$-0.02	$0.09	$0.12	$0.46	$-0.57	$0.71	$-0.39	$0.27	$0.08	$-0.65	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.01	$0.01	$0.03	$0.02	$0.00	$0.03	$0.01	$0.34	$1.20	$0.63	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.09	$-0.02	$0.13	$0.14	$0.15	$0.12	$0.15	$0.16	$0.28	$2.82	$2.68	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+19.8%/yr	+33.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+28.9%/yr	+22.1%/yr
EPS	—	+171.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+58.7%/yr	+129.6%/yr
Book value / share	—	+79.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

27Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

13%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$34Mowner earningsvs.$15Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $34M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1M it takes just to hold its position. It put $32M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2M.

Reported net income$15M

Owner earnings$34M · 14% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$15M	$6M	$74K	($73K)	($1M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1M	+$608K	+$320K	+$383K	+$536K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$4M	+$1M	+$581K	+$530K	+$469K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$15M	+$7M	−$9M	+$14M	−$10M
Cash from operations	$35M	$15M	($8M)	$15M	($10M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$1M	−$608K	−$257K	−$383K	−$64K
Owner earnings	$34M	$15M	($9M)	$14M	($11M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$32M	−$8M	—	−$153K	—
Free cash flow	$2M	$7M	($9M)	$14M	($11M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	10%	-16%	47%	-38%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $32M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer $30M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.3×

Adequate

Operating income $6M ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$67M

Net cash

Cash $86M − debt $18M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $67M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -33d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 19 + DIO 27 − DPO 79 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 69%

Very high (≥25%)

NOPAT $6M ÷ invested capital $9M (debt + equity − cash)

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -38%–47%; latest $34M = operating cash $35M − maintenance capex $1M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put $32M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves $30M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.30×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $35M ÷ net income $15M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 15%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $5M ÷ Owner Earnings $34M

What this means
Of $34M Owner Earnings, $5M (15%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $5M buybacks. Net of $4M stock comp, the real buyback was about $948K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 29.96×

Expanding

Capex $33M ÷ depreciation $1M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $246M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.63×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $18M vs $46M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +871%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.25/share (latest year $0.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 6% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to 2% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +45%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 45% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −3.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +6.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Although our long-term AI rack integration agreement signed in 2024 and subsequently amended in 2025 passes much of the risk for supply chain disruptions to our customer through the use of minimum quantity commitments as it relates to AI rack integration, we are still exposed to these issues in our procurement business…”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$89M

Cash & short-term investments$66M
Receivables$11M
Inventory$8M
Other current assets$4M

Current liabilities$41M

Debt due within a year$4M
Accounts payable$23M
Other current liabilities$13M

Current ratio2.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.99×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.62×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$48Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $66M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−44.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 2.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$78Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$14MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$40M$23M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $63M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$44M · 69%
Buybacks$10M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$9M · 15%

Returned to owners$10M
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $16M and cash and short-term investments rose $64M.
Average price paid for buybacks$2.94
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $5M, about $2.94 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $0.19 (2017) to $5.95 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($4M).
Net change in share count90.8%
The diluted count rose from 15M to 29M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained101%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($12M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $12M, so each retained $1 added about 1.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Darryll Dewan	$594k	$406k	($9M)
2024	Darryll Dewan	$893k	$18.8M	$15M
2025	Darryll Dewan	$3.1M	$810k	$34M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership16%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$4M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 63% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TSS Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?90.8%
Diluted shares grew 90.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $10M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1M → $17M
Debt rose from $1M to $17M while owner earnings went from about $1M to $13M — about 1.0 year of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NCNACCO Industries Inc.	$277M	13%	21.3%	12%	21%
NPKINPK International Inc.	$277M	19%	3.8%	3%	1%
ASPNAspen Aerogels Inc.	$271M	17%	-21.1%	-22%	-11%
VMDViemed Healthcare Inc.	$270M	61%	9.2%	12%	10%
TSSITSS Inc.	$246M	20%	2.0%	69%	8%
GHMGraham Corporation	$245M	22%	1.9%	3%	6%
VFFVillage Farms International Inc.	$216M	13%	-3.6%	-4%	-1%
RMRThe RMR Group Inc.	$183M	—	36.0%	158%	38%
Group median	—	19%	2.9%	8%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TSS Inc. has delivered.

TSS Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, TSS Inc. earns about $19M on its 7.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($19M) Net of stock comp (−$4M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($2M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+89%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+45%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($19M) on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $49M. The if-converted diluted count is 29M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($18M) runs well above depreciation ($1M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($2M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TSSI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TSS Inc. (TSSI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TSSI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TSN its page in the Manual TT →

Industry order: ← TRI the Professional Services chapter