Owner Scorecard


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1808 · Haseko

General Bldg Contractors - Residential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Haseko’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1808) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥772.3B¥813.3B¥891.0B¥846.0B¥809.4B¥909.7B¥1.03T¥1.09T¥1.18T¥1.27TRevenueRevenue
17%17%14%15%Gross marginGross mgn
7%8%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥89.0B¥100.8B¥98.4B¥85.9B¥72.9B¥82.7B¥90.2B¥85.7B¥84.7B¥98.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.5%12.4%11.0%10.2%9.0%9.1%8.8%7.8%7.2%7.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥58.8B¥72.3B¥87.4B¥59.9B¥48.3B¥54.5B¥59.3B¥56.0B¥34.5B¥54.8BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥109.5B¥56.5B¥33.1B(¥15.3B)¥31.9B¥65.4B(¥51.9B)¥115.0B¥3.9B¥157.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥3.5B¥3.7B¥4.6B¥4.8B¥5.3B¥5.9B¥6.2B¥7.4B¥8.0B¥8.8BDepreciationDeprec.
¥47.3B(¥19.5B)(¥58.9B)(¥79.9B)(¥21.6B)¥5.1B(¥117.4B)¥51.5B(¥38.5B)¥93.8BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥24.1B¥28.6B¥30.1B¥25.1B¥29.8B¥26.8B¥35.4B¥24.2B¥20.7B¥21.1BCapexCapex
3.1%3.5%3.4%3.0%3.7%2.9%3.5%2.2%1.8%1.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥106.1B¥52.8B¥28.5B(¥20.0B)¥26.6B¥59.6B(¥58.1B)¥107.6B(¥4.1B)¥148.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.7%6.5%3.2%−2.4%3.3%6.5%−5.7%9.8%−0.3%11.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥85.4B¥27.9B¥3.0B(¥40.3B)¥2.1B¥38.6B(¥87.4B)¥90.9B(¥16.7B)¥136.3BFree cash flowFCF
11.1%3.4%0.3%−4.8%0.3%4.2%−8.5%8.3%−1.4%10.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥4.5B¥12.0B¥15.0B¥27.1B¥25.0B¥19.5B¥23.6B¥22.2B¥23.6B¥24.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥4M¥4.5B¥5M¥5.4B¥21.5B¥3.1B¥3.5B¥5M¥545M¥20.1BBuybacksBuybacks
39%39%28%17%13%14%11%11%10%12%ROICROIC
25%24%24%15%12%13%13%11%7%11%Return on equityROE
23%20%20%8%6%8%8%7%2%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥201.5B¥206.9B¥213.0B¥155.0B¥214.8B¥264.9B¥208.3B¥283.5B¥239.1B¥299.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥478.6B¥505.3B¥568.3B¥572.3B¥689.5B¥810.1B¥869.2B¥1.02T¥1.05T¥1.05TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥270.0B¥280.9B¥287.3B¥247.3B¥272.0B¥350.5B¥378.8B¥394.4B¥442.8B¥398.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.8×2.0×2.3×2.5×2.3×2.3×2.6×2.4×2.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥4.2B¥3.5B¥3.0B¥2.8B¥2.6B¥2.4B¥2.2B¥2.0B¥1.8B¥1.6BGoodwillGoodwill
¥630.9B¥687.7B¥773.2B¥799.3B¥953.7B¥1.08T¥1.20T¥1.35T¥1.37T¥1.42TTotal assetsAssets
¥141.9B¥116.7B¥120.6B¥152.4B¥268.1B¥311.9B¥391.6B¥415.0B¥420.1B¥425.2BTotal debtDebt
(¥59.6B)(¥90.1B)(¥92.4B)(¥2.6B)¥53.3B¥47.1B¥183.2B¥131.6B¥181.0B¥125.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
63.5×91.6×111.3×95.4×53.9×49.4×47.0×35.0×23.9×20.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥238.5B¥296.8B¥368.1B¥401.2B¥402.9B¥417.7B¥454.1B¥511.2B¥500.0B¥510.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
301M301M301M301M301M301M301M301M301M292MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2567.63¥2703.76¥2962.09¥2812.65¥2691.00¥3024.35¥3415.21¥3638.44¥3914.15¥4352.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥195.36¥240.33¥290.53¥198.98¥160.44¥181.15¥197.23¥186.30¥114.53¥187.50EPS (diluted)EPS
¥352.68¥175.50¥94.69¥-66.54¥88.47¥197.99¥-193.12¥357.64¥-13.57¥508.20Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥283.88¥92.87¥9.84¥-134.06¥6.84¥128.47¥-290.42¥302.08¥-55.67¥465.95Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥14.99¥39.97¥49.97¥89.94¥82.99¥64.84¥78.45¥73.83¥78.45¥84.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥80.27¥95.02¥100.08¥83.32¥99.13¥89.12¥117.84¥80.31¥68.69¥72.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥792.79¥986.84¥1223.60¥1333.76¥1339.30¥1388.55¥1509.63¥1699.65¥1662.38¥1746.06Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.0%/yr+10.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.1%/yr+41.9%/yr
EPS−0.5%/yr+3.2%/yr
Dividends / share+21.2%/yr+0.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.2%/yr−6.1%/yr
Book value / share+9.2%/yr+5.4%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥148.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥8.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥12.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥136.3B.

Reported net income¥54.8B
Owner earnings¥148.6B · 12% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥54.8B¥34.5B¥56.0B¥59.3B¥54.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥8.8B+¥8.0B+¥7.4B+¥6.2B+¥5.9B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥93.8B−¥38.5B+¥51.5B−¥117.4B+¥5.1B
Cash from operations¥157.4B¥3.9B¥115.0B(¥51.9B)¥65.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥8.8B−¥8.0B−¥7.4B−¥6.2B−¥5.9B
Owner earnings¥148.6B(¥4.1B)¥107.6B(¥58.1B)¥59.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥12.4B−¥12.7B−¥16.7B−¥29.3B−¥20.9B
Free cash flow¥136.3B(¥16.7B)¥90.9B(¥87.4B)¥38.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue12%0%10%-6%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥8.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥12.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥98.7B ÷ interest expense ¥4.7B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥125.3B · 1.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash ¥288.1B + ST investments ¥11.8B − debt ¥425.2B
    What this means

    Netting ¥299.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥425.2B of debt leaves ¥125.3B owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (4.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 10%–39%; 12% latest = NOPAT ¥78.0B ÷ invested capital ¥647.7B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -6%–14%; latest ¥148.6B = operating cash ¥157.4B − maintenance capex ¥8.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥157.4B ÷ net income ¥54.8B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥44.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥148.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥148.6B Owner Earnings, ¥44.8B (30%) went back to shareholders, ¥24.7B dividends, ¥20.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.41×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥21.1B ÷ depreciation ¥8.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 8% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 7.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥505.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥265.9B · 53%
  • Dividends¥197.2B · 39%
  • Buybacks¥58.7B · 12%
  • Returned to owners¥255.9B

    57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥197.2B as dividends and ¥58.7B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥16.2B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥16.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥141.9B to ¥425.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥58.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−2.8%

    The diluted count fell from 301M to 292M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥84.48/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 21% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥329.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥21.6B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Haseko is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥141.9B → ¥425.2B

    Debt rose from ¥141.9B to ¥425.2B while owner earnings went from about ¥62.5B to ¥84.0B — about 2.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Haseko has delivered.

Haseko’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Haseko earns about ¥62.2B on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+215%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥136.3B on 292M diluted shares; net debt ¥125.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥21.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥8.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥148.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1803 its page in the Manual 1812 →

Industry order: the Homebuilders chapter 1925 →