Owner Scorecard


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LFST, LifeStance Health Group Inc.

The mental healthcare market remains under-reimbursed by commercial and government insurers, resulting in many clinicians only accepting cash pay for mental health services.

To fulfill this mission, we have built one of the nation's largest outpatient mental health platforms based on number of clinicians and geographic scale.

Our clinicians offer patients a comprehensive, multidisciplinary suite of mental health services, spanning psychiatric evaluations and treatment, psychological and neuropsychological testing, and individual, family and group therapy.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LFST · LifeStance Health Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.4B
+13.9% YoY · 46% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $918M
Operating margin 3.0% 5-yr avg −3972.0%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg −7%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg −76%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg −1176%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −18% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 6.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −9%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$213M$1M$860M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5BRevenueRevenue
19%n/m44%39%29%27%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$15M($286M)($210M)($189M)($32M)$24M$45MOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.2%n/m−24.5%−17.9%−2.5%1.7%3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$6M($307M)($216M)($186M)($57M)$10M$23MNet incomeNet inc.
28%22%31%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$17M$9M$53M($17M)$107M$146M$182MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$15M$29M$37M$41M$42M$42MDepreciationDeprec.
$8M$42M$52M$33M$48M$20M$46MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$14M$94M$79M$41M$22M$36M$40MCapexCapex
6.7%n/m9.2%3.8%1.7%2.5%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$14M($6M)$24M($57M)$86M$110M$143MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.6%−392.7%2.8%−5.4%6.9%7.7%9.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3M($85M)($26M)($57M)$86M$110M$143MFree cash flowFCF
1.3%n/m−3.1%−5.4%6.9%7.7%9.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$59M$100M$60M$20M$0$0$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-15%-10%-9%-2%1%2%ROICROIC
-20%-14%-13%-4%1%2%Return on equityROE
−20%−14%−13%−4%1%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$148M$109M$79M$155M$249M$195MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$76M$101M$125M$132M$96M$123MReceivablesReceiv.
$14M$12M$7M$7M$6M$4MAccounts payablePayables
$62M$89M$118M$125M$90M$119MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$267M$233M$226M$313M$416M$356MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$117M$176M$203M$229M$252M$240MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×1.3×1.1×1.4×1.7×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.9B$2.2B$2.1B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1BTotal assetsAssets
$159M$227M$283M$287M$280M$281MTotal debtDebt
$11M$119M$204M$132M$32M$86MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.8×-7.4×-10.5×-8.9×-1.2×2.1×4.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($166M)$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%n/m21.8%9.4%6.1%5.2%4.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
328M355M367M379M391M395MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.00$2.42$2.87$3.30$3.64$3.78Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.94$-0.61$-0.51$-0.15$0.02$0.06EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.02$0.07$-0.16$0.23$0.28$0.36Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.26$-0.07$-0.16$0.23$0.28$0.36Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.29$0.22$0.11$0.06$0.09$0.10Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.72$4.27$3.89$3.81$3.89$3.74Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+436.0%/yr (4-yr)+436.0%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share−24.8%/yr (4-yr)−24.8%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share−4.7%/yr (4-yr)−4.7%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
391Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
1%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.3×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$110Mowner earningsvs.$10Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $10M of profit into $110M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$10M
Owner earnings$110M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$10M($57M)($186M)($216M)($307M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$42M+$41M+$37M+$29M+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$75M+$76M+$99M+$187M+$259M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$20M+$48M+$33M+$52M+$42M
Cash from operations$146M$107M($17M)$53M$9M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$36M−$22M−$41M−$29M−$15M
Owner earnings$110M$86M($57M)$24M($6M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$50M−$79M
Free cash flow$110M$86M($57M)($26M)($85M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%7%-5%3%-393%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $75M), owner earnings is nearer $35M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In connection with the preparation of our consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 2019, we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $24M ÷ interest expense $12M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $32M · 1.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $249M − debt $280M
    What this means

    Netting $249M of cash and short-term investments against $280M of debt leaves $32M owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (11.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -15%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $19M ÷ invested capital $1.6B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range -393%–8%; latest $110M = operating cash $146M − maintenance capex $36M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $75M of SBC) leaves $35M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $146M ÷ net income $10M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.87×
    Maintaining
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $42M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.65×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $280M vs $164M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.20/share (latest year $0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −6611% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6611% early to −6% lately, median −18% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +69%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 69% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −19816.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We also expect our competitors to continue to improve their technology infrastructure, including with the use of artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning solutions, to interact with patients, clinicians and payors, sell their services, utilize their data and support and grow their patient base.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$356M
  • Cash & short-term investments$195M
  • Receivables$123M
  • Other current assets$38M
Current liabilities$240M
  • Debt due within a year$18M
  • Accounts payable$4M
  • Other current liabilities$217M
Current ratio1.48×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.48×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.81×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$116Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$18M due · $195M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($313M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$477M$196M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $316M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$286M · 91%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$30M · 9%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $191M.

  • Net change in share count20.6%

    The diluted count rose from 328M to 395M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.5B67% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity85%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$239Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $286M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$147.0M$118.8M($6M)
2022$41.0M$27.4M$24M
2022$9.8M−$26.0M$24M
2023$14.8M$39.4M($57M)
2024$10.2M$4.1M$86M
2025$6.6M$4.8M$110M
2025$7.1M−$482k$110M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio119:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$75M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 309% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PRVAPrivia Health Group$2.1B1.2%8%5%
MDPediatrix Medical Group Inc.$1.9B10.1%8%11%
HCSGHealthcare Services Group$1.8B13%4.4%15%2%
LFSTLifeStance Health Group Inc.$1.4B-10.2%-9%5%
ADUSAddus HomeCare$1.4B30%6.6%8%8%
PGNYProgyny$1.3B21%4.2%13%10%
PNTGThe Pennant Group Inc. Common Stock$948M4.8%9%5%
USPHU.S. Physical Therapy$781M12.8%14%12%
Group median4.6%8%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LifeStance Health Group Inc. has delivered.

LifeStance Health Group Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, LifeStance Health Group Inc. earns about $94M on its 6.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+81%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+28%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $143M on 388M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $86M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LifeStance Health Group Inc. (LFST), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LFST, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LFMDP its page in the Manual LFUS →

Industry order: ← LFMDP the Health Care Providers & Services chapter MD →