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KE, Kimball Electronics Inc.
We deliver a package of value that includes durable, high-reliability electronics, higher level and final assemblies, and contract manufacturing organization solutions.
Our CMO solutions support the production of medical disposables and drug delivery devices, from precision molded plastics and cold chain management to drug integration.
Customers and industry trade publications regularly award us for our design and manufacturing expertise that, coupled with robust processes and procedures, help us ensure that we deliver the highest levels of quality, reliability, and innovative service throughout the entire life cycle of our customers' products.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Automotive (50%), Medical (27%) and Industrial (24%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 8.0% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 2.7%–5.1% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Automotive at 50%.
- Automotive50%$738M
- Medical27%$396M
- Industrial24%$353M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $931M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 8% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 9% | 8% | 9% | 8% | 7% | 8% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $43M | $42M | $42M | $32M | $66M | $53M | $88M | $49M | $46M | $53M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.6% | 3.9% | 3.6% | 2.7% | 5.1% | 3.9% | 4.8% | 2.9% | 3.1% | 3.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $34M | $17M | $32M | $18M | $57M | $31M | $56M | $21M | $17M | $26M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 23% | — | 18% | 28% | 19% | 29% | 25% | 19% | 35% | 34% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $47M | $40M | ($7M) | $73M | $130M | ($83M) | ($14M) | $73M | $184M | $108M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $24M | $26M | $29M | $31M | $34M | $29M | $32M | $38M | $37M | $38M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($15M) | ($8M) | ($73M) | $20M | $35M | ($150M) | ($109M) | $7M | $123M | $36M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $33M | $26M | $25M | $38M | $38M | $74M | $89M | $46M | $33M | $53M | CapexCapex |
| 3.6% | 2.4% | 2.1% | 3.2% | 3.0% | 5.5% | 4.9% | 2.7% | 2.2% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $23M | $14M | ($31M) | $34M | $92M | ($113M) | ($46M) | $27M | $151M | $70M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.5% | 1.3% | −2.7% | 2.9% | 7.1% | −8.3% | −2.5% | 1.6% | 10.1% | 4.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $14M | $14M | ($31M) | $34M | $92M | ($157M) | ($103M) | $27M | $151M | $55M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.5% | 1.3% | −2.7% | 2.9% | 7.1% | −11.6% | −5.7% | 1.6% | 10.1% | 3.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $2M | $0 | $44M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $22M | $10M | $23M | $9M | $3M | $9M | $0 | $3M | $12M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 7% | 8% | 6% | 14% | 7% | 9% | 5% | 5% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 5% | 9% | 5% | 13% | 7% | 11% | 4% | 3% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 10% | 5% | 9% | 5% | 13% | 7% | 11% | 4% | 3% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $45M | $46M | $49M | $65M | $106M | $50M | $43M | $78M | $89M | $82M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $170M | $174M | $226M | $180M | $203M | $223M | $308M | $282M | $223M | $226M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $145M | $202M | $204M | $219M | $200M | $396M | $450M | $338M | $274M | $273M | InventoryInvent. |
| $155M | $188M | $197M | $204M | $217M | $300M | $322M | $214M | $219M | $229M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $160M | $187M | $232M | $195M | $187M | $318M | $436M | $407M | $277M | $270M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $388M | $437M | $555M | $558M | $583M | $761M | $929M | $847M | $700M | $707M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $199M | $229M | $275M | $273M | $301M | $409M | $475M | $375M | $319M | $336M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.2× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $6M | $6M | $18M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $6M | $6M | $6M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $555M | $609M | $764M | $775M | $814M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $0 | $92M | $92M | $40M | $145M | $235M | $295M | $147M | $163M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($46M) | $42M | $27M | ($66M) | $95M | $192M | $217M | $58M | $80M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 157.9× | 79.8× | 10.3× | 7.2× | 30.3× | 19.8× | 5.4× | 2.2× | 3.1× | 5.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $342M | $356M | $370M | $379M | $442M | $454M | $524M | $540M | $570M | $578M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 27.5M | 27.0M | 26.1M | 25.4M | 25.3M | 25.2M | 25.1M | 25.3M | 25.0M | 24.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $33.81 | $39.70 | $45.31 | $47.21 | $51.09 | $53.51 | $72.72 | $67.83 | $59.43 | $58.02 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.24 | $0.62 | $1.21 | $0.72 | $2.25 | $1.24 | $2.23 | $0.81 | $0.68 | $1.05 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.83 | $0.53 | $-1.20 | $1.35 | $3.63 | $-4.46 | $-1.84 | $1.07 | $6.02 | $2.81 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.49 | $0.53 | $-1.20 | $1.35 | $3.63 | $-6.23 | $-4.11 | $1.07 | $6.02 | $2.23 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.21 | $0.96 | $0.95 | $1.51 | $1.52 | $2.93 | $3.56 | $1.82 | $1.33 | $2.12 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $12.43 | $13.16 | $14.18 | $14.92 | $17.48 | $18.00 | $20.90 | $21.38 | $22.78 | $23.27 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.3%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +28.1%/yr | +34.8%/yr |
| EPS | −7.3%/yr | −1.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.2%/yr | −2.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.9%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-13.3%
“Net sales in fiscal year 2025 decreased 13% from the prior fiscal year, with decreases in each of our end market verticals. The decrease in sales to customers in the automotive markets were largely driven by the loss of a major automotive program that was unrelated to Kimball and other automotive programs going end of life.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $17M of profit into $151M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $17M | $21M | $56M | $31M | $57M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$37M | +$38M | +$32M | +$29M | +$34M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$7M | +$7M | +$7M | +$6M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$123M | +$7M | −$109M | −$150M | +$35M |
| Cash from operations | $184M | $73M | ($14M) | ($83M) | $130M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$33M | −$46M | −$32M | −$29M | −$38M |
| Owner earnings | $151M | $27M | ($46M) | ($113M) | $92M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$57M | −$45M | — |
| Free cash flow | $151M | $27M | ($103M) | ($157M) | $92M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 2% | -3% | -8% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $144M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $46M ÷ interest expense $15M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $58M · 1.3× operating profitModest net debtCash $89M − debt $147M
What this means
Netting $89M of cash and short-term investments against $147M of debt leaves $58M owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (3.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 55 + DIO 72 − DPO 58 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range 5%–14%; 5% latest = NOPAT $29M ÷ invested capital $628MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -8%–10%; latest $151M = operating cash $184M − maintenance capex $33MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $144M.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 10.83×Cash-backedCash from ops $184M ÷ net income $17M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $151M
What this means
Of $151M Owner Earnings, $12M (8%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $12M buybacks. Net of $7M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.90×MaintainingCapex $33M ÷ depreciation $37M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.20×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $147M vs $381M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +13%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.29/share (latest year $0.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $23.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 9
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 4% lately, median 4%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +22%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 22% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 2.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“The unpredictability of AI, machine learning, and similar systems that automate certain operational tasks bring the potential for unintended consequences and unexpected disruptions in business operations, financial losses, and reputational damage.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$82M
- Receivables$226M
- Inventory$273M
- Other current assets$126M
- Debt due within a year$35M
- Accounts payable$229M
- Other current liabilities$72M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $443M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$403M · 91%
- Buybacks$91M · 21%
- Returned to owners$91M
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $91M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$51M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $51M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$16.76
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $91M, about $16.76 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $14.12 (2020) to $20.93 (2024); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $17.75 ($23M).
- Net change in share count−9.8%
The diluted count fell from 28M to 25M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained22%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($191M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $42M, so each retained $1 added about 0.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Richard D. Phillips | $2.7M | $4.0M | $92M |
| 2022 | Richard D. Phillips | $3.9M | $3.0M | ($113M) |
| 2023 | Richard D. Phillips | $4.3M | $4.7M | ($46M) |
| 2023 | Richard D. Phillips | $1.4M | $1.4M | ($46M) |
| 2024 | Richard D. Phillips | $4.6M | $2.5M | $27M |
| 2025 | Richard D. Phillips | $4.0M | $2.2M | $151M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio301:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kimball Electronics Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TTMITTM Technologies Inc. | $2.9B | 18% | 5.5% | 5% | 7% |
| BHEBenchmark Electronics Inc. | $2.7B | 12% | 2.9% | 5% | 4% |
| KEKimball Electronics Inc. | $1.5B | 8% | 3.9% | 7% | 2% |
| DIODDiodes | $1.5B | 35% | 11.8% | 11% | 9% |
| ENPHEnphase Energy | $1.5B | 41% | 13.2% | 16% | 22% |
| PENGPenguin Solutions Inc. | $1.4B | 23% | 4.0% | 7% | 5% |
| CRDOCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd | $1.3B | 63% | -11.5% | -6% | -19% |
| ARRYArray Technologies Inc. | $1.3B | 23% | -1.7% | -2% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 23% | 3.9% | 6% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kimball Electronics Inc. has delivered.
Kimball Electronics Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Kimball Electronics Inc. earns about $24M on its 1.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $55M on 24M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $80M. The if-converted diluted count is 25M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($53M) runs well above depreciation ($38M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $75M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← KDP its page in the Manual KEEL →
Industry order: ← JBL the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter KEYS →