Owner Scorecard


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GTLS, Chart Industries

Industrial Machinery capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Chart Industries, Inc. is a global leader in the design, engineering, and manufacturing of process technologies and equipment for gas and liquid molecule handling for the Nexus of Clean - clean power, clean water, clean food, and clean industrials, regardless of molecule.

The Company's unique product and solution portfolio across stationary and rotating equipment is used in every phase of the liquid gas supply chain, including engineering, service and repair and from installation to preventive maintenance and digital monitoring.

Chart is a leading provider of technology, equipment and services related to liquefied natural gas ("LNG"), hydrogen, biogas and CO2 capture among other applications.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GTLS · Chart Industries
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
+2.5% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.1B 5-yr avg $2.9B
Gross margin 33% 5-yr avg 30%
Operating margin 6.2% 5-yr avg 10.3%
Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 57% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 6.7% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.9% to 16% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$859M$989M$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$3.4B$4.2B$4.3B$4.1BRevenueRevenue
40%38%26%24%28%25%25%31%33%34%33%Gross marginGross mgn
18%18%17%17%15%15%13%15%13%15%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$41M$39M$65M$52M$92M$89M$152M$391M$648M$358M$259MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.8%3.9%6.4%4.3%7.8%6.7%9.4%11.7%15.6%8.4%6.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$28M$28M$88M$46M$308M$59M$24M$47M$219M$41M($26M)Net incomeNet inc.
27%8%6%5%19%40%6%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$169M$44M$89M$134M$173M($21M)$81M$167M$503M$293M$105MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$33M$38M$50M$78M$85M$81M$1.2B$2.3B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8BDepreciationDeprec.
$108M($21M)($49M)$10M($220M)($161M)($1.1B)($2.2B)($2.5B)($2.6B)($2.7B)Working capital & otherWC & other
$17M$33M$36M$36M$38M$53M$74M$136M$121M$90M$95MCapexCapex
1.9%3.3%3.6%3.0%3.2%4.0%4.6%4.0%2.9%2.1%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$153M$11M$52M$98M$135M($74M)$7M$32M$382M$203M$10MOwner earningsOwner earn.
17.8%1.1%5.2%8.0%11.5%−5.6%0.4%0.9%9.2%4.8%0.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$153M$11M$52M$98M$135M($74M)$7M$32M$382M$203M$10MFree cash flowFCF
17.8%1.1%5.2%8.0%11.5%−5.6%0.4%0.9%9.2%4.8%0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$446M$226M$604M$52M$205M$26M$4.3B$0$0$29MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$700K$2M$0$0$19M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
5%5%3%5%3%8%ROICROIC
4%3%10%4%20%4%1%2%8%1%-1%Return on equityROE
4%3%10%4%20%4%1%2%8%1%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$282M$123M$118M$119M$125M$122M$664M$188M$309M$366M$268MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$143M$196M$195M$192M$201M$236M$278M$759M$752M$782M$763MReceivablesReceiv.
$170M$174M$233M$210M$248M$322M$358M$576M$491M$572M$588MInventoryInvent.
$80M$105M$126M$121M$140M$176M$211M$811M$1.1B$1.2B$1.1BAccounts payablePayables
$233M$265M$302M$281M$309M$382M$425M$524M$184M$118M$236MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$653M$634M$662M$674M$703M$854M$3.7B$2.2B$2.5B$2.9B$2.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$262M$388M$367M$378M$635M$694M$1.1B$1.9B$1.8B$2.1B$1.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×1.6×1.8×1.8×1.1×1.2×3.4×1.2×1.4×1.4×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$209M$460M$487M$811M$866M$995M$992M$2.9B$2.9B$3.1B$3.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.7B$1.9B$2.5B$2.6B$3.0B$5.9B$9.1B$9.1B$9.8B$9.7BTotal assetsAssets
$241M$498M$544M$777M$443M$857M$2.3B$3.8B$3.6B$3.6B$3.8BTotal debtDebt
($41M)$376M$426M$658M$317M$735M$1.6B$3.6B$3.3B$3.2B$3.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.2×3.0×2.1×4.8×1.4×2.0×1.2×0.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$697M$802M$885M$1.2B$1.6B$1.6B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
31.0M31.3M32.2M35.2M36.5M41.1M41.8M46.8M46.7M45.4M47.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$27.73$31.55$31.18$34.56$32.29$32.05$38.57$71.60$89.14$93.98$86.67Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.91$0.89$2.73$1.32$8.45$1.44$0.57$1.01$4.68$0.90$-0.54EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.93$0.36$1.63$2.78$3.70$-1.80$0.16$0.67$8.19$4.47$0.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.93$0.36$1.63$2.78$3.70$-1.80$0.16$0.67$8.19$4.47$0.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.54$1.05$1.13$1.03$1.04$1.28$1.78$2.90$2.59$1.98$1.98Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.50$25.60$27.47$34.90$43.15$39.32$64.01$59.52$60.61$71.20$65.98Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+14.5%/yr+23.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.1%/yr+3.9%/yr
EPS−0.2%/yr−36.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.6%/yr+13.8%/yr
Book value / share+13.7%/yr+10.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
45Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
8%low FY2019
Gross margin
34%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
15.8×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$203Mowner earningsvs.$41Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $41M of profit into $203M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$41M
Owner earnings$203M · 5% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$41M$219M$47M$24M$59M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.8B+$2.8B+$2.3B+$1.2B+$81M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$2.6B−$2.5B−$2.2B−$1.1B−$161M
Cash from operations$293M$503M$167M$81M($21M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$90M−$121M−$136M−$74M−$53M
Owner earnings$203M$382M$32M$7M($74M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%9%1%0%-6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $358M ÷ interest expense $308M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.2B · 8.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $366M − debt $3.6B
    What this means

    Netting $366M of cash and short-term investments against $3.6B of debt leaves $3.2B owed, about 8.9× a year's operating profit (9.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 67 + DIO 74 − DPO 160 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 3%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $203M = operating cash $293M − maintenance capex $90M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 5%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $198M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $293M ÷ net income $41M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $203M
    What this means

    Of $203M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.03×
    Harvesting
    Capex $90M ÷ depreciation $2.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.36×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.6B vs $771M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +113%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.13/share (latest year $0.85), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $67.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 12% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 3.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +4.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$268M
  • Receivables$763M
  • Inventory$588M
  • Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$1.9B
  • Debt due within a year$100K
  • Accounts payable$1.1B
  • Other current liabilities$760M
Current ratio1.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.21×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$985Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$100K due · $268M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−11.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.4B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$87M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$285Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$600K
'27$100K
'28$100K
'29$282M
'30$2.9B
later$510M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$600Kthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$700Kthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.9Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$268M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$203M
Together, against $600K due next year784.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $471M against the $600K due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 785 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$633M · 39%
  • Buybacks$22M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$976M · 60%
  • Returned to owners$22M

    2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $22M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.5B and cash and short-term investments fell $14M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $22M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count54.5%

    The diluted count rose from 31M to 48M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained15%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($866M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $133M, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.6B57% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity95%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$5.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $633M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Ms. Evanko$5.6M$14.2M$135M
2021Ms. Evanko$5.7M$13.3M($74M)
2022Ms. Evanko$5.1M−$592k$7M
2023Ms. Evanko$5.4M$7.8M$32M
2024Ms. Evanko$7.7M$13.8M$382M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Chart Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.0% vs 8.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.0% early in the record and 5.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?54.5%

    Diluted shares grew 54.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $22M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$241M → $3.8B

    Debt rose from $241M to $3.8B while owner earnings went from about $72M to $206M — about 3.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 18 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Machinery

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SLGNSilgan Holdings$6.5B16%9.3%9%7%
SNASnap-on$4.7B53%25.8%17%17%
GEFGreif$4.4B20%8.7%8%6%
GTLSChart Industries$4.3B30%7.3%5%5%
VMIValmont Industries Inc.$4.1B26%9.0%11%6%
ACAArcosa Inc. Common Stock$2.9B19%8.9%6%6%
AXONAxon Enterprise$2.8B61%3.3%3%11%
GFFGriffon Corporation$2.5B28%6.3%6%3%
Group median27%8.8%7%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Chart Industries has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Chart Industries earns about $213M on its 5.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $10M on 48M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net debt $3.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Chart Industries (GTLS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GTLS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GTLB its page in the Manual GTM →

Industry order: ← GTES the Industrial Machinery chapter HAYW →