← All companies ← PEN Manual PENN → ← OSIS Semiconductors PLAB →
PENG, Penguin Solutions Inc.
A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 3.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −1.5% to 13% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →43% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States57%$777M
- China14%$187M
- Other12%$161M
- Mexico11%$147M
- Europe7%$97M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $534M | $761M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 20% | 21% | 23% | 20% | 19% | 23% | 28% | 29% | 29% | 29% | 28% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 9% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 15% | 15% | 18% | 20% | 17% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 7% | 5% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 6% | 5% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $6M | $54M | $170M | $89M | $41M | ($16M) | $67M | $9M | $18M | $58M | $109M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.2% | 7.1% | 13.2% | 7.3% | 3.7% | −1.5% | 4.8% | 0.6% | 1.6% | 4.2% | 7.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($20M) | ($8M) | $119M | $51M | ($1M) | $21M | $67M | ($188M) | ($52M) | $25M | $97M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 13% | 22% | — | 31% | 21% | — | — | 44% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $15M | ($933K) | $68M | $170M | $87M | $153M | $105M | $104M | $77M | $109M | ($59M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $31M | $33M | $26M | $29M | $36M | $35M | $47M | $72M | $66M | $56M | $51M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($342K) | ($32M) | ($88M) | $71M | $33M | $66M | ($46M) | $181M | $21M | ($14M) | ($240M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $14M | $19M | $26M | $33M | $32M | $17M | $20M | $39M | $19M | $9M | $10M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 2.5% | 2.0% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.7% | 1.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1M | ($20M) | $42M | $136M | $55M | $137M | $85M | $65M | $58M | $100M | ($69M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.2% | −2.6% | 3.3% | 11.2% | 4.9% | 12.9% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 4.9% | 7.3% | −4.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1M | ($20M) | $42M | $136M | $55M | $137M | $85M | $65M | $58M | $100M | ($69M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.2% | −2.6% | 3.3% | 11.2% | 4.9% | 12.9% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 4.9% | 7.3% | −4.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $42M | $76M | $0 | $36M | $0 | $213M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $124K | — | — | $520K | $749K | $49M | $57M | $25M | $21M | $52M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 3% | 11% | 40% | 18% | 6% | -2% | 8% | 1% | 2% | 8% | 20% | ROICROIC |
| — | -9% | 64% | 19% | -0% | 7% | 18% | -84% | -13% | 6% | 22% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −9% | 64% | 19% | −0% | 7% | 18% | −84% | −13% | 6% | 22% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $59M | $22M | $31M | $98M | $151M | $223M | $313M | $391M | $389M | $454M | $440M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $141M | $183M | $237M | $217M | $216M | $313M | $355M | $219M | $252M | $308M | $308M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $103M | $127M | $221M | $119M | $163M | $364M | $264M | $175M | $151M | $255M | $498M | InventoryInvent. |
| $198M | $190M | $223M | $165M | $225M | $430M | $293M | $135M | $182M | $267M | $736M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $46M | $121M | $235M | $171M | $154M | $247M | $326M | $259M | $221M | $296M | $70M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $319M | $347M | $522M | $472M | $557M | $951M | $1.2B | $907M | $868M | $1.1B | $1.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $229M | $240M | $296M | $238M | $282M | $584M | $516M | $426M | $328M | $474M | $1.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.8× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.6× | 2.2× | 2.1× | 2.6× | 2.2× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $45M | $46M | $45M | $81M | $74M | $74M | $55M | $162M | $162M | $146M | $146M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $459M | $480M | $673M | $704M | $787M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $243M | $177M | $212M | $207M | $196M | $366M | $584M | $790M | $657M | $462M | $443M | Total debtDebt |
| $184M | $155M | $180M | $108M | $45M | $143M | $271M | $400M | $268M | $8M | $3M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($1M) | $82M | $187M | $273M | $282M | $310M | $372M | $222M | $391M | $394M | $439M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 2.9% | 2.7% | 2.7% | 3.7% | 3.0% | 2.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $19M | — | $16M | $5M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 27.7M | 31.6M | 46.2M | 46.9M | 48.0M | 48.6M | 54.4M | 51.3M | 52.4M | 54.4M | 54.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $19.31 | $24.11 | $27.87 | $25.82 | $23.39 | $21.74 | $25.64 | $28.08 | $22.33 | $25.18 | $27.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.72 | $-0.25 | $2.58 | $1.09 | $-0.02 | $0.44 | $1.22 | $-3.65 | $-1.00 | $0.47 | $1.77 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.04 | $-0.62 | $0.91 | $2.90 | $1.14 | $2.81 | $1.55 | $1.27 | $1.10 | $1.84 | $-1.27 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.04 | $-0.62 | $0.91 | $2.90 | $1.14 | $2.81 | $1.55 | $1.27 | $1.10 | $1.84 | $-1.27 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.50 | $0.59 | $0.56 | $0.71 | $0.68 | $0.34 | $0.37 | $0.77 | $0.37 | $0.17 | $0.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.04 | $2.61 | $4.05 | $5.83 | $5.88 | $6.39 | $6.83 | $4.33 | $7.47 | $7.25 | $8.05 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2020 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.0%/yr | +1.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +51.6%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −11.5%/yr | −24.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +4.3%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+16.9%
“Net Sales, Cost of Sales and Gross Profit Net sales increased by $198.0 million, or 16.9%, in 2025 compared to the prior year, primarily due to higher sales from our Advanced Computing and Integrated Memory business segment.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $25M of profit into $100M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $25M | ($52M) | ($188M) | $67M | $21M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$56M | +$66M | +$72M | +$47M | +$35M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$41M | +$43M | +$39M | +$37M | +$31M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$14M | +$21M | +$181M | −$46M | +$66M |
| Cash from operations | $109M | $77M | $104M | $105M | $153M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$9M | −$19M | −$39M | −$20M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $100M | $58M | $65M | $85M | $137M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $41M), owner earnings is nearer $59M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $8M · 0.1× operating profitModest net debtCash $454M − debt $462M
What this means
Netting $454M of cash and short-term investments against $462M of debt leaves $8M owed, about 0.1× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 82 + DIO 96 − DPO 100 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–40%; 8% latest = NOPAT $32M ÷ invested capital $402MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest $100M = operating cash $109M − maintenance capex $9M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 5%)Industry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $41M of SBC) leaves $59M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $109M ÷ net income $25M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $52M ÷ Owner Earnings $100M
What this means
Of $100M Owner Earnings, $52M (52%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $52M buybacks. Net of $41M stock comp, the real buyback was about $11M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.16×HarvestingCapex $9M ÷ depreciation $56M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.25×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $462M vs $590M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −334%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.40/share (latest year $0.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 2% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2021 · −1.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$440M
- Receivables$308M
- Inventory$498M
- Other current assets$482M
- Debt due within a year$148M
- Accounts payable$736M
- Other current liabilities$235M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $888M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$229M · 26%
- Buybacks$205M · 23%
- Retained (debt / cash)$453M · 51%
- Returned to owners$205M
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $205M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $200M and cash and short-term investments rose $382M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $205M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count97.1%
The diluted count rose from 28M to 55M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$35M written down across 2 years (2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ajay Shah | $47k | $5.9M | $137M |
| 2021 | Mark Adams | $14.8M | $29.5M | $137M |
| 2022 | Mark Adams | $6.7M | $5.2M | $85M |
| 2023 | Mark Adams | $3.2M | $4.9M | $65M |
| 2024 | Mark Adams | $6.0M | $1.7M | $58M |
| 2025 | Mark Adams | $11.7M | $9.7M | $100M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio262:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$41M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 71% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Penguin Solutions Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?97.1%
Diluted shares grew 97.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $205M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OSISOSI Systems Inc. Common Stock (DE) | $1.7B | 35% | 9.6% | 11% | 6% |
| DIODDiodes | $1.5B | 35% | 11.8% | 11% | 9% |
| ENPHEnphase Energy | $1.5B | 41% | 13.2% | 16% | 22% |
| PENGPenguin Solutions Inc. | $1.4B | 23% | 4.0% | 7% | 5% |
| CRDOCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd | $1.3B | 63% | -11.5% | -6% | -19% |
| ARRYArray Technologies Inc. | $1.3B | 23% | -1.7% | -2% | 7% |
| SEDGSolarEdge Technologies Inc. | $1.2B | 31% | 10.2% | 14% | 9% |
| VIAVViavi Solutions Inc. | $1.1B | 58% | 5.6% | 5% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 35% | 7.6% | 9% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Penguin Solutions Inc. has delivered.
Penguin Solutions Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Penguin Solutions Inc. earns about $67M on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($69M) on 51M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-02; net debt $3M. The if-converted diluted count is 55M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($51M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($68M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PEN its page in the Manual PENN →
Industry order: ← OSIS the Semiconductors chapter PLAB →