Owner Scorecard


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USPH, U.S. Physical Therapy

Health Care Providers & Services diversified Serial acquirer

Revenue is Net Patient Revenue (83%), Other Revenue (17%) and Management Contract Revenue (1%).

Services provided by the industrial injury prevention services ("IIP") segment include onsite services for clients' employees including injury prevention and rehabilitation, performance optimization, post-offer employment testing, functional capacity evaluations and ergonomic assessments.

IIP is performed through industrial sports medicine professionals with specialized training related to the musculoskeletal system.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
USPH · U.S. Physical Therapy
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$781M
+16.3% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $795M 5-yr avg $621M
Operating margin 10.0% 5-yr avg 10.7%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A healthcare-services business, paid to deliver or facilitate care.
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 72% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 10 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Net Patient Revenue is 83% of revenue, with Other Revenue the other meaningful line at 17%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Net Patient Revenue83%$650M
  • Other Revenue17%$131M
  • Management Contract Revenue1%$10M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$357M$414M$454M$482M$423M$495M$553M$605M$671M$781M$795MRevenueRevenue
9%9%9%9%10%9%8%9%9%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$50M$55M$60M$67M$52M$71M$57M$51M$63M$87M$80MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.9%13.2%13.3%14.0%12.4%14.3%10.3%8.4%9.4%11.1%10.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$21M$22M$35M$40M$35M$41M$32M$28M$31M$40M$35MNet incomeNet inc.
37%21%25%25%27%27%27%30%32%33%35%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$51M$57M$73M$62M$100M$76M$59M$82M$75M$75M$84MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$9M$10M$10M$10M$11M$12M$15M$16M$19M$22M$23MDepreciationDeprec.
$17M$20M$22M$5M$46M$16M$4M$31M$17M$5M$17MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$8M$7M$7M$10M$8M$8M$8M$9M$9M$14M$17MCapexCapex
2.3%1.7%1.6%2.1%1.8%1.7%1.5%1.5%1.4%1.8%2.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$43M$49M$66M$52M$92M$68M$50M$73M$66M$61M$67MOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.0%11.9%14.5%10.8%21.8%13.8%9.1%12.0%9.8%7.8%8.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$43M$49M$66M$52M$92M$68M$50M$73M$66M$61M$67MFree cash flowFCF
12.0%11.9%14.5%10.8%21.8%13.8%9.1%12.0%9.8%7.8%8.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$24M$37M$16M$31M$24M$87M$60M$27M$133M$16M$33MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$9M$10M$12M$15M$4M$19M$21M$24M$27M$27M$27MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$6MBuybacksBuybacks
14%18%20%19%14%13%9%8%7%10%8%ROICROIC
11%11%16%17%13%14%10%6%6%8%7%Return on equityROE
6%6%11%11%11%7%3%1%1%3%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$20M$22M$23M$24M$33M$29M$32M$153M$41M$36M$28MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M$45M$45M$46M$42M$46M$46M$52M$59M$64M$69MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$2M$2M$2M$1M$3M$3M$4M$6M$6M$7MAccounts payablePayables
$37M$43M$43M$44M$41M$43M$43M$48M$53M$58M$62MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$66M$77M$79M$85M$88M$95M$111M$233M$138M$140M$139MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$25M$40M$42M$61M$93M$83M$85M$102M$116M$139M$117MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×1.9×1.9×1.4×0.9×1.1×1.3×2.3×1.2×1.0×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$227M$271M$294M$318M$346M$435M$494M$510M$667M$692M$716MGoodwillGoodwill
$351M$419M$443M$631M$594M$749M$858M$997M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$52M$61M$40M$51M$21M$118M$184M$147M$154M$162M$205MTotal debtDebt
$32M$39M$16M$28M($11M)$90M$152M($6M)$112M$127M$176MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.3×2.6×29.5×32.4×38.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$188M$205M$216M$240M$276M$296M$316M$476M$489M$476M$469MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%1.2%1.3%1.4%1.9%1.6%1.3%1.2%1.2%1.1%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
12.5M12.6M12.7M12.8M12.8M12.9M13.0M14.2M15.1M15.2M15.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$28.52$32.94$35.84$37.78$32.95$38.38$42.60$42.63$44.57$51.47$52.45Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.64$1.77$2.75$3.14$2.74$3.17$2.48$1.99$2.09$2.61$2.29EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.42$3.93$5.20$4.10$7.20$5.29$3.87$5.12$4.36$4.02$4.40Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.42$3.93$5.20$4.10$7.20$5.29$3.87$5.12$4.36$4.02$4.40Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.68$0.80$0.92$1.14$0.32$1.45$1.64$1.70$1.76$1.80$1.80Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.66$0.56$0.57$0.80$0.60$0.64$0.64$0.66$0.61$0.93$1.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.00$16.30$17.05$18.83$21.52$22.92$24.32$33.56$32.46$31.40$30.92Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.8%/yr+9.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+1.8%/yr−11.0%/yr
EPS+5.3%/yr−1.0%/yr
Dividends / share+11.4%/yr+41.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.8%/yr+9.3%/yr
Book value / share+8.6%/yr+7.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
15Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
10%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.1×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$61Mowner earningsvs.$40Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $40M of profit into $61M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$40M
Owner earnings$61M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$40M$31M$28M$32M$41M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$22M+$19M+$16M+$15M+$12M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$8M+$8M+$7M+$7M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$5M+$17M+$31M+$4M+$16M
Cash from operations$75M$75M$82M$59M$76M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$14M−$9M−$9M−$8M−$8M
Owner earnings$61M$66M$73M$50M$68M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%10%12%9%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $53M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $87M ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $127M · 1.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $36M − debt $162M
    What this means

    Netting $36M of cash and short-term investments against $162M of debt leaves $127M owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (1.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 7%–20%; 10% latest = NOPAT $58M ÷ invested capital $603M
    Industry peers: median -0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–22%; latest $61M = operating cash $75M − maintenance capex $14M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $53M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $75M ÷ net income $40M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $61M
    What this means

    Of $61M Owner Earnings, $33M (54%) went back to shareholders, $27M dividends, $6M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($8M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.63×
    Harvesting
    Capex $14M ÷ depreciation $22M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $781M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.01×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $162M vs $950K WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +28%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.17/share (latest year $2.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 10% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 8.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$139M
  • Cash & short-term investments$28M
  • Receivables$69M
  • Other current assets$42M
Current liabilities$117M
  • Debt due within a year$11M
  • Accounts payable$7M
  • Other current liabilities$100M
Current ratio1.19×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$22Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $28M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($427M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($320M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$363M$158M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $710M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$89M · 13%
  • Dividends$167M · 24%
  • Buybacks$6M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$448M · 63%
  • Returned to owners$173M

    28% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $167M as dividends and $6M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $153M and cash and short-term investments rose $8M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$68.44

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $6M, about $68.44 each.

  • Net change in share count21.3%

    The diluted count rose from 13M to 15M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.80/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($153M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $14M, so each retained $1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$865M72% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$453Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $89M of capital spent building

$25M written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Christopher J. Reading$4.1M$3.3M$68M
2022Christopher J. Reading$2.4M$1.9M$50M
2023Christopher J. Reading$3.4M$3.8M$73M
2024Christopher J. Reading$3.6M$3.5M$66M
2025Christopher J. Reading$4.5M$4.2M$61M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$8M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why U.S. Physical Therapy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.9% vs 12.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.8% early in the record and 9.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.3%

    Diluted shares grew 21.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $6M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$52M → $205M

    Debt rose from $52M to $205M while owner earnings went from about $53M to $66M — about 1.0 year of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PRVAPrivia Health Group$2.1B1.2%8%5%
LFSTLifeStance Health Group Inc.$1.4B-10.2%-9%5%
PGNYProgyny$1.3B21%4.2%13%10%
PNTGThe Pennant Group Inc. Common Stock$948M4.8%9%5%
CAICaris Life Sciences Inc.$812M-62.4%-62%
USPHU.S. Physical Therapy$781M12.8%14%12%
TOIThe Oncology Institute Inc.$503M-18.9%-55%-10%
SRTAStrata Critical Medical Inc.$197M19%-36.6%-9%-30%
Group median-4.5%8%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what U.S. Physical Therapy has delivered.

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Through the cycle, U.S. Physical Therapy earns about $93M on its 12.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $67M on 15M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-08; net debt $176M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($17M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $69M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "U.S. Physical Therapy (USPH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/USPH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← USNA its page in the Manual UTHR →

Industry order: ← UHS the Health Care Providers & Services chapter VMD →