Owner Scorecard


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WGO, Winnebago Industries

Leisure Products capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Winnebago Industries, Inc. is a leading North American manufacturer of outdoor lifestyle products under the Winnebago, Grand Design, Chris-Craft, Newmar and Barletta brands, which are used primarily in leisure travel and outdoor recreation activities.

Other products manufactured by us consist primarily of original equipment manufacturing parts for other manufacturers and commercial vehicles.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
WGO · Winnebago Industries
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.8B
−5.9% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $3.6B
Gross margin 13% 5-yr avg 16%
Operating margin 2.4% 5-yr avg 7.4%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 18%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 44% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 15% and operating margin about 7.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.0% to 12% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$975M$1.5B$2.0B$2.0B$2.4B$3.6B$5.0B$3.5B$3.0B$2.8B$2.8BRevenueRevenue
12%14%15%15%13%18%19%17%15%13%13%Gross marginGross mgn
3%6%6%7%8%6%6%8%9%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$66M$125M$160M$155M$114M$407M$584M$301M$100M$57M$69MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.7%8.1%8.0%7.8%4.8%11.2%11.8%8.6%3.4%2.0%2.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$45M$71M$102M$112M$61M$282M$391M$216M$13M$26M$39MNet incomeNet inc.
31%34%28%20%20%23%24%23%15%15%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$53M$97M$83M$134M$270M$237M$401M$295M$144M$129M$208MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$7M$10M$14M$16M$18M$24M$47M$59M$61M$60MDepreciationDeprec.
($2M)$16M($36M)$1M$187M($78M)($31M)$21M$58M$27M$90MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$25M$14M$29M$41M$32M$45M$88M$83M$45M$39M$27MCapexCapex
2.5%0.9%1.4%2.1%1.4%1.2%1.8%2.4%1.5%1.4%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$47M$90M$73M$120M$254M$219M$376M$248M$99M$90M$181MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.8%5.8%3.6%6.0%10.8%6.0%7.6%7.1%3.3%3.2%6.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$28M$83M$55M$93M$238M$192M$313M$211M$99M$90M$181MFree cash flowFCF
2.9%5.4%2.7%4.7%10.1%5.3%6.3%6.1%3.3%3.2%6.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$392M$81M$702K$261M$0$228M$88M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$11M$13M$13M$14M$15M$16M$24M$33M$37M$39M$40MDividends paidDiv. paid
$3M$2M$6M$8M$2M$48M$214M$55M$75M$54MBuybacksBuybacks
25%12%14%15%9%27%29%14%3%4%ROICROIC
17%16%19%18%7%27%31%16%1%2%3%Return on equityROE
13%13%17%16%6%25%29%13%−2%−1%−0%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$86M$36M$2M$37M$293M$435M$282M$310M$331M$174M$71MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$66M$125M$165M$158M$221M$254M$254M$179M$184M$192M$186MReceivablesReceiv.
$123M$142M$195M$201M$183M$341M$526M$471M$439M$396M$435MInventoryInvent.
$44M$79M$81M$82M$132M$180M$218M$147M$145M$129M$114MAccounts payablePayables
$145M$188M$279M$278M$271M$415M$562M$502M$478M$459M$508MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$281M$314M$372M$411M$714M$1.1B$1.1B$997M$989M$792M$711MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$93M$167M$204M$198M$300M$407M$522M$396M$405M$327M$300MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×1.9×1.8×2.1×2.4×2.6×2.1×2.5×2.4×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1M$243M$274M$275M$348M$348M$484M$515M$484M$484M$484MGoodwillGoodwill
$391M$903M$1.1B$1.1B$1.7B$2.1B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.2B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$0$275M$291M$254M$513M$529M$546M$592M$696M$541M$443MTotal debtDebt
($86M)$239M$289M$217M$220M$94M$264M$283M$365M$367M$372MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.4×8.8×8.7×3.0×10.1×14.1×14.7×4.7×2.2×3.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$268M$442M$534M$632M$828M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.2%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.4%0.3%0.3%0.5%0.6%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
27.0M30.8M31.8M31.7M33.5M34.1M33.0M35.4M29.5M28.3M28.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.08$50.29$63.39$62.60$70.41$106.45$150.23$98.61$100.80$98.88$99.86Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.68$2.32$3.22$3.52$1.84$8.27$11.84$6.10$0.44$0.91$1.36EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.74$2.92$2.31$3.79$7.61$6.43$11.41$6.99$3.35$3.16$6.36Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.04$2.70$1.72$2.93$7.12$5.64$9.47$5.97$3.35$3.16$6.36Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40$0.41$0.40$0.43$0.44$0.48$0.72$0.94$1.25$1.37$1.40Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.91$0.45$0.90$1.29$0.97$1.32$2.67$2.35$1.53$1.39$0.95Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.93$14.36$16.80$19.93$24.74$30.99$38.27$38.65$43.16$43.28$43.46Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.9%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.9%/yr−16.1%/yr
EPS−6.6%/yr−13.1%/yr
Dividends / share+14.6%/yr+25.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.9%/yr+7.5%/yr
Book value / share+17.8%/yr+11.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
3%low FY2025
Gross margin
13%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.1×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$90Mowner earningsvs.$26Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $26M of profit into $90M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$26M
Owner earnings$90M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$26M$13M$216M$391M$282M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$61M+$59M+$47M+$24M+$18M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$15M+$11M+$17M+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$27M+$58M+$21M−$31M−$78M
Cash from operations$129M$144M$295M$401M$237M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$39M−$45M−$47M−$24M−$18M
Owner earnings$90M$99M$248M$376M$219M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$36M−$64M−$27M
Free cash flow$90M$99M$211M$313M$192M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%3%7%8%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $74M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $57M ÷ interest expense $26M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $367M · 6.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $174M − debt $541M
    What this means

    Netting $174M of cash and short-term investments against $541M of debt leaves $367M owed, about 6.4× a year's operating profit (9.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 25 + DIO 59 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 3%–29%; 3% latest = NOPAT $49M ÷ invested capital $1.6B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–11%; latest $90M = operating cash $129M − maintenance capex $39M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $74M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $129M ÷ net income $26M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $93M ÷ Owner Earnings $90M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $90M of Owner Earnings, $93M (103%) went back to shareholders, $39M dividends, $54M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $16M stock comp, the real buyback was about $38M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.65×
    Harvesting
    Capex $39M ÷ depreciation $61M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $541M vs $465M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +16%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.00/share (latest year $0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 5% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 2.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.5%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$711M
  • Cash & short-term investments$62M
  • Receivables$186M
  • Inventory$435M
  • Other current assets$28M
Current liabilities$300M
  • Accounts payable$114M
  • Other current liabilities$186M
Current ratio2.37×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$412Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−9.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$310Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($93M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$485M$42M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$200M
'29$0
'30$350M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$350Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$550Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $541M of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Aug 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$441M · 24%
  • Dividends$214M · 12%
  • Buybacks$466M · 25%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$722M · 39%
  • Returned to owners$680M

    42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $214M as dividends and $466M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $443M and cash and short-term investments fell $24M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $466M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count5.1%

    The diluted count rose from 27M to 28M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.37/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 15% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($640M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $75M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$941M44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity40%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $441M of capital spent building

$30M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Happe$6.6M$14.0M$219M
2022Mr. Happe$6.7M$5.6M$376M
2023Mr. Happe$6.7M$4.0M$248M
2024Mr. Happe$7.2M$4.3M$99M
2025Mr. Happe$9.0M$1.0M$90M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio112:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 28% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Winnebago Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.1%

    Diluted shares grew 5.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $466M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $443M

    Debt rose from $0 to $443M while owner earnings went from about $70M to $145M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Leisure Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GTXGarrett Motion Inc.$3.6B20%12.2%58%8%
PHINPHINIA Inc.$3.5B22%7.3%8%5%
MODModine Manufacturing Company$3.2B17%5.4%12%3%
ALSNAllison Transmission Holdings Inc.$3.0B48%29.0%21%23%
WGOWinnebago Industries$2.8B15%7.9%14%6%
CPSCooper-Standard Holdings Inc.$2.7B12%3.2%7%1%
GNTXGentex$2.5B36%23.7%22%21%
FSSFederal Signal Corporation$2.2B26%11.4%13%7%
Group median21%9.6%14%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Winnebago Industries has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Winnebago Industries earns about $166M on its 5.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−25%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $181M on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-17; net debt $372M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Winnebago Industries (WGO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WGO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WFRD its page in the Manual WGS →

Industry order: ← THO the Leisure Products chapter YETI →