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1808 · Haseko
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Haseko’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1808) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥772.3B | ¥813.3B | ¥891.0B | ¥846.0B | ¥809.4B | ¥909.7B | ¥1.03T | ¥1.09T | ¥1.18T | ¥1.27T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 17% | 17% | — | — | — | 14% | 15% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 7% | 8% | — | — | — | 7% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥89.0B | ¥100.8B | ¥98.4B | ¥85.9B | ¥72.9B | ¥82.7B | ¥90.2B | ¥85.7B | ¥84.7B | ¥98.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 11.5% | 12.4% | 11.0% | 10.2% | 9.0% | 9.1% | 8.8% | 7.8% | 7.2% | 7.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥58.8B | ¥72.3B | ¥87.4B | ¥59.9B | ¥48.3B | ¥54.5B | ¥59.3B | ¥56.0B | ¥34.5B | ¥54.8B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥109.5B | ¥56.5B | ¥33.1B | (¥15.3B) | ¥31.9B | ¥65.4B | (¥51.9B) | ¥115.0B | ¥3.9B | ¥157.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥3.5B | ¥3.7B | ¥4.6B | ¥4.8B | ¥5.3B | ¥5.9B | ¥6.2B | ¥7.4B | ¥8.0B | ¥8.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥47.3B | (¥19.5B) | (¥58.9B) | (¥79.9B) | (¥21.6B) | ¥5.1B | (¥117.4B) | ¥51.5B | (¥38.5B) | ¥93.8B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥24.1B | ¥28.6B | ¥30.1B | ¥25.1B | ¥29.8B | ¥26.8B | ¥35.4B | ¥24.2B | ¥20.7B | ¥21.1B | CapexCapex |
| 3.1% | 3.5% | 3.4% | 3.0% | 3.7% | 2.9% | 3.5% | 2.2% | 1.8% | 1.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥106.1B | ¥52.8B | ¥28.5B | (¥20.0B) | ¥26.6B | ¥59.6B | (¥58.1B) | ¥107.6B | (¥4.1B) | ¥148.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.7% | 6.5% | 3.2% | −2.4% | 3.3% | 6.5% | −5.7% | 9.8% | −0.3% | 11.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥85.4B | ¥27.9B | ¥3.0B | (¥40.3B) | ¥2.1B | ¥38.6B | (¥87.4B) | ¥90.9B | (¥16.7B) | ¥136.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.1% | 3.4% | 0.3% | −4.8% | 0.3% | 4.2% | −8.5% | 8.3% | −1.4% | 10.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥4.5B | ¥12.0B | ¥15.0B | ¥27.1B | ¥25.0B | ¥19.5B | ¥23.6B | ¥22.2B | ¥23.6B | ¥24.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥4M | ¥4.5B | ¥5M | ¥5.4B | ¥21.5B | ¥3.1B | ¥3.5B | ¥5M | ¥545M | ¥20.1B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 39% | 39% | 28% | 17% | 13% | 14% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 25% | 24% | 24% | 15% | 12% | 13% | 13% | 11% | 7% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 23% | 20% | 20% | 8% | 6% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 2% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥201.5B | ¥206.9B | ¥213.0B | ¥155.0B | ¥214.8B | ¥264.9B | ¥208.3B | ¥283.5B | ¥239.1B | ¥299.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥478.6B | ¥505.3B | ¥568.3B | ¥572.3B | ¥689.5B | ¥810.1B | ¥869.2B | ¥1.02T | ¥1.05T | ¥1.05T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥270.0B | ¥280.9B | ¥287.3B | ¥247.3B | ¥272.0B | ¥350.5B | ¥378.8B | ¥394.4B | ¥442.8B | ¥398.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.8× | 1.8× | 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.5× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.6× | 2.4× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥4.2B | ¥3.5B | ¥3.0B | ¥2.8B | ¥2.6B | ¥2.4B | ¥2.2B | ¥2.0B | ¥1.8B | ¥1.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥630.9B | ¥687.7B | ¥773.2B | ¥799.3B | ¥953.7B | ¥1.08T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.37T | ¥1.42T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥141.9B | ¥116.7B | ¥120.6B | ¥152.4B | ¥268.1B | ¥311.9B | ¥391.6B | ¥415.0B | ¥420.1B | ¥425.2B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥59.6B) | (¥90.1B) | (¥92.4B) | (¥2.6B) | ¥53.3B | ¥47.1B | ¥183.2B | ¥131.6B | ¥181.0B | ¥125.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 63.5× | 91.6× | 111.3× | 95.4× | 53.9× | 49.4× | 47.0× | 35.0× | 23.9× | 20.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥238.5B | ¥296.8B | ¥368.1B | ¥401.2B | ¥402.9B | ¥417.7B | ¥454.1B | ¥511.2B | ¥500.0B | ¥510.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 301M | 292M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2567.63 | ¥2703.76 | ¥2962.09 | ¥2812.65 | ¥2691.00 | ¥3024.35 | ¥3415.21 | ¥3638.44 | ¥3914.15 | ¥4352.90 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥195.36 | ¥240.33 | ¥290.53 | ¥198.98 | ¥160.44 | ¥181.15 | ¥197.23 | ¥186.30 | ¥114.53 | ¥187.50 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥352.68 | ¥175.50 | ¥94.69 | ¥-66.54 | ¥88.47 | ¥197.99 | ¥-193.12 | ¥357.64 | ¥-13.57 | ¥508.20 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥283.88 | ¥92.87 | ¥9.84 | ¥-134.06 | ¥6.84 | ¥128.47 | ¥-290.42 | ¥302.08 | ¥-55.67 | ¥465.95 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥14.99 | ¥39.97 | ¥49.97 | ¥89.94 | ¥82.99 | ¥64.84 | ¥78.45 | ¥73.83 | ¥78.45 | ¥84.48 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥80.27 | ¥95.02 | ¥100.08 | ¥83.32 | ¥99.13 | ¥89.12 | ¥117.84 | ¥80.31 | ¥68.69 | ¥72.25 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥792.79 | ¥986.84 | ¥1223.60 | ¥1333.76 | ¥1339.30 | ¥1388.55 | ¥1509.63 | ¥1699.65 | ¥1662.38 | ¥1746.06 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.0%/yr | +10.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +4.1%/yr | +41.9%/yr |
| EPS | −0.5%/yr | +3.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +21.2%/yr | +0.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.2%/yr | −6.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.2%/yr | +5.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥148.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥8.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥12.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥136.3B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥54.8B | ¥34.5B | ¥56.0B | ¥59.3B | ¥54.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥8.8B | +¥8.0B | +¥7.4B | +¥6.2B | +¥5.9B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥93.8B | −¥38.5B | +¥51.5B | −¥117.4B | +¥5.1B |
| Cash from operations | ¥157.4B | ¥3.9B | ¥115.0B | (¥51.9B) | ¥65.4B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥8.8B | −¥8.0B | −¥7.4B | −¥6.2B | −¥5.9B |
| Owner earnings | ¥148.6B | (¥4.1B) | ¥107.6B | (¥58.1B) | ¥59.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥12.4B | −¥12.7B | −¥16.7B | −¥29.3B | −¥20.9B |
| Free cash flow | ¥136.3B | (¥16.7B) | ¥90.9B | (¥87.4B) | ¥38.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 12% | 0% | 10% | -6% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥8.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥12.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 20.8×ComfortableOperating income ¥98.7B ÷ interest expense ¥4.7B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥125.3B · 1.3× operating profitModest net debtCash ¥288.1B + ST investments ¥11.8B − debt ¥425.2B
What this means
Netting ¥299.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥425.2B of debt leaves ¥125.3B owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (4.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 10%–39%; 12% latest = NOPAT ¥78.0B ÷ invested capital ¥647.7BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -6%–14%; latest ¥148.6B = operating cash ¥157.4B − maintenance capex ¥8.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥157.4B ÷ net income ¥54.8B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥44.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥148.6B
What this means
Of ¥148.6B Owner Earnings, ¥44.8B (30%) went back to shareholders, ¥24.7B dividends, ¥20.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.41×ExpandingCapex ¥21.1B ÷ depreciation ¥8.8B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 8% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 7.2% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.3%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥505.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥265.9B · 53%
- Dividends¥197.2B · 39%
- Buybacks¥58.7B · 12%
- Returned to owners¥255.9B
57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥197.2B as dividends and ¥58.7B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥16.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥16.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥141.9B to ¥425.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥58.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−2.8%
The diluted count fell from 301M to 292M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥84.48/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 21% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained7%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥329.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥21.6B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Haseko is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥141.9B → ¥425.2B
Debt rose from ¥141.9B to ¥425.2B while owner earnings went from about ¥62.5B to ¥84.0B — about 2.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Haseko has delivered.
Haseko’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Haseko earns about ¥62.2B on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥136.3B on 292M diluted shares; net debt ¥125.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥21.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥8.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥148.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1803 its page in the Manual 1812 →
Industry order: the Homebuilders chapter 1925 →