Owner Scorecard


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VMI, Valmont Industries Inc.

Building Products capital-intensive

Valmont Industries, Inc., along with its subsidiaries, is a diversified manufacturer of products and services for infrastructure and agriculture markets.

Infrastructure Segment Products and Services Utility: We design, engineer, and manufacture structures made of steel, pre-stressed concrete, and composites to support the infrastructure necessary for electrical transmission, substations, and distribution applications within the utility industry.

Our scalable solutions feature innovative designs that address the growing demand for reliable energy, especially considering increasing concerns about grid resilience due to natural disasters like fires, storms, and floods.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VMI · Valmont Industries Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.1B
+0.7% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.2B 5-yr avg $4.0B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 10.6% 5-yr avg 9.6%
ROIC 18% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Infrastructure (75%) and Agriculture (25%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 8.2% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Infrastructure is 75% of revenue, with Agriculture the other meaningful segment at 25%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Infrastructure75%$3.1B
  • Agriculture25%$1.0B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.5B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$3.5B$4.3B$4.2B$4.1B$4.1B$4.2BRevenueRevenue
26%25%24%25%26%25%26%30%30%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
16%15%16%16%18%17%16%18%18%17%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$245M$267M$212M$228M$226M$287M$433M$292M$525M$416M$443MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.7%9.7%7.7%8.2%7.8%8.2%10.0%7.0%12.9%10.1%10.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$173M$116M$102M$146M$141M$196M$251M$151M$348M$350M$371MNet incomeNet inc.
20%48%31%25%26%24%30%37%25%6%8%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$233M$133M$153M$308M$316M$66M$326M$307M$573M$456M$495MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$82M$85M$83M$82M$83M$93M$97M$99M$95M$89M$90MDepreciationDeprec.
($33M)($79M)($42M)$67M$78M($251M)($64M)$18M$99M($7M)$12MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$58M$55M$72M$97M$107M$108M$93M$97M$79M$145M$149MCapexCapex
2.3%2.0%2.6%3.5%3.7%3.1%2.1%2.3%1.9%3.5%3.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$175M$78M$81M$210M$233M($42M)$233M$210M$493M$368M$405MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.9%2.8%2.9%7.6%8.1%−1.2%5.4%5.0%12.1%9.0%9.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$175M$78M$81M$210M$210M($42M)$233M$210M$493M$311M$346MFree cash flowFCF
6.9%2.8%2.9%7.6%7.2%−1.2%5.4%5.0%12.1%7.6%8.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$5M$143M$82M$16M$313M$39M$33M$33MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$34M$34M$34M$33M$37M$41M$46M$50M$48M$52M$54MDividends paidDiv. paid
$54M$0$115M$63M$56M$26M$40M$345M$70M$198MBuybacksBuybacks
15%10%10%11%11%10%13%8%19%17%18%ROICROIC
18%10%10%13%12%14%16%11%23%21%22%Return on equityROE
15%7%6%10%9%11%13%7%19%18%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$400M$493M$313M$354M$401M$177M$185M$203M$164M$187M$160MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$439M$504M$484M$480M$512M$572M$604M$658M$654M$590M$653MReceivablesReceiv.
$350M$421M$384M$418M$449M$729M$729M$658M$590M$566M$588MInventoryInvent.
$177M$228M$218M$198M$268M$348M$360M$358M$372M$360M$374MAccounts payablePayables
$612M$697M$649M$700M$693M$953M$973M$958M$872M$797M$866MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$350M$403M$409M$514M$673M$766M$804M$723M$811M$732M$746MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.7×3.3×2.8×2.3×2.2×2.2×2.5×2.1×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$321M$338M$385M$429M$430M$709M$740M$633M$624M$571M$587MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.6B$2.6B$2.8B$3.0B$3.4B$3.6B$3.5B$3.3B$3.4B$3.4BTotal assetsAssets
$756M$755M$743M$766M$731M$952M$872M$1.1B$731M$796M$791MTotal debtDebt
$356M$262M$429M$412M$330M$775M$687M$906M$566M$609M$631MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.5×6.0×4.8×5.7×5.5×6.7×9.1×5.1×8.9×10.3×11.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$943M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.5%0.8%1.0%0.9%0.7%0.6%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$35M$35M$14M$13M$6M$122M$65M$65MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
22.7M22.7M22.4M21.8M21.4M21.5M21.6M21.2M20.3M19.9M19.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$111.04$120.77$122.83$127.11$135.14$162.92$201.36$197.30$201.13$205.85$212.27Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.63$5.11$4.53$6.73$6.57$9.10$11.62$7.13$17.19$17.57$18.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.70$3.43$3.61$9.66$10.89$-1.95$10.80$9.93$24.34$18.46$20.66Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.70$3.43$3.61$9.66$9.78$-1.95$10.80$9.93$24.34$15.62$17.62Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.50$1.49$1.50$1.50$1.72$1.93$2.12$2.34$2.39$2.63$2.74Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.55$2.43$3.21$4.48$4.98$5.02$4.32$4.57$3.92$7.27$7.61Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$41.55$48.94$47.21$52.57$55.17$64.53$73.26$64.00$76.11$81.90$85.61Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.1%/yr+8.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.2%/yr+11.1%/yr
EPS+9.7%/yr+21.8%/yr
Dividends / share+6.5%/yr+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.4%/yr+7.9%/yr
Book value / share+7.8%/yr+8.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income-20.8%
    “Consolidated operating income decreased by 20.8% in fiscal 2025, as compared to fiscal 2024, primarily due to the impairment of certain long-lived assets totaling $91.3 million, realignment charges of $15.4 million, and slightly higher SG&A expenses.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
20Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
17%low FY2023
Gross margin
30%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.7×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$368Mowner earningsvs.$350Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $368M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $89M it takes just to hold its position. It put $57M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $311M.

Reported net income$350M
Owner earnings$368M · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$350M$348M$151M$251M$196M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$89M+$95M+$99M+$97M+$93M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$30M+$39M+$42M+$29M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$7M+$99M+$18M−$64M−$251M
Cash from operations$456M$573M$307M$326M$66M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$89M−$79M−$97M−$93M−$108M
Owner earnings$368M$493M$210M$233M($42M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$57M
Free cash flow$311M$493M$210M$233M($42M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%12%5%5%-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $89M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $57M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $344M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $416M ÷ interest expense $41M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $609M · 1.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $187M − debt $796M
    What this means

    Netting $187M of cash and short-term investments against $796M of debt leaves $609M owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (1.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 52 + DIO 72 − DPO 46 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 8%–19%; 17% latest = NOPAT $389M ÷ invested capital $2.2B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–12%; latest $368M = operating cash $456M − maintenance capex $89M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. It chose to put $57M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $311M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $344M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $456M ÷ net income $350M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $251M ÷ Owner Earnings $368M
    What this means

    Of $368M Owner Earnings, $251M (68%) went back to shareholders, $52M dividends, $198M buybacks. Net of $24M stock comp, the real buyback was about $174M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.64×
    Expanding
    Capex $145M ÷ depreciation $89M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 6 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.35×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $796M vs $988M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +117%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $14.58/share (latest year $18.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $84.11/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 10% lately, median 8%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 20%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 7.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“To remain competitive, we must invest in our manufacturing capabilities, product development, customer service, and our information technology systems and networks, including artificial intelligence.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$160M
  • Receivables$653M
  • Inventory$588M
  • Other current assets$371M
Current liabilities$746M
  • Debt due within a year$513K
  • Accounts payable$374M
  • Other current liabilities$371M
Current ratio2.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.59×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$513K due · $160M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$973Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$25MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$944M$153M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$77Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$912M · 32%
  • Dividends$409M · 14%
  • Buybacks$968M · 34%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$583M · 20%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    67% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $409M as dividends and $968M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$206.11

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $968M, about $206.11 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $121.86 (2016) to $326.03 (2025); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $269.18 ($345M).

  • Net change in share count−13.6%

    The diluted count fell from 23M to 20M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.63/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained41%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($597M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $246M, so each retained $1 added about 0.41 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$692M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$631Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $912M of capital spent building

$290M written down across 7 years (2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 46% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$7.3M$16.4M($42M)
2022$8.7M$21.7M$233M
2023$6.0M$4.3M$210M
2023$6.3M−$5.4M$210M
2024$7.6M$13.4M$493M
2025$7.8M$13.8M$368M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Valmont Industries Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $598M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SLGNSilgan Holdings$6.5B16%9.3%9%7%
SNASnap-on$4.7B53%25.8%17%17%
GEFGreif$4.4B20%8.7%8%6%
GTLSChart Industries$4.3B30%7.3%5%5%
VMIValmont Industries Inc.$4.1B26%9.0%11%6%
ACAArcosa Inc. Common Stock$2.9B19%8.9%6%6%
AXONAxon Enterprise$2.8B61%3.3%3%11%
GFFGriffon Corporation$2.5B28%6.3%6%3%
Group median27%8.8%7%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Valmont Industries Inc. has delivered.

Valmont Industries Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Valmont Industries Inc. earns about $252M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+46%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $346M on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $631M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($149M) runs well above depreciation ($90M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $406M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Valmont Industries Inc. (VMI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VMI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VMD its page in the Manual VNDA →

Industry order: ← TT the Building Products chapter WMS →