Owner Scorecard


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XPRO, Expro Group Holdings N.V.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive

Expro Group Holdings N.V. is a Netherlands limited liability company and includes the activities of its wholly owned subsidiaries.

Our Operations Working for clients across the entire well life cycle, we are a leading provider of energy services, offering cost-effective, innovative solutions and what we consider to be best-in-class safety and service quality.

With roots dating to 1938, we have approximately 8,500 employees and provide services and solutions to leading exploration and production companies in both onshore and offshore environments in over 50 countries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
XPRO · Expro Group Holdings N.V.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.6B
−6.2% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.6B 5-yr avg $1.4B
Operating margin 4.7% 5-yr avg −0.8%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg −0%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 0%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by NLA (35%) and ESSA (30%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −15% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 8.1% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest NLA at 35%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • NLA35%$558M
  • ESSA30%$487M
  • MENA23%$364M
  • APAC12%$199M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$488M$455M$522M$810M$675M$826M$1.3B$1.5B$1.7B$1.6B$1.6BRevenueRevenue
86%81%95%Gross marginGross mgn
35%28%24%4%4%9%5%4%5%5%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($163M)($215M)($93M)($72M)($322M)($128M)$2M$11M$94M$81M$74MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−33.5%−47.2%−17.8%−8.9%−47.7%−15.4%0.2%0.7%5.5%5.0%4.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
($135M)($159M)($91M)($65M)($307M)($132M)($20M)($23M)$52M$52M$37MNet incomeNet inc.
47%40%54%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($11M)$25M($33M)$81M$70M$16M$80M$138M$169M$210M$194MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$114M$122M$111M$123M$114M$124M$140M$172M$163M$192M$192MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)$48M($64M)$12M$253M$24M($58M)($30M)($72M)($63M)($64M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$42M$22M$20M$104M$112M$82M$82M$122M$144M$112M$105MCapexCapex
8.6%4.8%3.8%12.8%16.6%9.9%6.4%8.1%8.4%7.0%6.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($53M)$3M($52M)($23M)($42M)($65M)($2M)$16M$26M$98M$89MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−10.9%0.6%−10.0%−2.8%−6.2%−7.9%−0.1%1.1%1.5%6.1%5.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($53M)$3M($52M)($23M)($42M)($65M)($2M)$16M$26M$98M$89MFree cash flowFCF
−10.9%0.6%−10.0%−2.8%−6.2%−7.9%−0.1%1.1%1.5%6.1%5.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$150M$0$0$48M$0$0$29M$32M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$79M$50M$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$3M$0$0$0$0$13M$20M$14M$40MBuybacksBuybacks
-13%-19%-9%-8%-51%-9%0%0%3%3%3%ROICROIC
-10%-14%-9%-7%-50%-10%-2%-2%3%3%2%Return on equityROE
−16%−19%−9%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$320M$294M$213M$195M$119M$235M$215M$152M$183M$196M$173MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$89M$83M$115M$102M$194M$319M$419M$469M$518M$477M$492MReceivablesReceiv.
$139M$76M$69M$79M$53M$125M$154M$143M$159M$168M$168MInventoryInvent.
$16M$34M$28M$17M$64M$85M$101M$147M$144M$101M$129MAccounts payablePayables
$212M$126M$156M$164M$183M$359M$472M$466M$533M$544M$532MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$640M$512M$492M$466M$428M$764M$866M$852M$964M$960M$964MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$99M$118M$130M$129M$224M$331M$438M$489M$484M$444M$453MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.4×4.3×3.8×3.6×1.9×2.3×2.0×1.7×2.0×2.2×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$211M$211M$211M$100M$26M$180M$221M$248M$349M$349M$349MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.6B$1.3B$1.2B$994M$1.0B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2BTotal assetsAssets
$0$20M$121M$79M$79MTotal debtDebt
($215M)($132M)($62M)($117M)($93M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.3B$1.1B$993M$925M$612M$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.3%3.0%2.0%1.4%1.6%1.4%1.3%1.5%1.8%1.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
58.9M74.3M74.7M70.9M70.9M80.5M109M109M116M116M114MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.28$6.12$7.00$11.43$9.52$10.25$11.73$13.86$14.79$13.88$13.94Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.30$-2.15$-1.22$-0.91$-4.33$-1.64$-0.18$-0.21$0.45$0.45$0.32EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.90$0.04$-0.70$-0.32$-0.59$-0.81$-0.02$0.15$0.22$0.84$0.78Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.90$0.04$-0.70$-0.32$-0.59$-0.81$-0.02$0.15$0.22$0.84$0.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.34$0.67$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.72$0.29$0.26$1.47$1.59$1.01$0.75$1.12$1.24$0.97$0.92Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.28$15.02$13.30$13.04$8.63$16.11$11.79$11.87$12.88$13.25$13.34Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.9%/yr+7.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.4%/yr−9.3%/yr
Book value / share−5.6%/yr+9.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • ESSA-13.7%
    “ESSA Revenue for ESSA was $116.3 million for the three months ended December 31, 2025, a decrease of $9.5 million, or 7.6%, compared to $125.8 million for the three months ended September 30, 2025. The decrease in revenue was primarily driven by lower subsea well access and well construction revenue in Angola, and central and west Africa, partially offset by higher well flow management revenue in Bulgaria.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record
  • MENA+9.5%
    “MENA Revenue for MENA was $93.0 million for the three months ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $6.9 million, or 8.0%, compared to $86.1 million for the three months ended September 30, 2025. The increase in revenue was driven by higher well flow management revenue in Algeria and Saudi Arabia.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • APAC-20.6%
    “APAC Revenue for APAC was $42.5 million for the three months ended December 31, 2025, a decrease of $6.1 million, or 12.5%, compared to $48.6 million for the three months ended September 30, 2025. The decrease in revenue was primarily due to lower well flow management activity in Indonesia and India, lower well construction revenue in Australia, offset by higher subsea well access activity in Australia.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
116Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
3%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$98Mowner earningsvs.$52Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $52M of profit into $98M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$52M
Owner earnings$98M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$52M$52M($23M)($20M)($132M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$192M+$163M+$172M+$140M+$124M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$29M+$26M+$20M+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$63M−$72M−$30M−$58M+$24M
Cash from operations$210M$169M$138M$80M$16M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$112M−$144M−$122M−$82M−$82M
Owner earnings$98M$26M$16M($2M)($65M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%2%1%0%-8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $29M), owner earnings is nearer $69M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $196M + ST investments $2M − debt $86M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $112M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 108 + DIO 703 − DPO 424 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -51%–3%; 3% latest = NOPAT $49M ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $98M = operating cash $210M − maintenance capex $112M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -3%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $29M of SBC) leaves $69M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $210M ÷ net income $52M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $40M ÷ Owner Earnings $98M
    What this means

    Of $98M Owner Earnings, $40M (41%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $40M buybacks. Net of $29M stock comp, the real buyback was about $11M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.59×
    Harvesting
    Capex $112M ÷ depreciation $192M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.16×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $86M vs $517M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.24/share (latest year $0.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −33% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −33% early to 4% lately, median −15% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −47.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We are integrating AI tools into our systems, and our third-party service providers, as well as our competitors, may also develop or use such tools.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$964M
  • Cash & short-term investments$173M
  • Receivables$492M
  • Inventory$168M
  • Other current assets$131M
Current liabilities$453M
  • Debt due within a year$87K
  • Accounts payable$129M
  • Other current liabilities$324M
Current ratio2.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.76×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$512Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$87K due · $173M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$926Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$235MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$158M$79M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$21Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $747M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$842M · 113%
  • Dividends$129M · 17%
  • Buybacks$91M · 12%
  • Returned to owners$220M

    $129M as dividends and $91M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$314M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $314M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $147M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$12.17

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 6M shares were bought for $74M, about $12.17 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $10.83 (2025) to $16.69 (2023); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $10.83 ($40M).

  • Net change in share count93.0%

    The diluted count rose from 59M to 114M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$600M27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity23%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$259Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $842M of capital spent building

$218M written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 84% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Mr. Kearney$4.0M$737k($42M)
2021Mr. Jardon$8.1M$16.2M($65M)
2021Mr. Kearney$7.2M$8.2M($65M)
2022Mr. Jardon$2.5M$1.9M($2M)
2023Mr. Jardon$7.1M$1.9M$16M
2024Mr. Jardon$7.0M$1.8M$26M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$29M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 36% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Expro Group Holdings N.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?93.0%

    Diluted shares grew 93.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $91M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OIIOceaneering International$2.6B12%2.6%5%4%
ACDCProFrac Holding Corp.$1.9B-2.5%-3%3%
RESRPC$1.6B26%4.8%7%5%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.$1.6B95%-12.2%-8%-1%
WTTRSelect Water Solutions$1.4B12%1.9%-0%6%
NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp$1.3B13%7.4%8%9%
HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc.$1.3B12%3.3%1%9%
PUMPProPetro Holding Corp.$1.3B0.1%0%7%
Group median12%2.3%0%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Expro Group Holdings N.V. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+146%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $89M on 113M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $93M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Expro Group Holdings N.V. (XPRO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XPRO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← XPOF its page in the Manual XRAY →

Industry order: ← WTTR the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter