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WOOF, Petco Health and Wellness

Specialty Retail retail Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Petco Health and Wellness is a leading pet specialty retailer focused on improving the lives of pets, pet parents, and our own partners.

Some market and industry data, and statistical information and forecasts, are also based on management's estimates, which are derived from our review of internal surveys as well as the independent sources referred to above.

We nurture the pet-human bond in the aisles of more than 1,500 Petco stores across the U.S., Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Chile.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

WOOF · Petco Health and Wellness

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$6.0B

−2.5% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.0B 5-yr avg $6.0B

Gross margin 39% 5-yr avg 39%

Operating margin 2.2% 5-yr avg −1.7%

ROIC 3% 5-yr avg −6%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Consumables (50%), Supplies and companion animals (33%) and Services and other (17%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 2.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −19% to 4.6% — on a steadier 40% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Consumables at 50%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026

Consumables50%$3.0B
Supplies and companion animals33%$2.0B
Services and other17%$1.0B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMay 2026
								Income statement
$4.4B	$4.9B	$5.8B	$6.0B	$6.3B	$6.1B	$6.0B	$6.0B	RevenueRevenue
43%	43%	42%	40%	38%	38%	39%	39%	Gross marginGross mgn
40%	39%	37%	36%	37%	38%	37%	37%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$111M	$194M	$266M	$226M	($1.2B)	$7M	$120M	$129M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.5%	4.0%	4.6%	3.7%	−18.9%	0.1%	2.0%	2.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($96M)	($26M)	$164M	$91M	($1.3B)	($102M)	$9M	$6M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	25%	28%	—	—	41%	59%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$110M	$269M	$358M	$346M	$216M	$178M	$314M	$299M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$174M	$175M	$172M	$194M	$204M	$209M	$197M	$196M	DepreciationDeprec.
$23M	$107M	($28M)	$590K	$1.2B	$21M	$76M	$64M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$157M	$160M	$239M	$278M	$226M	$128M	$127M	$137M	CapexCapex
3.5%	3.2%	4.1%	4.6%	3.6%	2.1%	2.1%	2.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($47M)	$109M	$186M	$152M	($10M)	$50M	$187M	$162M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.1%	2.2%	3.2%	2.5%	−0.2%	0.8%	3.1%	2.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($47M)	$109M	$119M	$68M	($10M)	$50M	$187M	$162M	Free cash flowFCF
−1.1%	2.2%	2.1%	1.1%	−0.2%	0.8%	3.1%	2.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3M	—	$4M	$10M	$7M	$629K	—	$165K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	5%	4%	-35%	—	3%	3%	ROICROIC
-17%	-1%	7%	4%	-108%	-9%	1%	0%	Return on equityROE
−17%	−1%	7%	4%	−108%	−9%	1%	0%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$155M	$111M	$212M	$202M	$125M	$166M	$257M	$167M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$42M	$56M	$50M	$44M	$40M	$46M	$37M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$539M	$675M	$652M	$685M	$653M	$590M	$633M	InventoryInvent.
—	$339M	$404M	$381M	$485M	$493M	$451M	$481M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$241M	$327M	$321M	$244M	$201M	$185M	$189M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$778M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$952M	$974M	$1.0B	$961M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$875M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$980M	$980M	$980M	$980M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$6.1B	$6.5B	$6.6B	$5.4B	$5.2B	$5.2B	$5.1B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total debtDebt
—	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.4×	0.9×	3.4×	2.2×	-7.8×	0.0×	0.9×	1.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$561M	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.3%	0.8%	1.0%	1.3%	0.8%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
209M	211M	265M	266M	268M	273M	286M	284M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$21.22	$23.35	$21.89	$22.70	$23.38	$22.37	$20.83	$21.03	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.46	$-0.13	$0.62	$0.34	$-4.78	$-0.37	$0.03	$0.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.22	$0.52	$0.70	$0.57	$-0.04	$0.18	$0.65	$0.57	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.22	$0.52	$0.45	$0.26	$-0.04	$0.18	$0.65	$0.57	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.75	$0.76	$0.90	$1.05	$0.84	$0.47	$0.44	$0.48	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.69	$9.82	$8.57	$8.95	$4.43	$4.07	$4.07	$4.07	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.3%/yr	−2.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+4.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−8.4%/yr	−10.1%/yr
Book value / share	+7.2%/yr	−16.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

286Mpeak FY2026

ROIC

3%low FY2024

Gross margin

39%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.6×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$187Mowner earningsvs.$9Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $9M of profit into $187M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$9M

Owner earnings$187M · 3% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$9M	($102M)	($1.3B)	$91M	$164M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$197M	+$209M	+$204M	+$194M	+$172M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$33M	+$50M	+$82M	+$61M	+$49M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$76M	+$21M	+$1.2B	+$590K	−$28M
Cash from operations	$314M	$178M	$216M	$346M	$358M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$127M	−$128M	−$226M	−$194M	−$172M
Owner earnings	$187M	$50M	($10M)	$152M	$186M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$84M	−$67M
Free cash flow	$187M	$50M	($10M)	$68M	$119M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	1%	0%	3%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer $154M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.9×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $120M ÷ interest expense $131M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 10.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $257M − debt $1.5B

What this means
Netting $257M of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 10.2× a year's operating profit (12.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 17d

Tight

DSO 3 + DIO 59 − DPO 45 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -35%–5%; 3% latest = NOPAT $71M ÷ invested capital $2.4B

Industry peers: median 23%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -1%–3%; latest $187M = operating cash $314M − maintenance capex $127M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves $154M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 34.64×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $314M ÷ net income $9M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.65×

Harvesting

Capex $127M ÷ depreciation $197M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.90×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs ($114M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −3364%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.61/share (latest year $0.03), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to −6% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +25%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 25% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · −18.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +5.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI into their business, services, and products more rapidly or more successfully than us, which could hinder our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$961M

Cash & short-term investments$167M
Receivables$37M
Inventory$633M
Other current assets$124M

Current liabilities$1.1B

Accounts payable$481M
Other current liabilities$650M

Current ratio0.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.29×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($169M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$175Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.8B$1.3B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.9B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$31Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$420M

'27$350M

'28$294M

'29$210M

'30$142M

later$286M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$420Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.4Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.5B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.4B

Total fixed claims on the business$2.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.9B, of which the leases are 48%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2020–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.3B · 73%
Retained (debt / cash)$476M · 27%

Net change in share count35.8%
The diluted count rose from 209M to 284M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$980M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity84%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$24Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building

$1.2B written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership6.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$33M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 27% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Petco Health and Wellness is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2026.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?35.8%
Diluted shares grew 35.8% over 2020–2026. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Inventory, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ULTAUlta Beauty Inc.	$12.4B	38%	13.4%	48%	10%
BBWIBath & Body Works	$7.3B	44%	17.3%	56%	11%
SIGSignet Jewelers	$6.8B	38%	6.7%	15%	8%
ASOAcademy Sports and Outdoors	$6.1B	34%	8.8%	25%	7%
WOOFPetco Health and Wellness	$6.0B	40%	2.5%	4%	2%
SBHSally Beauty Holdings	$3.7B	50%	9.8%	20%	5%
TITNTitan Machinery Inc.	$2.4B	18%	1.9%	7%	5%
SGUStar Group L.P.	$1.8B	62%	4.1%	—	4%
Group median	—	39%	7.8%	20%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Petco Health and Wellness has delivered.

Petco Health and Wellness’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Petco Health and Wellness earns about $132M on its 2.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($132M) Net of stock comp (−$33M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−9%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’26+25%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $162M on 284M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WOOF against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Petco Health and Wellness (WOOF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WOOF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WOLF its page in the Manual WOR →

Industry order: ← WINA the Specialty Retail chapter WSHP →