Owner Scorecard


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RMR, The RMR Group Inc.

Professional Services capital-intensive Cyclical

RMR Group Inc., or RMR Inc., is a holding company and substantially all of its business is conducted by its majority owned subsidiary, The RMR Group LLC, or RMR LLC.

SVC (Nasdaq: SVC) owns a diverse portfolio of hotels and service-focused retail net lease properties.

RMR LLC's wholly owned subsidiary, Tremont Realty Capital LLC, or Tremont, an investment adviser registered with the SEC, provides advisory services for Seven Hills Realty Trust, or SEVN.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RMR · The RMR Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$183M
−5.8% YoY · −21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $199M 5-yr avg $284M
Operating margin 30.2% 5-yr avg 30.1%
Owner-earnings margin 46% 5-yr avg 35%
Free cash flow margin 46% 5-yr avg 35%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 28% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 12% and 62% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 158%, above 15% in 4 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 38% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$267M$272M$405M$713M$590M$607M$200M$236M$194M$183M$199MRevenueRevenue
9%9%7%4%4%4%16%15%23%23%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$147M$136M$252M$198M$69M$72M$88M$114M$45M$42M$60MOperating incomeOp. inc.
55.0%49.9%62.2%27.7%11.7%11.9%44.2%48.2%23.2%22.9%30.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$37M$42M$96M$75M$29M$36M$34M$57M$23M$18M$21MNet incomeNet inc.
40%40%38%27%29%27%28%28%33%30%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$100M$126M$228M$198M$77M$72M$101M$109M$61M$76M$97MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$2M$1M$1M$968K$973K$993K$1M$5M$12M$16MDepreciationDeprec.
$52M$74M$121M$114M$40M$23M$56M$38M$23M$37M$48MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1M$827K$648K$702K$601K$1M$1M$4M$4M$4M$5MCapexCapex
0.4%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.6%1.7%2.0%2.0%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$99M$125M$228M$198M$77M$71M$100M$105M$58M$72M$92MOwner earningsOwner earn.
37.0%46.0%56.3%27.7%13.0%11.6%50.1%44.6%29.7%39.5%46.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$99M$125M$228M$198M$77M$71M$100M$105M$58M$72M$92MFree cash flowFCF
37.0%46.0%56.3%27.7%13.0%11.6%50.1%44.6%29.7%39.5%46.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M$0$0$0$0$79M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$17M$16M$16M$23M$25M$140M$26M$27M$28M$30M$31MDividends paidDiv. paid
$91K$358K$987K$827K$523K$834K$547K$734K$1M$903KBuybacksBuybacks
158%199%363%21%10%ROICROIC
31%28%41%26%10%18%16%24%10%8%9%Return on equityROE
16%18%34%18%1%−53%4%13%−2%−6%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$66M$109M$257M$358M$370M$160M$189M$268M$142M$62M$80MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$21M$30M$39M$31M$29MReceivablesReceiv.
$21M$26M$28M$20M$17M$15M$17M$23M$32M$39M$45MAccounts payablePayables
$4M$7M$7M($8M)($16M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$95M$141M$296M$458M$456M$255M$303M$386M$294M$193M$178MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$21M$26M$28M$91M$82M$81M$109M$106M$133M$118M$102MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.6×5.3×10.5×5.0×5.6×3.1×2.8×3.7×2.2×1.6×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$72M$72M$72MGoodwillGoodwill
$338M$384M$499M$661M$690M$498M$542M$582M$700M$718M$685MTotal assetsAssets
$0$45M$136M$137MTotal debtDebt
($268M)($96M)$74M$57MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
57.4×9.7×7.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$122M$150M$233M$289M$296M$195M$207M$240M$238M$228M$228MShareholders’ equityEquity
3.2%2.6%2.6%1.3%1.3%2.0%5.1%5.3%5.5%5.3%6.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
16.0M16.0M16.1M16.1M15.6M15.6M15.7M16.4M16.5M16.6M16.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$16.68$16.93$25.12$44.19$37.80$38.82$12.76$14.38$11.73$10.98$11.86Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.33$2.64$5.96$4.62$1.85$2.28$2.17$3.48$1.40$1.06$1.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.16$7.80$14.13$12.24$4.93$4.52$6.39$6.41$3.48$4.33$5.50Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.16$7.80$14.13$12.24$4.93$4.52$6.39$6.41$3.48$4.33$5.50Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.08$1.00$1.00$1.41$1.59$8.94$1.64$1.62$1.72$1.82$1.82Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.07$0.05$0.04$0.04$0.04$0.07$0.07$0.24$0.23$0.22$0.32Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.60$9.32$14.44$17.88$18.97$12.47$13.18$14.62$14.37$13.68$13.59Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2020 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−4.5%/yr−21.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.8%/yr−2.6%/yr
EPS−8.4%/yr−10.5%/yr
Dividends / share+6.0%/yr+2.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.1%/yr+41.6%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr−6.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
17Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
10%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.0×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$72Mowner earningsvs.$18Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $18M of profit into $72M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$18M
Owner earnings$72M · 39% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$18M$23M$57M$34M$36M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12M+$5M+$1M+$993K+$973K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$10M+$11M+$12M+$10M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$37M+$23M+$38M+$56M+$23M
Cash from operations$76M$61M$109M$101M$72M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$4M−$4M−$4M−$1M−$1M
Owner earnings$72M$58M$105M$100M$71M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue39%30%45%50%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer $62M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $42M ÷ interest expense $4M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $74M · 1.8× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $62M − debt $136M
    What this means

    Netting $62M of cash and short-term investments against $136M of debt leaves $74M owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (3.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 10%–363%; 10% latest = NOPAT $29M ÷ invested capital $302M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 12%–56%; latest $72M = operating cash $76M − maintenance capex $4M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year, a 37% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $62M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $76M ÷ net income $18M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $31M ÷ Owner Earnings $72M
    What this means

    Of $72M Owner Earnings, $31M (43%) went back to shareholders, $30M dividends, $903K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($10M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.32×
    Harvesting
    Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $183M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.64×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $136M vs $75M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −44%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.17/share (latest year $1.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 56% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 56% early to 31% lately, median 28% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 11.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We incorporate artificial intelligence into some of our business workflows and processes, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, legal liability, and increased regulatory costs and adversely affect our results of operations.…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$178M
  • Cash & short-term investments$80M
  • Receivables$29M
  • Other current assets$69M
Current liabilities$102M
  • Accounts payable$45M
  • Other current liabilities$57M
Current ratio1.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$75Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−12.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$134Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($103M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$65M$21M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$18M · 2%
  • Dividends$348M · 30%
  • Buybacks$7M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$777M · 68%
  • Returned to owners$355M

    31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $348M as dividends and $7M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $7M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count4.6%

    The diluted count rose from 16M to 17M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.82/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−79%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($92M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $72M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.79 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Adam Portnoy$4.3M$4.4M$71M
2022Adam Portnoy$4.1M$4.0M$100M
2023Adam Portnoy$4.2M$4.2M$105M
2024Adam Portnoy$4.9M$5.0M$58M
2025Adam Portnoy$4.8M$4.4M$72M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$10M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why The RMR Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?37.9% vs 46.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 46.4% early in the record and 37.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.6%

    Diluted shares grew 4.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $7M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TSSITSS Inc.$246M20%2.0%69%8%
NMAXNewsmax Inc.$189M-52.8%-92%-57%
RMRThe RMR Group Inc.$183M36.0%158%38%
NSSCNAPCO Security Technologies Inc.$182M43%13.4%23%9%
MXMagnachip Semiconductor Corporation$179M24%2.5%8%-5%
PACBPacific Biosciences of California Inc.$160M38%-146.8%-51%-88%
DMLPDorchester Minerals L.P. Common$153M67.0%87%
CLFDClearfield Inc.$150M40%8.1%9%6%
Group median5.3%9%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The RMR Group Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $92M on 15M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2024-09-30; net debt $57M. The if-converted diluted count is 17M, 12% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($16M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $94M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "The RMR Group Inc. (RMR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RMR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RMNI its page in the Manual RNG →

Industry order: ← PAYX the Professional Services chapter ROMA →