Owner Scorecard


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WMT, Walmart Inc.

Walmart runs discount stores and membership warehouse clubs that sell groceries and general merchandise to everyday shoppers, both in its buildings and online. Most of the money comes from its US stores, with the rest split between markets abroad and the Sam's Club warehouses. It buys goods in enormous volume, marks them up little, and keeps a thin slice on each sale across an immense number of transactions.

Making life easier for busy families includes our commitment to price leadership, which has been and will remain a cornerstone of our business, as well as increasing convenience to save our customers time.

By leading on price, we earn the trust of our customers every day by providing a broad assortment of quality merchandise and services at everyday low prices ("EDLP").

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
WMT · Walmart Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$706.4B
+4.7% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $718.1B 5-yr avg $639.4B
Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 24%
Operating margin 4.2% 5-yr avg 4.1%
ROIC 18% 5-yr avg 17%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Walmart US (68%), Walmart International (18%) and Sam's Club US (13%).
What moves the needle
This is a thin-margin reseller of goods that anyone can stock, so the test is whether sheer scale buys a cost position rivals cannot match — in what it pays suppliers, in moving freight, and in carrying an item from the dock to a customer's door. Watch whether that scale lets it underprice competitors and still earn a real return on the capital sunk into stores and distribution, or whether the saved pennies pass straight to the shopper and leave the owner little. The bad case is plain: staples and groceries carry slight markup, selling online invites a deep-pocketed rival, and a retailer that loses the low-price contest has no second moat behind it. The figures for margin, returns, and debt are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Walmart US is 68% of revenue, with Walmart International the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
  • Walmart US68%$483.0B
  • Walmart International18%$130.4B
  • Sam's Club US13%$93.0B
By geographyUnited States82%International19%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$481.3B$495.8B$510.3B$519.9B$555.2B$567.8B$605.9B$642.6B$674.5B$706.4B$718.1BRevenueRevenue
25%25%24%24%24%24%23%24%24%24%24%Gross marginGross mgn
21%21%21%21%21%21%21%20%21%21%21%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$22.8B$20.4B$22.0B$20.6B$22.5B$25.9B$20.4B$27.0B$29.3B$29.8B$30.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.7%4.1%4.3%4.0%4.1%4.6%3.4%4.2%4.4%4.2%4.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$13.6B$9.9B$6.7B$14.9B$13.5B$13.7B$11.7B$15.5B$19.4B$21.9B$22.7BNet incomeNet inc.
31%32%39%25%34%26%33%26%24%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$31.7B$28.3B$27.8B$25.3B$36.1B$24.2B$28.8B$35.7B$36.4B$41.6B$40.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10.1B$10.5B$10.7B$11.0B$11.2B$10.7B$10.9B$11.9B$13.0B$14.2B$14.7BDepreciationDeprec.
$8.0B$7.9B$10.4B($613M)$11.4B($150M)$6.2B$8.4B$4.0B$5.5B$3.5BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$10.6B$10.1B$10.3B$10.7B$10.3B$13.1B$16.9B$20.6B$23.8B$26.6B$28.3BCapexCapex
2.2%2.0%2.0%2.1%1.8%2.3%2.8%3.2%3.5%3.8%3.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$21.1B$18.3B$17.4B$14.6B$25.8B$11.1B$17.9B$23.9B$23.5B$27.4B$26.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.4%3.7%3.4%2.8%4.6%2.0%3.0%3.7%3.5%3.9%3.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$21.1B$18.3B$17.4B$14.6B$25.8B$11.1B$12.0B$15.1B$12.7B$14.9B$12.6BFree cash flowFCF
4.4%3.7%3.4%2.8%4.6%2.0%2.0%2.4%1.9%2.1%1.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.5B$375M$14.7B$56M$180M$359M$740M$9M$1.9B$53M$53MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$6.2B$6.1B$6.1B$6.0B$6.1B$6.2B$6.1B$6.1B$6.7B$7.5B$7.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
$8.3B$8.3B$7.4B$5.7B$2.6B$9.8B$9.9B$2.8B$4.5B$8.1BBuybacksBuybacks
14%13%12%14%14%18%13%17%19%18%18%ROICROIC
18%13%9%20%17%16%15%18%21%22%24%Return on equityROE
10%5%1%12%9%9%7%11%14%14%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$6.9B$6.8B$7.7B$9.5B$17.7B$14.8B$8.6B$9.9B$9.0B$10.7B$10.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$5.8B$5.6B$6.3B$6.3B$6.5B$8.3B$7.9B$8.8B$10.0B$11.2B$10.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$43.0B$43.8B$44.3B$44.4B$44.9B$56.5B$56.6B$54.9B$56.4B$58.9B$62.6BInventoryInvent.
$41.4B$46.1B$47.1B$47.0B$49.1B$55.3B$53.7B$56.8B$58.7B$63.1B$62.9BAccounts payablePayables
$7.4B$3.3B$3.5B$3.7B$2.3B$9.5B$10.8B$6.9B$7.7B$7.0B$10.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$57.7B$59.7B$61.9B$61.8B$90.1B$81.1B$75.7B$76.9B$79.5B$84.9B$88.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$66.9B$78.5B$77.5B$77.8B$92.6B$87.4B$92.2B$92.4B$96.6B$107.5B$114.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.8×0.8×0.8×1.0×0.9×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$17.0B$18.2B$31.2B$31.1B$29.0B$29.0B$28.2B$28.1B$28.8B$28.7B$28.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$198.8B$204.5B$219.3B$236.5B$252.5B$244.9B$243.2B$252.4B$260.8B$284.7B$289.6BTotal assetsAssets
$38.3B$33.8B$45.7B$49.2B$44.3B$37.8B$39.6B$40.4B$36.8B$38.8B$40.8BTotal debtDebt
$31.4B$27.0B$37.9B$39.7B$26.6B$23.1B$31.0B$30.5B$27.8B$28.1B$30.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$77.8B$77.9B$72.5B$74.7B$80.9B$83.3B$76.7B$83.9B$91.0B$99.6B$94.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
9.34B9.03B8.84B8.60B8.54B8.41B8.20B8.11B8.08B8.02B8.00BShares out (diluted)Shares
$51.55$54.90$57.76$60.43$65.01$67.47$73.87$79.26$83.47$88.06$89.78Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.46$1.09$0.75$1.73$1.58$1.62$1.42$1.91$2.41$2.73$2.84EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.26$2.03$1.97$1.69$3.02$1.32$2.18$2.94$2.90$3.41$3.28Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.26$2.03$1.97$1.69$3.02$1.32$1.46$1.86$1.57$1.86$1.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.67$0.68$0.69$0.70$0.72$0.73$0.75$0.76$0.83$0.94$0.95Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.14$1.11$1.17$1.24$1.20$1.56$2.06$2.54$2.94$3.32$3.54Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.33$8.62$8.21$8.68$9.47$9.89$9.35$10.34$11.26$12.42$11.79Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.1%/yr+6.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.7%/yr+2.5%/yr
EPS+7.2%/yr+11.5%/yr
Dividends / share+3.9%/yr+5.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.6%/yr+22.5%/yr
Book value / share+4.5%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
8Bpeak FY2017
ROIC
18%low FY2019
Gross margin
24%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.0×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$27.4Bowner earningsvs.$21.9Bnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $27.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $14.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put $12.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $14.9B.

Reported net income$21.9B
Owner earnings$27.4B · 4% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$21.9B$19.4B$15.5B$11.7B$13.7B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$14.2B+$13.0B+$11.9B+$10.9B+$10.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$5.5B+$4.0B+$8.4B+$6.2B−$150M
Cash from operations$41.6B$36.4B$35.7B$28.8B$24.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$14.2B−$13.0B−$11.9B−$10.9B−$13.1B
Owner earnings$27.4B$23.5B$23.9B$17.9B$11.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$12.4B−$10.8B−$8.8B−$5.9B
Free cash flow$14.9B$12.7B$15.1B$12.0B$11.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%3%4%3%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $14.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $12.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $28.1B · 0.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $10.7B − debt $38.8B
    What this means

    Netting $10.7B of cash and short-term investments against $38.8B of debt leaves $28.1B owed, about 0.9× a year's operating profit (1.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 6 + DIO 40 − DPO 43 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 12%–19%; 18% latest = NOPAT $22.4B ÷ invested capital $127.7B
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–5%; latest $27.4B = operating cash $41.6B − maintenance capex $14.2B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put $12.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $14.9B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $41.6B ÷ net income $21.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $15.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $27.4B
    What this means

    Of $27.4B Owner Earnings, $15.6B (57%) went back to shareholders, $7.5B dividends, $8.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.88×
    Expanding
    Capex $26.6B ÷ depreciation $14.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $706.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.79×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $38.8B vs ($22.6B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +88%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.38/share (latest year $2.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 4% lately, median 4%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 3.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, to remain competitive, we must continue to develop, integrate and scale digital tools, including AI-powered search and discovery platforms and capabilities, useful interfaces and other marketing tools such as third-party recommendation engines, paid search and mobile applications.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$88.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$10.7B
  • Receivables$10.7B
  • Inventory$62.6B
  • Other current assets$4.4B
Current liabilities$114.6B
  • Debt due within a year$3.9B
  • Accounts payable$62.9B
  • Other current liabilities$47.8B
Current ratio0.77×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($26.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$3.9B due · $10.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$66.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$56.8B$16.1B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $61.1B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'27$3.5B
'28$3.2B
'29$3.4B
'30$2.1B
'31$2.6B
later$23.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2031, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3.5Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$6.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$3.5Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$38.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Apr 30, 2026$10.7B
One year of owner earnings (FY2026)$27.4B
Together, against $3.5B due next year10.8×

Cash on hand as of Apr 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $38.1B against the $3.5B due in the twelve months after the Jan 31, 2026 schedule: 11 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$3.7B
'27$3.5B
'28$3.2B
'29$2.8B
'30$2.5B
later$17.8B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$3.7Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$33.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$22.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$38.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$22.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$61.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $61.1B, of which the leases are 37%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $315.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$153.0B · 48%
  • Dividends$63.2B · 20%
  • Buybacks$67.4B · 21%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$32.3B · 10%
  • Returned to owners$130.6B

    65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $63.2B as dividends and $67.4B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$38.19

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1765M shares were bought for $67.4B, about $38.19 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $23.07 (2017) to $95.15 (2026); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $44.72 ($9.9B).

  • Net change in share count−14.3%

    The diluted count fell from 9336M to 7999M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.94/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Doug McMillon$25.7M$31.5M$11.1B
2023Doug McMillon$25.3M$31.0M$17.9B
2024Doug McMillon$27.0M$47.5M$23.9B
2025Doug McMillon$27.4M$101.5M$23.5B
2026Doug McMillon$29.2M$36.5M$27.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio958:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Walmart Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WMTWalmart Inc.$706.4B24%4.2%14%4%
COSTCostco Wholesale Corp.$275.2B13%3.3%32%4%
TGTTarget Corp.$104.8B29%5.6%17%5%
DGDollar General Corporation$42.7B31%8.4%18%6%
MMacy's$21.8B38%5.0%13%4%
BJBJ's Wholesale$21.5B18%3.7%24%3%
DLTRDollar Tree Inc.$19.4B31%8.3%14%5%
PSMTPriceSmart Inc.$5.3B15%4.3%13%3%
Group median27%4.6%16%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Walmart Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Walmart Inc. earns about $25.3B on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $12.6B on 7958M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-27; net debt $30.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($28.3B) runs well above depreciation ($14.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $26.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Walmart Inc. (WMT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WMT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WMS its page in the Manual WNC →

Industry order: ← TGT the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter