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XRAY, DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc.
DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. is the world's largest diversified manufacturer of professional dental products and technologies, with a 139-year history of innovation and service to the dental industry and a vision of improving oral health and continence care globally.
Dentsply Sirona develops, manufactures, and markets comprehensive solutions, including technologically advanced dental equipment supported by cloud-enabled software solutions as well as dental products and healthcare consumable products in urology and enterology under a strong portfolio of world-class brands.
Dentsply Sirona's innovative products provide high-quality, effective, and connected solutions to advance patient care and deliver better, safer, and faster dentistry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 39% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 14% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −11%) on a 53% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and what follows it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $0 | $4.0B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $3.3B | $4.2B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 55% | 52% | 54% | 50% | 55% | 54% | 53% | 52% | 50% | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | 42% | 43% | 39% | 39% | 37% | 41% | 41% | 42% | 39% | 39% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $455M | ($1.6B) | ($958M) | $353M | ($3M) | $608M | ($937M) | ($85M) | ($879M) | ($422M) | ($520M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| — | −39.1% | −24.0% | 8.8% | −0.1% | 14.4% | −23.9% | −2.1% | −23.2% | −11.5% | −14.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $430M | ($1.6B) | ($1.0B) | $256M | ($73M) | $411M | ($950M) | ($132M) | ($910M) | ($598M) | ($628M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 2% | — | — | 24% | — | 25% | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $563M | $602M | $500M | $639M | $649M | $657M | $517M | $377M | $461M | $235M | $268M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $272M | $316M | $331M | $323M | $334M | $347M | $328M | $343M | $349M | $352M | $352M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($180M) | $1.8B | $1.2B | ($6M) | $341M | ($149M) | $1.1B | $120M | $983M | $448M | $513M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $125M | $144M | $183M | $123M | $87M | $142M | $149M | $149M | $180M | $131M | $164M | CapexCapex |
| — | 3.6% | 4.6% | 3.1% | 2.6% | 3.4% | 3.8% | 3.8% | 4.7% | 3.6% | 4.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $438M | $458M | $317M | $516M | $562M | $515M | $368M | $228M | $281M | $104M | $104M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 11.5% | 8.0% | 12.8% | 16.8% | 12.2% | 9.4% | 5.8% | 7.4% | 2.8% | 2.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $438M | $458M | $317M | $516M | $562M | $515M | $368M | $228M | $281M | $104M | $104M | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | 11.5% | 8.0% | 12.8% | 16.8% | 12.2% | 9.4% | 5.8% | 7.4% | 2.8% | 2.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $342M | $146M | $130M | $3M | $1.1B | $248M | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $65M | $78M | $79M | $81M | $88M | $92M | $104M | $116M | $126M | $128M | $128M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $814M | $401M | $250M | $260M | $140M | $200M | $150M | $300M | $250M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | -16% | -12% | 4% | -0% | 7% | -14% | -1% | -21% | -10% | -12% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | -23% | -20% | 5% | -1% | 8% | -25% | -4% | -47% | -45% | -48% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | −25% | −21% | 3% | −3% | 6% | −28% | −8% | −53% | −54% | −57% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $384M | $321M | $310M | $405M | $438M | $339M | $365M | $334M | $272M | $326M | $190M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $517M | $623M | $599M | $562M | $476M | $515M | $627M | $624M | $564M | $642M | $659M | InventoryInvent. |
| $223M | $284M | $284M | $308M | $302M | $262M | $279M | $305M | $241M | $300M | $259M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $294M | $339M | $315M | $254M | $174M | $253M | $348M | $319M | $323M | $342M | $400M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.7B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $1.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $768M | $955M | $1.0B | $995M | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.3× | 2.1× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.1× | 1.5× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $6.0B | $4.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $1.6B | $1.1B | $1.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $11.6B | $10.4B | $8.7B | $8.6B | $9.3B | $9.2B | $7.6B | $7.4B | $5.8B | $5.4B | $5.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $2.3B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 12.7× | -40.8× | -25.9× | 11.8× | -0.1× | 10.0× | -14.4× | -1.0× | -12.7× | -4.8× | -5.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8.1B | $6.6B | $5.1B | $5.1B | $4.9B | $5.0B | $3.8B | $3.3B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | 1.2% | 0.5% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $1.7B | $1.1B | — | $157M | — | $1.2B | $291M | $773M | $525M | $525M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 222M | 229M | 224M | 224M | 219M | 220M | 216M | 212M | 203M | 199M | 200M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.00 | $17.41 | $17.77 | $17.92 | $15.23 | $19.21 | $18.20 | $18.70 | $18.67 | $18.46 | $18.41 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.94 | $-6.76 | $-4.51 | $1.14 | $-0.33 | $1.87 | $-4.41 | $-0.62 | $-4.48 | $-3.00 | $-3.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.98 | $1.99 | $1.41 | $2.30 | $2.56 | $2.34 | $1.71 | $1.08 | $1.38 | $0.52 | $0.52 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.98 | $1.99 | $1.41 | $2.30 | $2.56 | $2.34 | $1.71 | $1.08 | $1.38 | $0.52 | $0.52 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.29 | $0.34 | $0.35 | $0.36 | $0.40 | $0.42 | $0.48 | $0.55 | $0.62 | $0.64 | $0.64 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.56 | $0.63 | $0.82 | $0.55 | $0.40 | $0.64 | $0.69 | $0.70 | $0.89 | $0.66 | $0.82 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $36.62 | $28.84 | $22.83 | $22.70 | $22.50 | $22.69 | $17.68 | $15.53 | $9.56 | $6.72 | $6.59 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | — | +3.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −13.8%/yr | −27.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +9.2%/yr | +9.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.7%/yr | +10.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | −17.2%/yr | −21.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $598M loss into $104M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($598M) | ($910M) | ($132M) | ($950M) | $411M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$352M | +$349M | +$343M | +$328M | +$347M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$33M | +$39M | +$46M | +$59M | +$48M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$448M | +$983M | +$120M | +$1.1B | −$149M |
| Cash from operations | $235M | $461M | $377M | $517M | $657M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$131M | −$180M | −$149M | −$149M | −$142M |
| Owner earnings | $104M | $281M | $228M | $368M | $515M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 7% | 6% | 9% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer $71M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -4.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($422M) ÷ interest expense $88M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $326M + ST investments $37K − debt $2.2B
What this means
Netting $326M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -21%–7%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($333M) ÷ invested capital $3.3BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 3%–17%; latest $104M = operating cash $235M − maintenance capex $131MIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves $71M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($598M) · cash from operations $235M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $128M ÷ Owner Earnings $104M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $104M of Owner Earnings, $128M (123%) went back to shareholders, $128M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.37×HarvestingCapex $131M ÷ depreciation $352M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.51×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs $680M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.73/share (latest year $-2.99), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −18% → −12% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −18% early to −12% lately, median −11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −39.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$190M
- Inventory$659M
- Other current assets$996M
- Debt due within a year$230M
- Accounts payable$259M
- Other current liabilities$718M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $294M against the $228M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.3 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $5.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.4B · 27%
- Dividends$957M · 18%
- Buybacks$2.8B · 53%
- Retained (debt / cash)$65M · 1%
- Returned to owners$3.7B
98% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $957M as dividends and $2.8B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$47.43
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 58M shares were bought for $2.8B, about $47.43 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.60 (2024) to $64.74 (2017); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $60.74 ($814M).
- Net change in share count−9.8%
The diluted count fell from 222M to 200M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.64/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$5.7B written down across 7 years (2017, 2018, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership0.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$33M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.3% vs 10.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.7% early in the record and 5.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.5B → $2.2B
Debt rose from $1.5B to $2.2B while owner earnings went from about $404M to $204M — about 3.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $6.1B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Medical Devices & Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DXCMDexCom Inc. | $4.7B | 65% | 12.1% | 10% | 17% |
| HOLXHologic | $4.1B | 66% | 20.6% | 13% | 24% |
| ALGNAlign Technology | $4.0B | 72% | 19.9% | 23% | 22% |
| XRAYDENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. | $3.7B | 53% | -11.5% | -6% | 9% |
| MMEDMiniMed Group Inc. | $3.1B | 56% | -5.4% | -3% | -4% |
| GMEDGlobus Medical | $2.9B | 75% | 19.9% | 11% | 17% |
| NVSTEnvista Holdings | $2.7B | 56% | 10.3% | 4% | 12% |
| PODDInsulet Corporation | $2.7B | 65% | 6.2% | 5% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 65% | 11.2% | 7% | 14% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. earns about $345M on its 9.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $104M on 200M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $2.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($164M) runs well above depreciation ($352M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $137M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← XPRO its page in the Manual XRN →
Industry order: ← WST the Medical Devices & Equipment chapter ZBH →