← All companies ← UCB Manual UDR → ← TXN Semiconductors UMC →
UCTT, Ultra Clean Holdings
Ultra Clean Holdings, Inc., is a leading developer and supplier of critical subsystems, components, parts, and ultra-high purity cleaning and analytical services primarily for the semiconductor industry.
UCT offers its customers an integrated outsourced solution for major subassemblies, improved design-to-delivery cycle times, design for manufacturability, prototyping and part and component manufacturing, as well as tool chamber parts cleaning and coating, and micro-contamination analytical services.
Products include chemical delivery modules, frame assemblies, gas delivery systems, fluid delivery systems, precision robotics, process modules as well as other high-level assemblies.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 17% and operating margin about 4.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −5.2% to 10% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →76% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- Singapore37%$754M
- United States24%$495M
- Austria11%$222M
- Others9%$191M
- China7%$143M
- South Korea5%$113M
- Other7%$137M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $563M | $924M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 15% | 18% | 16% | 18% | 21% | 20% | 20% | 16% | 17% | 16% | 16% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 8% | 6% | 8% | 12% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 9% | 9% | 9% | 9% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $22M | $90M | $61M | $30M | $121M | $186M | $120M | $35M | $91M | ($107M) | ($109M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.0% | 9.7% | 5.5% | 2.8% | 8.7% | 8.8% | 5.1% | 2.0% | 4.3% | −5.2% | −5.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $10M | $75M | $37M | ($9M) | $78M | $120M | $40M | ($31M) | $24M | ($181M) | ($194M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 47% | 14% | 29% | — | 20% | 19% | 48% | — | 58% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $18M | $49M | $42M | $121M | $97M | $212M | $47M | $136M | $65M | $66M | $4M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $6M | $5M | $12M | $22M | $25M | $34M | $38M | $38M | $46M | $48M | $49M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($4M) | ($39M) | ($17M) | $97M | ($18M) | $42M | ($51M) | $117M | ($22M) | $180M | $130M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $16M | $26M | $26M | $36M | $59M | $100M | $76M | $64M | $50M | $48M | CapexCapex |
| 1.3% | 1.7% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 3.0% | 2.4% | 2.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $10M | $44M | $30M | $95M | $72M | $178M | $9M | $98M | $19M | $15M | ($43M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.8% | 4.7% | 2.8% | 8.9% | 5.2% | 8.4% | 0.4% | 5.7% | 0.9% | 0.7% | −2.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $10M | $33M | $16M | $95M | $61M | $152M | ($53M) | $60M | $2M | $15M | ($43M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.8% | 3.5% | 1.4% | 8.9% | 4.4% | 7.2% | −2.2% | 3.5% | 0.1% | 0.7% | −2.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $320M | $30M | $0 | $343M | $0 | $46M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $12M | $29M | $0 | $3M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 7% | 33% | 15% | — | 16% | 16% | 6% | — | 4% | -10% | -9% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | 25% | 8% | -2% | 15% | 14% | 5% | -4% | 3% | -25% | -31% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 25% | 8% | −2% | 15% | 14% | 5% | −4% | 3% | −25% | −31% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $52M | $68M | $144M | $163M | $200M | $467M | $359M | $307M | $314M | $312M | $324M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $75M | $90M | $107M | $113M | $146M | $250M | $254M | $181M | $241M | $209M | $233M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $104M | $237M | $186M | $172M | $180M | $379M | $444M | $375M | $381M | $391M | $482M | InventoryInvent. |
| $71M | $174M | $99M | $133M | $121M | $333M | $254M | $193M | $213M | $195M | $263M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $107M | $154M | $194M | $152M | $205M | $296M | $444M | $362M | $410M | $405M | $451M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $237M | $407M | $463M | $467M | $545M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $893M | $970M | $960M | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $101M | $207M | $139M | $211M | $201M | $469M | $389M | $310M | $336M | $301M | $358M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.3× | 2.0× | 3.3× | 2.2× | 2.7× | 2.4× | 2.8× | 2.9× | 2.9× | 3.2× | 3.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $85M | $85M | $150M | $171M | $171M | $270M | $249M | $265M | $265M | $114M | $114M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $381M | $563M | $966M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $302M | $277M | $565M | $485M | — | $500M | $481M | $602M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | $139M | $77M | $99M | $127M | — | $186M | $170M | $278M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | 40.7× | 6.1× | 1.2× | 7.2× | 7.7× | 3.6× | 0.7× | 2.0× | -2.8× | -3.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $216M | $300M | $436M | $437M | $533M | $849M | $888M | $839M | $874M | $711M | $628M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 33.1M | 34.3M | 38.9M | 39.5M | 41.1M | 44.4M | 45.7M | 44.7M | 45.3M | 45.3M | 45.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $16.98 | $26.95 | $28.19 | $26.99 | $34.03 | $47.33 | $51.95 | $38.80 | $46.30 | $45.34 | $45.68 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.30 | $2.19 | $0.94 | $-0.24 | $1.89 | $2.69 | $0.88 | $-0.70 | $0.52 | $-4.00 | $-4.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.31 | $1.27 | $0.78 | $2.40 | $1.76 | $4.00 | $0.19 | $2.20 | $0.43 | $0.34 | $-0.96 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.31 | $0.96 | $0.40 | $2.40 | $1.48 | $3.43 | $-1.16 | $1.34 | $0.03 | $0.34 | $-0.96 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.22 | $0.47 | $0.67 | $0.67 | $0.89 | $1.34 | $2.19 | $1.70 | $1.40 | $1.11 | $1.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.52 | $8.76 | $11.22 | $11.06 | $12.96 | $19.12 | $19.43 | $18.77 | $19.28 | $15.70 | $13.86 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.5%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +0.9%/yr | −28.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +19.7%/yr | +4.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.3%/yr | +3.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Services+4.4%
“Services revenues increased by $10.8 million in fiscal year 2025 over fiscal year 2024, driven by higher demand across its customer base.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $181M loss into $15M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($181M) | $24M | ($31M) | $40M | $120M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$48M | +$46M | +$38M | +$38M | +$34M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$19M | +$17M | +$12M | +$19M | +$16M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$180M | −$22M | +$117M | −$51M | +$42M |
| Cash from operations | $66M | $65M | $136M | $47M | $212M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$50M | −$46M | −$38M | −$38M | −$34M |
| Owner earnings | $15M | $19M | $98M | $9M | $178M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$18M | −$38M | −$62M | −$25M |
| Free cash flow | $15M | $2M | $60M | ($53M) | $152M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 1% | 6% | 0% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($4M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($107M) ÷ interest expense $38M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $312M − debt $481M
What this means
Netting $312M of cash and short-term investments against $481M of debt leaves $170M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 37 + DIO 82 − DPO 41 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -10%–33%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($85M) ÷ invested capital $881MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–9%; latest $15M = operating cash $66M − maintenance capex $50MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($4M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($181M) · cash from operations $66M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $15M
What this means
Of $15M Owner Earnings, $3M (22%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($19M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.05×MaintainingCapex $50M ÷ depreciation $48M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.19×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $481M vs $659M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −255%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.40/share (latest year $-4.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.86/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to 0% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −17%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −5.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 27, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$324M
- Receivables$233M
- Inventory$482M
- Other current assets$60M
- Accounts payable$263M
- Other current liabilities$94M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $852M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$461M · 54%
- Buybacks$45M · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)$346M · 41%
- Returned to owners$45M
8% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $45M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $271M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $45M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count36.7%
The diluted count rose from 33M to 45M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained14%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($116M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $16M, so each retained $1 added about 0.14 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$151M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 20% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio169:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ultra Clean Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.4% vs 3.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.1% early in the record and 2.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.7%
Diluted shares grew 36.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $45M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MPWRMonolithic Power Systems Inc. | $2.8B | 55% | 20.6% | 23% | 27% |
| UCTTUltra Clean Holdings | $2.1B | 18% | 4.7% | 11% | 4% |
| CRUSCirrus Logic | $2.0B | 51% | 18.3% | 21% | 21% |
| OSISOSI Systems Inc. Common Stock (DE) | $1.7B | 35% | 9.6% | 11% | 6% |
| DIODDiodes | $1.5B | 35% | 11.8% | 11% | 9% |
| ENPHEnphase Energy | $1.5B | 41% | 13.2% | 16% | 22% |
| PENGPenguin Solutions Inc. | $1.4B | 23% | 4.0% | 7% | 5% |
| CRDOCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd | $1.3B | 63% | -11.5% | -6% | -19% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 10.7% | 11% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ultra Clean Holdings has delivered.
Ultra Clean Holdings’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Ultra Clean Holdings earns about $77M on its 3.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($43M) on 45M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $278M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← UCB its page in the Manual UDR →
Industry order: ← TXN the Semiconductors chapter UMC →