Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← ZENA Manual ZH → ← VFC Textiles & Apparel

ZGN, Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.

Textiles & Apparel consumer brand Cyclical

Revenue is led by ZEGNA brand (62%) and Tom Ford Fashion (17%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in EUR
ZGN · Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
€1.9B
−1.5% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue €1.9B 5-yr avg €1.7B
Gross margin 68% 5-yr avg 64%
Operating margin 7.3% 5-yr avg 5.9%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 64% and operating margin about 7.3% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.3% to 11% — on a steadier 64% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 27% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

ZEGNA brand is 62% of revenue, with Tom Ford Fashion the other meaningful line at 17%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • ZEGNA brand62%€1.2B
  • Tom Ford Fashion17%€317M
  • Thom Browne14%€268M
  • Textile7%€134M
  • Other1%€16M
By geographyAmericas30%United States25%Greater China Region23%Rest of APAC12%Italy12%Netherlands1%Other0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
€1.3B€1.0B€1.3B€1.5B€1.9B€1.9B€1.9B€1.9BRevenueRevenue
62%62%64%67%68%68%Gross marginGross mgn
€89M(€23M)(€94M)€148M€208M€167M€139M€139MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.7%−2.2%−7.3%9.9%10.9%8.6%7.3%7.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
€22M(€51M)(€136M)€51M€122M€77M€99M€99MNet incomeNet inc.
41%22%34%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
€174M€71M€281M€146M€275M€279M€336M€336MOperating cash flowOp. cash
€168M€166M€155M€172M€193M€225M€245M€245MDepreciationDeprec.
(€16M)(€45M)€262M(€77M)(€39M)(€23M)(€8M)(€8M)Working capital & otherWC & other
€46M€28M€80M€49M€57M€100M€81M€81MCapexCapex
3.5%2.7%6.2%3.3%3.0%5.1%4.2%4.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
€128M€43M€201M€97M€218M€179M€255M€255MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.7%4.3%15.6%6.5%11.5%9.2%13.3%13.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
€128M€43M€201M€97M€218M€179M€255M€255MFree cash flowFCF
9.7%4.3%15.6%6.5%11.5%9.2%13.3%13.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
€0€0€102K€22M€25M€30M€30M€30MDividends paidDiv. paid
€0€0€455M€0€0BuybacksBuybacks
9%-2%-12%14%25%12%11%11%ROICROIC
3%-8%-23%8%14%8%10%10%Return on equityROE
3%−8%−23%4%11%5%7%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
€211M€667M€800M€575M€387M€296M€298M€298MCash & investmentsCash+inv
€139M€160M€177M€240M€249M€227M€227MReceivablesReceiv.
€321M€338M€411M€523M€521M€507M€507MInventoryInvent.
€188M€223M€271M€314M€310M€326M€326MAccounts payablePayables
€272M€276M€317M€449M€460M€408M€408MOperating working capitalOper. WC
€1.2B€1.4B€1.3B€1.3B€1.2B€1.2B€1.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
€535M€702M€867M€1.0B€853M€750M€750MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×2.0×1.5×1.3×1.4×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
€420M€388M€425M€456M€572M€614M€554M€554MGoodwillGoodwill
€2.4B€2.5B€2.4B€2.8B€2.8B€2.8B€2.8BTotal assetsAssets
€559M€472M€185M€113M€196M€162M€162MTotal debtDebt
(€109M)(€329M)(€390M)(€274M)(€100M)(€135M)(€135M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.4×-0.5×-2.1×2.7×3.1×3.2×2.8×2.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
€730M€602M€601M€679M€840M€916M€1.0B€1.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
202M201M203M238M247M252M260M260MShares out (diluted)Shares
€6.56€5.04€6.35€6.28€7.71€7.74€7.38€7.38Revenue / shareRev/sh
€0.11€-0.25€-0.67€0.22€0.49€0.31€0.38€0.38EPS (diluted)EPS
€0.64€0.21€0.99€0.41€0.88€0.71€0.98€0.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
€0.64€0.21€0.99€0.41€0.88€0.71€0.98€0.98Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
€0.00€0.00€0.00€0.09€0.10€0.12€0.12€0.12Dividends / shareDiv/sh
€0.23€0.14€0.39€0.21€0.23€0.40€0.31€0.31Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
€3.62€2.99€2.95€2.86€3.40€3.64€3.97€3.97Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.0%/yr+8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.5%/yr+35.5%/yr
EPS+23.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.2%/yr+17.7%/yr
Book value / share+1.6%/yr+5.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
260Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
11%low FY2021
Gross margin
68%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

€255Mowner earningsvs.€99Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned €99M of profit into €255M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income€99M
Owner earnings€255M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income€99M€77M€122M€51M(€136M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+€245M+€225M+€193M+€172M+€155M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−€8M−€23M−€39M−€77M+€262M
Cash from operations€336M€279M€275M€146M€281M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−€81M−€100M−€57M−€49M−€80M
Owner earnings€255M€179M€218M€97M€201M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%9%11%7%16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income €139M ÷ interest expense €50M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • Net cash
    Cash €220M + ST investments €77M − debt €162M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €135M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 43 + DIO 297 − DPO 191 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -12%–25%; 11% latest = NOPAT €106M ÷ invested capital €973M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range 4%–16%; latest €255M = operating cash €336M − maintenance capex €81M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 7 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops €336M ÷ net income €99M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks €30M ÷ Owner Earnings €255M
    What this means

    Of €255M Owner Earnings, €30M (12%) went back to shareholders, €30M dividends, €0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.33×
    Harvesting
    Capex €81M ÷ depreciation €245M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.59×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · €162M vs €440M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €0.38/share (latest year €0.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €3.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1% early to 9% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −7.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets€1.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments€298M
  • Receivables€227M
  • Inventory€507M
  • Other current assets€159M
Current liabilities€750M
  • Accounts payable€326M
  • Other current liabilities€424M
Current ratio1.59×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital€440Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value€477Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases€894M€732M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated €1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested€440M · 28%
  • Dividends€108M · 7%
  • Buybacks€455M · 29%
  • Retained (debt / cash)€560M · 36%
  • Returned to owners€563M

    50% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €108M as dividends and €455M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran €455M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count28.8%

    The diluted count rose from 202M to 260M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record€0.12/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.8%

    Diluted shares grew 28.8% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent €455M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Textiles & Apparel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LEVILevi Strauss & Co$6.3B58%9.8%23%5%
UAUnder Armour Inc.$5.0B46%2.3%4%2%
COLMColumbia Sportswear$3.4B50%10.7%18%10%
GIIIG-III Apparel$3.0B36%6.3%9%4%
CRICarter's$2.9B43%11.0%24%9%
ZGNErmenegildo Zegna N.V.€1.9B64%7.3%11%10%
OXMOxford Industries$1.5B59%8.0%14%7%
FIGSFIGS Inc.$631M70%6.0%8%8%
Group median54%7.7%13%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. reports in EUR, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that EUR, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in EUR. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. has delivered.

Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Through the cycle, Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. earns about €186M on its 9.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings €255M on 260M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash €135M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. (ZGN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ZGN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ZENA its page in the Manual ZH →

Industry order: ← VFC the Textiles & Apparel chapter