Owner Scorecard


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TXN, Texas Instruments Incorporated

Semiconductors capital-intensive Capital build-out

Texas Instruments designs and makes semiconductor chips — mostly analog parts that handle real-world signals like power, sound and temperature, plus embedded processors that run the simple computing inside a device. It sells these chips by the catalog to the companies that build the gear, vehicles and electronics of many industries. The money comes from making an enormous variety of small, long-lived parts in its own factories and selling each to many customers across many markets.

As each generation has become more reliable, more affordable and lower in power, semiconductors are used by a growing number of customers and markets.

Our passion continues to be alive today as we help our customers develop electronics and new applications.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TXN · Texas Instruments Incorporated
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$17.7B
+13.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $18.4B 5-yr avg $17.8B
Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 63%
Operating margin 35.3% 5-yr avg 42.1%
ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 31%
Owner-earnings margin 31% 5-yr avg 35%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Analog (79%), Embedded Processing (15%) and Other (6%).
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 26% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
The question is whether this is a franchise or a commodity: an analog part is cheap, but once an engineer designs it into a product it tends to stay, and the filing notes that many customers reuse the software from one product on the next — so the tests to watch are pricing power and switching cost, and whether competition forces price down, as the filing's own warning of "product development and pricing pressures" allows. The second test is the cost position: TI owns its factories, a heavy fixed bill that rewards scale when its plants run full and punishes it when demand falls. Weigh against that the reinvestment runway — the same part designed into a wider count of devices and markets — and the standing risk that capacity gets built ahead of orders. The margins, returns on capital, and the debt that funds the factories are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 35%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, Analog, is also where the profit is made: 79% of revenue and 90% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit same segments
  • Analog79%$14.0B90% of profit
  • Embedded Processing15%$2.7B5% of profit
  • Other6%$979M5% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$13.4B$15.0B$15.8B$14.4B$14.5B$18.3B$20.0B$17.5B$15.6B$17.7B$18.4BRevenueRevenue
62%64%65%64%64%67%69%63%58%57%57%Gross marginGross mgn
13%11%11%11%11%9%9%10%11%11%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
10%10%10%11%11%8%8%11%13%12%11%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$4.9B$6.1B$6.7B$5.7B$5.9B$9.0B$10.1B$7.3B$5.5B$6.0B$6.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
36.3%40.7%42.5%39.8%40.8%48.8%50.6%41.8%34.9%34.1%35.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.6B$3.7B$5.6B$5.0B$5.6B$7.8B$8.7B$6.5B$4.8B$5.0B$5.4BNet incomeNet inc.
27%39%17%12%7%13%13%12%12%12%13%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.6B$5.4B$7.2B$6.6B$6.1B$8.8B$8.7B$6.4B$6.3B$7.2B$7.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$605M$539M$590M$708M$733M$755M$925M$1.2B$1.5B$1.9B$2.0BDepreciationDeprec.
$162M$900M$787M$707M($413M)$2M($1.2B)($1.6B)($376M)($185M)$10MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$531M$695M$1.1B$847M$649M$2.5B$2.8B$5.1B$4.8B$4.5B$4.1BCapexCapex
4.0%4.6%7.2%5.9%4.5%13.4%14.0%28.9%30.8%25.7%22.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$4.1B$4.8B$6.6B$5.8B$5.5B$8.0B$7.8B$5.2B$4.8B$5.2B$5.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
30.5%32.2%41.8%40.3%38.0%43.6%38.9%29.9%30.8%29.6%31.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.1B$4.7B$6.1B$5.8B$5.5B$6.3B$5.9B$1.3B$1.5B$2.6B$3.7BFree cash flowFCF
30.5%31.2%38.4%40.3%38.0%34.3%29.6%7.7%9.6%14.7%20.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.6B$2.1B$2.6B$3.0B$3.4B$3.9B$4.3B$4.6B$4.8B$5.0B$5.1BDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.1B$2.6B$5.1B$3.0B$2.6B$527M$3.6B$293M$929M$1.5BBuybacksBuybacks
27%29%48%41%43%47%44%26%18%19%21%ROICROIC
34%36%62%56%61%58%60%39%28%31%32%Return on equityROE
19%15%34%23%24%29%31%12%0%0%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.5B$4.5B$4.2B$5.4B$6.6B$9.7B$9.1B$8.6B$7.6B$4.9B$5.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.7B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.8B$2.0B$2.2B$2.0B$2.0B$1.9B$2.8B$4.0B$4.5B$4.8B$4.7BInventoryInvent.
$396M$466M$478M$388M$415M$571M$851M$802M$820M$756M$638MAccounts payablePayables
$2.7B$2.8B$2.9B$2.7B$3.0B$3.0B$3.8B$5.0B$5.4B$6.0B$6.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$7.5B$8.7B$8.1B$8.8B$10.2B$13.7B$14.0B$15.1B$15.0B$13.8B$13.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.3B$2.3B$2.5B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$3.0B$3.3B$3.6B$3.2B$3.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×3.9×3.3×4.1×4.3×5.3×4.7×4.6×4.1×4.4×4.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.4B$4.3B$4.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$16.4B$17.6B$17.1B$18.0B$19.4B$24.7B$27.2B$32.3B$35.5B$34.6B$34.4BTotal assetsAssets
$3.6B$4.1B$5.1B$5.8B$6.8B$7.7B$8.7B$11.2B$13.6B$14.0B$14.1BTotal debtDebt
$119M($392M)$835M$416M$230M($2.0B)($332M)$2.6B$6.0B$9.2B$8.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
60.7×78.0×53.7×33.7×31.0×48.7×47.4×20.8×10.8×11.1×11.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$10.5B$10.3B$9.0B$8.9B$9.2B$13.3B$14.6B$16.9B$16.9B$16.3B$16.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.9%1.6%1.5%1.5%1.5%1.3%1.4%2.1%2.5%2.4%2.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
1.02B1.01B990M952M933M936M926M916M919M913M914MShares out (diluted)Shares
$13.10$14.78$15.94$15.11$15.50$19.60$21.63$19.13$17.02$19.37$20.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.52$3.64$5.64$5.27$6.00$8.30$9.45$7.11$5.22$5.48$5.87EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.00$4.77$6.67$6.09$5.88$8.55$8.42$5.73$5.23$5.73$6.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.00$4.61$6.12$6.09$5.88$6.72$6.40$1.47$1.63$2.85$4.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.61$2.08$2.58$3.16$3.67$4.15$4.64$4.97$5.22$5.48$5.53Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.52$0.69$1.14$0.89$0.70$2.63$3.02$5.54$5.24$4.98$4.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.26$10.21$9.08$9.36$9.85$14.24$15.74$18.45$18.39$17.82$18.36Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.4%/yr+4.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.1%/yr−0.5%/yr
EPS+5.0%/yr−1.8%/yr
Dividends / share+14.6%/yr+8.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+28.5%/yr+48.3%/yr
Book value / share+6.3%/yr+12.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Embedded Processing+6.5%
    “Embedded Processing (includes microcontrollers and processors) 2025 2024 Change Revenue $ 2,697 $ 2,533 6 % Operating profit 304 352 (14) % Operating profit % of revenue 11.3 % 13.9 % 21 Embedded Processing revenue increased due to higher demand, which was impacted by the macroeconomic factors discussed above.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
913Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
19%low FY2024
Gross margin
57%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$5.2Bowner earningsvs.$5.0Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $5.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.6B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2.6B.

Reported net income$5.0B
Owner earnings$5.2B · 30% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$5.0B$4.8B$6.5B$8.7B$7.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.9B+$1.5B+$1.2B+$925M+$755M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$419M+$387M+$362M+$289M+$230M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$185M−$376M−$1.6B−$1.2B+$2M
Cash from operations$7.2B$6.3B$6.4B$8.7B$8.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1.9B−$1.5B−$1.2B−$925M−$755M
Owner earnings$5.2B$4.8B$5.2B$7.8B$8.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$2.6B−$3.3B−$3.9B−$1.9B−$1.7B
Free cash flow$2.6B$1.5B$1.3B$5.9B$6.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue30%31%30%39%44%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.6B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $419M), owner earnings is nearer $4.8B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $6.0B ÷ interest expense $543M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.2B · 1.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $3.2B + ST investments $1.7B − debt $14.0B
    What this means

    Netting $4.9B of cash and short-term investments against $14.0B of debt leaves $9.2B owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (2.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 41 + DIO 231 − DPO 36 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 18%–48%; 19% latest = NOPAT $5.3B ÷ invested capital $27.1B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 30%–44%; latest $5.2B = operating cash $7.2B − maintenance capex $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 30% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.6B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2.6B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $419M of SBC) leaves $4.8B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $7.2B ÷ net income $5.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $6.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $5.2B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $5.2B of Owner Earnings, $6.5B (124%) went back to shareholders, $5.0B dividends, $1.5B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $419M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.1B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.37×
    Expanding
    Capex $4.5B ÷ depreciation $1.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $17.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.35×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $14.0B vs $10.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +27%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.97/share (latest year $5.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 40% → 37% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 40% early to 37% lately, median 41% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 34.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$13.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$5.1B
  • Receivables$2.2B
  • Inventory$4.7B
  • Other current assets$1.8B
Current liabilities$3.1B
  • Debt due within a year$1.1B
  • Accounts payable$638M
  • Other current liabilities$1.3B
Current ratio4.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.94×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.65×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$10.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.1B due · $5.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.6× → 4.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$12.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$14.8B$731M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $67.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$23.6B · 35%
  • Dividends$35.3B · 52%
  • Buybacks$22.1B · 33%
  • Returned to owners$57.4B

    99% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $35.3B as dividends and $22.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$13.6B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $13.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.6B to $14.1B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$104.62

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 198M shares were bought for $20.7B, about $104.62 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $60.09 (2016) to $185.80 (2024); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $103.07 ($5.1B).

  • Net change in share count−10.5%

    The diluted count fell from 1021M to 914M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.48/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 15% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Templeton$19.2M$37.4M$8.0B
2022Mr. Templeton$21.6M$11.8M$7.8B
2023Mr. Ilan$16.2M$16.4M$5.2B
2023Mr. Templeton$20.9M$23.2M$5.2B
2024Mr. Ilan$19.1M$25.0M$4.8B
2025Mr. Ilan$22.7M$17.4M$5.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio272:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$419M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Texas Instruments Incorporated is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?30.1% vs 34.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 34.9% early in the record and 30.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.6B → $14.1B

    Debt rose from $3.6B to $14.1B while owner earnings went from about $5.2B to $5.1B — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?23% → 38% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $3.1B to $6.9B while revenue grew 38%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (23% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
INTCIntel Corporation$52.9B56%23.4%11%15%
MUMicron Technology Inc.$37.4B39%24.4%15%20%
EMREmerson Electric Company$18.0B43%15.3%17%14%
TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated$17.7B64%40.7%35%35%
WHRWhirlpool$15.5B17%5.4%12%3%
OTISOtis Worldwide Corporation Common Stock$14.4B14.5%122%10%
AMKRAmkor Technology$6.7B17%7.5%10%6%
FSLRFirst Solar$5.2B23%8.9%5%4%
Group median39%14.9%14%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Texas Instruments Incorporated has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Texas Instruments Incorporated earns about $6.2B on its 35.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $3.7B on 910M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-15; net debt $8.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.1B) runs well above depreciation ($2.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Texas Instruments Incorporated (TXN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TXN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TXG its page in the Manual TXNM →

Industry order: ← TSM the Semiconductors chapter UCTT →