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YETI, YETI Holdings
YETI is a global designer, retailer, and distributor of innovative outdoor products.
From coolers and drinkware to bags and apparel, YETI products are built to meet the unique and varying needs of diverse outdoor pursuits, whether in the remote wilderness, at the beach, or anywhere life takes you.
By consistently delivering high-performing, exceptional products, we have built a strong following of brand loyalists throughout the world, ranging from serious outdoor enthusiasts to individuals who simply value products of uncompromising quality and design.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Drinkware (58%), Coolers and Equipment (40%) and Other (2%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 52% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 7.9% to 20% — on a steadier 52% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 30%, above 15% in 7 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Drinkware at 58%.
- Drinkware58%$1.1B
- Coolers And Equipment40%$749M
- Other2%$34M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $819M | $639M | $779M | $914M | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 51% | 46% | 49% | 52% | 58% | — | 57% | 58% | 57% | 57% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 40% | 36% | 36% | 42% | 38% | 40% | 43% | 45% | 46% | 46% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $88M | $64M | $102M | $90M | $214M | $126M | $225M | $245M | $214M | $204M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 10.8% | 10.0% | 13.1% | 9.8% | 19.6% | 7.9% | 13.6% | 13.4% | 11.4% | 10.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $48M | $15M | $58M | $50M | $156M | $90M | $170M | $176M | $165M | $159M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 26% | 52% | 17% | 25% | 24% | 23% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 24% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $29M | $148M | $176M | $87M | $366M | $101M | $286M | $261M | $255M | $302M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $12M | $21M | $25M | $29M | $31M | $40M | $46M | $48M | $54M | $55M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($149M) | $98M | $80M | ($45M) | $171M | ($46M) | $40M | ($3M) | ($13M) | $42M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $36M | $42M | $21M | $32M | $16M | $46M | $51M | $42M | $43M | $45M | CapexCapex |
| 4.3% | 6.6% | 2.7% | 3.5% | 1.4% | 2.9% | 3.1% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 2.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $17M | $127M | $155M | $55M | $351M | $55M | $235M | $220M | $212M | $257M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.1% | 19.9% | 19.9% | 6.0% | 32.1% | 3.4% | 14.2% | 12.0% | 11.3% | 13.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($7M) | $106M | $155M | $55M | $351M | $55M | $235M | $220M | $212M | $257M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.8% | 16.5% | 19.9% | 6.0% | 32.1% | 3.4% | 14.2% | 12.0% | 11.3% | 13.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $3M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $36M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $454M | $3M | $3M | $636K | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $2M | $0 | $0 | $100M | $0 | $200M | $298M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 9% | 31% | 19% | 95% | 25% | 45% | 40% | 30% | 26% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 199% | 41% | 54% | 17% | 23% | 24% | 25% | 24% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 191% | 41% | 54% | 17% | — | — | — | 24% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $21M | $54M | $80M | $73M | $253M | $235M | $439M | $359M | $188M | $128M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $67M | $59M | $83M | $65M | $79M | $96M | $120M | $141M | $136M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $175M | $145M | $186M | $140M | $371M | $337M | $310M | $291M | $318M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $40M | $69M | $84M | $124M | $141M | $190M | $158M | $140M | $147M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $202M | $136M | $185M | $82M | $310M | $243M | $272M | $292M | $308M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $303M | $297M | $361M | $476M | $719M | $914M | $827M | $660M | $642M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $152M | $187M | $170M | $288M | $409M | $398M | $380M | $334M | $306M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.0× | 1.6× | 2.1× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 2.3× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $54M | $54M | $54M | $54M | $54M | $54M | $73M | $72M | $72M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $516M | $514M | $630M | $737M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $476M | $328M | $297M | $136M | $97M | $88M | $81M | $75M | $75M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $422M | $248M | $224M | ($117M) | ($137M) | ($351M) | ($277M) | ($113M) | ($53M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.1× | 2.0× | 3.3× | 4.1× | 23.4× | 37.8× | 239.3× | — | — | — | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($95M) | ($76M) | $29M | $122M | $288M | $526M | $724M | $740M | $650M | $660M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 14.5% | 2.1% | 1.7% | 5.7% | 0.8% | 1.1% | 1.8% | 2.2% | 2.6% | 2.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 82.8M | 83.0M | 83.5M | 86.3M | 87.8M | 87.2M | 87.4M | 85.8M | 81.6M | 76.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.90 | $7.70 | $9.33 | $10.58 | $12.43 | $18.29 | $18.98 | $21.34 | $22.90 | $24.73 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.58 | $0.19 | $0.69 | $0.58 | $1.77 | $1.03 | $1.94 | $2.05 | $2.03 | $2.07 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.21 | $1.53 | $1.86 | $0.63 | $3.99 | $0.63 | $2.69 | $2.56 | $2.60 | $3.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.08 | $1.27 | $1.86 | $0.63 | $3.99 | $0.63 | $2.69 | $2.56 | $2.60 | $3.36 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $5.48 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.43 | $0.51 | $0.25 | $0.37 | $0.18 | $0.53 | $0.58 | $0.49 | $0.52 | $0.58 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.15 | $-0.92 | $0.35 | $1.41 | $3.28 | $6.04 | $8.28 | $8.63 | $7.97 | $8.60 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 10-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.8%/yr | +13.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +28.7%/yr | −8.2%/yr |
| EPS | +13.3%/yr | +2.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.0%/yr | +24.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +19.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $165M of profit into $212M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $165M | $176M | $170M | $90M | $156M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$54M | +$48M | +$46M | +$40M | +$31M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$48M | +$41M | +$30M | +$18M | +$9M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$13M | −$3M | +$40M | −$46M | +$171M |
| Cash from operations | $255M | $261M | $286M | $101M | $366M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$43M | −$42M | −$51M | −$46M | −$16M |
| Owner earnings | $212M | $220M | $235M | $55M | $351M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 11% | 12% | 14% | 3% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $48M), owner earnings is nearer $164M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 226.7×ComfortableOperating income $214M ÷ interest expense $942K
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $188M − debt $75M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $113M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 28 + DIO 133 − DPO 64 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle8-yr median, range 9%–95%; 30% latest = NOPAT $160M ÷ invested capital $537MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 30% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 2%–32%; latest $212M = operating cash $255M − maintenance capex $43MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $48M of SBC) leaves $164M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $255M ÷ net income $165M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $298M ÷ Owner Earnings $212M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $212M of Owner Earnings, $298M (140%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $298M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $48M stock comp, the real buyback was about $250M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.79×HarvestingCapex $43M ÷ depreciation $54M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.98×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $75M vs $326M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 9 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +322%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.25/share (latest year $2.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 9
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 11% early, 13% lately, median 11%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 7.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Innovation by existing or new competitors could alter the competitive landscape by improving the customer experience and heightening customer expectations or by transforming other aspects of their business through new technologies, such as AI.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$128M
- Receivables$136M
- Inventory$318M
- Other current assets$60M
- Debt due within a year$4M
- Accounts payable$147M
- Other current liabilities$155M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2026
Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$327M · 19%
- Dividends$460M · 27%
- Buybacks$600M · 35%
- Retained (debt / cash)$322M · 19%
- Returned to owners$1.1B
74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $460M as dividends and $600M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$36.50
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $298M, about $36.50 each.
- Net change in share count−7.3%
The diluted count fell from 83M to 77M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Matthew J. Reintjes | $7.7M | $15.5M | $351M |
| 2022 | Matthew J. Reintjes | $5.3M | −$7.6M | $55M |
| 2023 | Matthew J. Reintjes | $10.1M | $14.5M | $235M |
| 2024 | Matthew J. Reintjes | $7.8M | $10.5M | $220M |
| 2026 | Matthew J. Reintjes | $7.7M | $15.3M | $212M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio83:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$48M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 22% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why YETI Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?12.5% vs 14.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.0% early in the record and 12.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 9 years, $17M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Leisure Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HASHasbro Inc. | $4.7B | 67% | 10.5% | 12% | 12% |
| GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp. | $2.6B | 51% | 11.4% | 12% | 7% |
| PTONPeloton Interactive Inc. | $2.5B | 43% | -15.3% | -10% | -5% |
| CALYCallaway Golf Company | $2.1B | 44% | 6.9% | 7% | 8% |
| YETIYETI Holdings | $1.9B | 54% | 11.4% | 30% | 12% |
| BRCBrady Corporation | $1.5B | 50% | 14.6% | 17% | 12% |
| FNKOFunko Inc. | $908M | 36% | 4.7% | 6% | 5% |
| JOUTJohnson Outdoors Inc. | $592M | 42% | 9.1% | 16% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 47% | 9.8% | 12% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what YETI Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, YETI Holdings earns about $224M on its 12.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $257M on 76M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net cash $53M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← YELP its page in the Manual YEXT →
Industry order: ← WGO the Leisure Products chapter