Owner Scorecard


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UHS, Universal Health

We provide capital resources as well as a variety of management services to our facilities, including central purchasing, information services, finance and control systems, facilities planning, physician recruitment services, administrative personnel management, marketing and public relations.

In this Annual Report, "we," "us," "our" "UHS" and the "Company" refer to Universal Health Services, Inc. and its subsidiaries.

UHS is a registered trademark of UHS of Delaware, Inc., the management company for, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UHS · Universal Health
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$17.4B
+9.7% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $17.8B 5-yr avg $14.7B
Operating margin 11.5% 5-yr avg 9.7%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Acute Care Hospital Services (57%) and Behavioral Health Services (43%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Acute Care Hospital Services at 57%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Acute Care Hospital Services57%$9.9B
  • Behavioral Health Services43%$7.4B
  • Other0%$13M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$9.8B$10.4B$10.8B$11.4B$11.6B$12.6B$13.4B$14.3B$15.8B$17.4B$17.8BRevenueRevenue
$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.0B$1.2B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.1%12.3%10.9%10.7%11.8%10.8%7.5%8.2%10.6%11.5%11.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$702M$752M$780M$815M$944M$992M$676M$718M$1.1B$1.5B$1.5BNet incomeNet inc.
37%33%23%23%24%24%24%24%23%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$2.4B$884M$996M$1.3B$2.1B$1.9B$1.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$417M$448M$453M$490M$510M$533M$582M$568M$585M$619M$626MDepreciationDeprec.
$167M($9M)($25M)$64M$840M($715M)($347M)($106M)$241M($339M)($337M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$520M$558M$665M$634M$731M$856M$734M$743M$944M$1.0B$993MCapexCapex
5.3%5.4%6.2%5.6%6.3%6.8%5.5%5.2%6.0%5.8%5.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$814M$690M$822M$948M$1.8B$350M$414M$700M$1.5B$1.2B$1.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.3%6.6%7.6%8.3%16.0%2.8%3.1%4.9%9.4%7.2%7.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$814M$690M$610M$804M$1.6B$28M$262M$525M$1.1B$849M$913MFree cash flowFCF
8.3%6.6%5.7%7.1%14.1%0.2%2.0%3.7%7.1%4.9%5.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$614M$23M$110M$8M$52M$105M$20M$4M$19M$48M$44MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$39M$38M$37M$53M$17M$66M$58M$55M$53M$51M$51MDividends paidDiv. paid
$353M$364M$397M$771M$207M$1.2B$833M$547M$671M$968MBuybacksBuybacks
9%10%10%10%12%10%7%8%12%13%13%ROICROIC
15%15%14%15%15%16%11%12%17%20%20%Return on equityROE
15%14%14%14%15%15%10%11%16%20%20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$34M$74M$105M$61M$1.2B$115M$103M$119M$126M$138M$119MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$2.2B$2.6B$2.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$440M$442M$446M$447M$571M$659M$637M$614M$632M$750M$750MAccounts payablePayables
$1000M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.9B$2.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$3.3B$2.3B$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$3.4B$3.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.3B$1.8B$1.4B$1.6B$2.5B$2.0B$1.9B$2.0B$2.2B$3.2B$3.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.0×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.1×1.3×1.4×1.3×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.8B$3.8B$3.8B$3.9B$3.9B$4.0B$3.9B$3.9B$3.9B$4.0B$4.0BGoodwillGoodwill
$10.3B$10.8B$11.3B$11.7B$13.5B$13.1B$13.5B$14.0B$14.5B$15.5B$15.7BTotal assetsAssets
$4.1B$4.0B$4.0B$4.0B$3.9B$4.2B$4.8B$4.9B$4.5B$4.8B$4.7BTotal debtDebt
$4.1B$4.0B$3.9B$3.9B$2.6B$4.1B$4.7B$4.8B$4.4B$4.6B$4.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.2×8.8×7.6×7.5×12.8×16.3×7.9×5.7×9.0×12.8×13.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.5B$5.0B$5.4B$5.5B$6.3B$6.1B$5.9B$6.1B$6.7B$7.3B$7.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
98.4M96.3M93.8M89.0M85.6M83.7M73.8M70.1M67.9M64.5M61.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$99.27$108.07$114.90$127.79$135.05$151.06$181.48$203.66$233.12$269.38$288.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.14$7.81$8.32$9.15$11.03$11.85$9.15$10.24$16.82$23.10$24.66EPS (diluted)EPS
$8.27$7.16$8.76$10.65$21.61$4.19$5.61$9.98$21.83$19.32$20.76Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$8.27$7.16$6.50$9.03$19.03$0.33$3.55$7.48$16.54$13.17$14.80Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40$0.40$0.40$0.60$0.20$0.79$0.79$0.79$0.79$0.80$0.82Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.29$5.79$7.09$7.12$8.54$10.22$9.94$10.60$13.90$15.75$16.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$46.08$51.80$57.49$61.82$73.81$72.76$80.19$87.69$98.18$112.87$121.05Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.7%/yr+14.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.9%/yr−2.2%/yr
EPS+13.9%/yr+15.9%/yr
Dividends / share+8.1%/yr+31.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.9%/yr+13.0%/yr
Book value / share+10.5%/yr+8.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Net income+30.4%
    “Net income attributable to UHS increased by $347 million, or 30%, to $1.49 billion during 2025 as compared to $1.14 billion during 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
64Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
13%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.7×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $619M it takes just to hold its position. It put $396M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $849M.

Reported net income$1.5B
Owner earnings$1.2B · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.5B$1.1B$718M$676M$992M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$619M+$585M+$568M+$582M+$533M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$96M+$99M+$88M+$85M+$74M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$339M+$241M−$106M−$347M−$715M
Cash from operations$1.9B$2.1B$1.3B$996M$884M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$619M−$585M−$568M−$582M−$533M
Owner earnings$1.2B$1.5B$700M$414M$350M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$396M−$359M−$175M−$152M−$322M
Free cash flow$849M$1.1B$525M$262M$28M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%9%5%3%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $619M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $396M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $96M), owner earnings is nearer $1.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $2.0B ÷ interest expense $156M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.6B · 2.3× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $138M − debt $4.8B
    What this means

    Netting $138M of cash and short-term investments against $4.8B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 2.3× a year's operating profit (2.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 7%–13%; 13% latest = NOPAT $1.5B ÷ invested capital $11.9B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–16%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.9B − maintenance capex $619M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put $396M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $849M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $96M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.9B ÷ net income $1.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B
    What this means

    Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $1.0B (82%) went back to shareholders, $51M dividends, $968M buybacks. Net of $96M stock comp, the real buyback was about $872M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.64×
    Expanding
    Capex $1.0B ÷ depreciation $619M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $17.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.05×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.8B vs $168M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +50%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $18.28/share (latest year $24.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $119.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 10% lately, median 11%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 7.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$119M
  • Receivables$2.7B
  • Other current assets$636M
Current liabilities$3.2B
  • Debt due within a year$756M
  • Accounts payable$750M
  • Other current liabilities$1.7B
Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$256Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$756M due · $119M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$5.1B$417M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $14.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$7.4B · 50%
  • Dividends$469M · 3%
  • Buybacks$6.3B · 43%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$533M · 4%
  • Returned to owners$6.8B

    73% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $469M as dividends and $6.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $6.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−37.3%

    The diluted count fell from 98M to 62M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.80/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained17%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $367M, so each retained $1 added about 0.17 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.1B26% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity55%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $7.4B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Marc D. Miller$14.0M$9.8M$350M
2022Marc D. Miller$10.9M$13.5M$414M
2023Marc D. Miller$14.4M$15.0M$700M
2024Marc D. Miller$15.0M$25.8M$1.5B
2025Marc D. Miller$16.1M$27.7M$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$96M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Universal Health is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HCAHCA Healthcare Inc.$75.6B11.7%16%10%
UHSUniversal Health$17.4B10.8%10%7%
CYHCommunity Health Systems Inc.$12.5B84%5.8%5%0%
EHCEncompass Health$5.9B15.0%10%13%
PACSPACS Group Inc.$5.3B6.3%21%5%
ENSGEnsign Group$5.0B20%7.7%17%5%
AHCOAdaptHealth Corp.$3.2B18%6.6%4%7%
BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc.$3.2B-1.3%-1%-1%
Group median7.1%10%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Universal Health has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Universal Health earns about $1.3B on its 7.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+37%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $913M on 61M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $4.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($993M) runs well above depreciation ($626M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Universal Health (UHS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UHS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UHAL its page in the Manual UHT →

Industry order: ← TOI the Health Care Providers & Services chapter USPH →