Owner Scorecard


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TRI, Thomson Reuters Corporation

Professional Services capital-intensive

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 40-F
TRI · Thomson Reuters Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.5B
+3.0% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $7.5B 5-yr avg $6.9B
Operating margin 28.5% 5-yr avg 27.8%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 24%
Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 20% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 12% to 34% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 8.5% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$11.2B$5.3B$5.5B$5.9B$6.0B$6.3B$6.6B$6.8B$7.3B$7.5B$7.5BRevenueRevenue
$1.4B$1.0B$780M$1.2B$1.9B$1.2B$1.8B$2.3B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.4%19.5%14.2%20.3%32.2%19.6%27.7%34.3%29.1%28.5%28.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.1B$1.4B$3.9B$1.6B$1.1B$5.7B$1.3B$2.7B$2.2B$1.5B$1.5BNet incomeNet inc.
-0%3%6%22%16%13%-6%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.0B$2.0B$2.1B$702M$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.3B$2.5B$2.7B$2.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.0B$995M$110M$154M$184M$177M$140M$116M$113M$111M$995MDepreciationDeprec.
($1.1B)($361M)($2.0B)($1.0B)$439M($4.1B)$437M($470M)$134M$1.0B$154MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$519M$576M$505M$504M$487M$595M$544M$607M$634M$634MCapexCapex
9.8%10.5%8.6%8.4%7.7%9.0%8.0%8.4%8.5%8.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.5B$1.5B$197M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
28.5%27.0%3.3%20.7%20.3%19.9%26.4%25.5%27.0%27.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.5B$1.5B$197M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0BFree cash flowFCF
28.5%27.0%3.3%20.7%20.3%19.9%26.4%25.5%27.0%27.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$980M$956M$900M$698M$730M$773M$834M$887M$944M$1.0B$1.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
$1.7B$1.0B$1.2B$488M$200M$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$639M$1.0BBuybacksBuybacks
8%5%8%10%15%6%10%15%16%12%15%ROICROIC
24%11%43%16%11%41%11%24%18%13%16%Return on equityROE
17%3%33%9%4%36%4%16%11%4%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2.6B$972M$2.8B$1.4B$2.4B$886M$1.3B$1.4B$2.0B$605M$605MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B$1.5B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$32M$31M$33M$23M$26M$28M$29M$20M$21M$23M$23MInventoryInvent.
$1.4B$1.5B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$4.6B$3.0B$4.5B$3.1B$4.0B$2.5B$2.8B$2.9B$3.5B$2.2B$2.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.6B$4.8B$2.7B$3.2B$2.7B$2.6B$4.9B$3.2B$3.4B$3.5B$3.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.6×1.7×1.0×1.5×1.0×0.6×0.9×1.0×0.6×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$14.5B$15.0B$5.1B$5.9B$6.0B$5.9B$5.9B$6.7B$7.3B$7.9B$7.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$27.9B$26.5B$17.0B$17.3B$17.9B$22.1B$21.7B$18.7B$18.4B$17.9B$17.9BTotal assetsAssets
$7.4B$7.0B$3.2B$3.3B$3.9B$3.8B$4.8B$3.3B$2.8B$2.1B$2.1BTotal debtDebt
$4.8B$6.1B$434M$1.9B$1.5B$2.9B$3.5B$1.9B$817M$1.5B$1.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$12.8B$13.1B$9.2B$9.6B$10.0B$13.8B$11.9B$11.1B$12.0B$11.9B$9.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
747M718M667M500M496M493M484M463M450M449M449MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.95$7.38$8.25$11.80$12.06$12.87$13.70$14.67$16.11$16.66$16.66Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.15$1.94$5.90$3.13$2.26$11.54$2.77$5.82$4.91$3.35$3.35EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.10$2.23$0.39$2.50$2.61$2.73$3.88$4.11$4.49$4.49Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.10$2.23$0.39$2.50$2.61$2.73$3.88$4.11$4.49$4.49Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.31$1.33$1.35$1.39$1.47$1.57$1.72$1.92$2.10$2.31$2.31Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.72$0.86$1.01$1.02$0.99$1.23$1.17$1.35$1.41$1.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.11$18.21$13.83$19.10$20.11$28.05$24.57$23.89$26.65$26.54$20.55Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.2%/yr+6.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.0%/yr (8-yr)+12.4%/yr
EPS−2.4%/yr+8.2%/yr
Dividends / share+6.5%/yr+9.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.7%/yr (8-yr)+6.8%/yr
Book value / share+5.0%/yr+5.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
449Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
12%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.8×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.0Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.5B of profit into $2.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.5B
Owner earnings$2.0B · 27% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.5B$2.2B$2.7B$1.3B$5.7B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$111M+$113M+$116M+$140M+$177M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.0B+$134M−$470M+$437M−$4.1B
Cash from operations$2.7B$2.5B$2.3B$1.9B$1.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$634M−$607M−$544M−$595M−$487M
Owner earnings$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.3B$1.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue27%25%26%20%20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 0.7× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $511M + ST investments $94M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $605M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 0.7× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–16%; 15% latest = NOPAT $1.7B ÷ invested capital $10.8B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 3%–29%; latest $2.0B = operating cash $2.7B − maintenance capex $634M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 9 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.7B ÷ net income $1.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.0B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $2.0B of Owner Earnings, $2.0B (101%) went back to shareholders, $1.0B dividends, $1.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.64×
    Harvesting
    Capex $634M ÷ depreciation $995M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.64×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs ($1.2B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −24%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.76/share (latest year $3.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 31% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 12.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −5.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$605M
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Inventory$23M
  • Other current assets$435M
Current liabilities$3.5B
  • Debt due within a year$795M
  • Other current liabilities$2.7B
Current ratio0.64×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$795M due · $605M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.8B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.4B$249M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $17.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$5.0B · 28%
  • Dividends$7.8B · 44%
  • Buybacks$8.3B · 47%
  • Returned to owners$16.0B

    126% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $7.8B as dividends and $8.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$3.3B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $8.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−37.5%

    The diluted count fell from 718M to 449M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.31/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained15%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $824M, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$11.0B61% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity86%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.0B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Thomson Reuters Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.84×

    Across the record the business reported $24.5B of net income but generated $20.7B of operating cash, a 0.84-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Professional Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TRIThomson Reuters Corporation$7.5B24.0%10%25%
QUADQuad Graphics Inc$2.4B20%1.9%8%3%
ACCOAcco Brands Corporation$1.5B33%7.1%8%8%
EBFEnnis Inc.$392M30%12.7%16%12%
Group median9.9%9%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Thomson Reuters Corporation reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Thomson Reuters Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Thomson Reuters Corporation earns about $1.9B on its 25.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 27.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.0B on 449M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Thomson Reuters Corporation (TRI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TRI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TOYO its page in the Manual TRMD →

Industry order: ← SUPX the Professional Services chapter TSSI →