← Japan catalog ← 1808 Manual 1925 → ← 1803 Construction & Engineering 1963 →
1812 · Kajima
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kajima’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1812) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.82T | ¥1.83T | ¥1.97T | ¥2.01T | ¥1.91T | ¥2.08T | ¥2.39T | ¥2.67T | ¥2.91T | ¥3.07T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 12% | 13% | — | — | — | 11% | 14% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 6% | 6% | — | — | — | 6% | 6% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥155.4B | ¥158.4B | ¥142.6B | ¥132.0B | ¥127.3B | ¥123.4B | ¥123.5B | ¥136.2B | ¥151.9B | ¥240.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.5% | 8.7% | 7.2% | 6.6% | 6.7% | 5.9% | 5.2% | 5.1% | 5.2% | 7.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥104.9B | ¥126.8B | ¥109.8B | ¥103.2B | ¥98.5B | ¥103.9B | ¥111.8B | ¥115.0B | ¥125.8B | ¥177.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥187.5B | ¥120.5B | ¥30.4B | ¥53.1B | ¥153.1B | ¥30.2B | (¥29.1B) | ¥123.7B | ¥30.6B | ¥114.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥19.3B | ¥19.4B | ¥19.2B | ¥20.0B | ¥19.1B | ¥22.6B | ¥24.7B | ¥27.3B | ¥30.9B | ¥33.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥63.3B | (¥25.7B) | (¥98.6B) | (¥70.1B) | ¥35.5B | (¥96.3B) | (¥165.6B) | (¥18.6B) | (¥126.0B) | (¥96.2B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥25.0B | ¥12.7B | ¥23.4B | ¥81.2B | ¥46.4B | ¥49.4B | ¥60.7B | ¥41.5B | ¥66.6B | ¥50.5B | CapexCapex |
| 1.4% | 0.7% | 1.2% | 4.0% | 2.4% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 1.6% | 2.3% | 1.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥168.2B | ¥107.7B | ¥7.0B | ¥33.1B | ¥134.0B | ¥7.6B | (¥53.8B) | ¥96.5B | (¥219M) | ¥81.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.2% | 5.9% | 0.4% | 1.6% | 7.0% | 0.4% | −2.3% | 3.6% | −0.0% | 2.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥162.5B | ¥107.7B | ¥7.0B | (¥28.1B) | ¥106.7B | (¥19.2B) | (¥89.9B) | ¥82.2B | (¥36.0B) | ¥64.1B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 8.9% | 5.9% | 0.4% | −1.4% | 5.6% | −0.9% | −3.8% | 3.1% | −1.2% | 2.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥16.6B | ¥23.9B | ¥27.0B | ¥26.3B | ¥25.6B | ¥28.1B | ¥29.6B | ¥36.9B | ¥47.8B | ¥54.0B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥198M | ¥61M | ¥30M | ¥10.0B | ¥10.0B | ¥20.0B | ¥10.0B | ¥15.1B | ¥30.0B | ¥20.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 22% | 20% | 15% | 14% | 13% | 9% | 7% | 7% | 8% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 19% | 15% | 15% | 13% | 11% | 11% | 9% | 13% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | 15% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 8% | 8% | 6% | 8% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥367.5B | ¥389.3B | ¥315.5B | ¥255.8B | ¥301.3B | ¥267.7B | ¥282.3B | ¥350.1B | ¥349.7B | ¥392.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | — | — | ¥324.9B | ¥401.6B | ¥440.4B | ¥480.8B | ¥588.6B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | — | ¥324.9B | ¥401.6B | ¥440.4B | ¥480.8B | ¥588.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.30T | ¥1.29T | ¥1.32T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.26T | ¥1.39T | ¥1.75T | ¥1.92T | ¥2.14T | ¥2.18T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥1.12T | ¥1.10T | ¥1.06T | ¥1.13T | ¥990.1B | ¥1.11T | ¥1.32T | ¥1.51T | ¥1.70T | ¥1.60T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | ¥2.3B | ¥1.4B | ¥801M | ¥3.7B | ¥1.4B | ¥1.1B | ¥2.6B | ¥1.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥1.99T | ¥2.05T | ¥2.09T | ¥2.17T | ¥2.16T | ¥2.34T | ¥2.77T | ¥3.14T | ¥3.45T | ¥3.62T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥374.0B | ¥346.2B | ¥300.2B | ¥328.4B | ¥319.6B | ¥362.3B | ¥540.9B | ¥616.7B | ¥795.9B | ¥837.2B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥6.5B | (¥43.2B) | (¥15.2B) | ¥72.6B | ¥18.3B | ¥94.6B | ¥258.7B | ¥266.7B | ¥446.2B | ¥444.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 39.9× | 47.3× | 41.6× | 37.7× | 47.9× | 52.2× | 25.7× | 9.5× | 6.9× | 9.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥552.6B | ¥669.8B | ¥756.9B | ¥691.7B | ¥752.7B | ¥953.6B | ¥1.06T | ¥1.22T | ¥999.2B | ¥1.10T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | 529M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥3446.11 | ¥3462.79 | ¥3734.51 | ¥3803.51 | ¥3607.59 | ¥3933.93 | ¥4523.89 | ¥5041.42 | ¥5507.96 | ¥5802.02 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥198.35 | ¥239.81 | ¥207.77 | ¥195.29 | ¥186.36 | ¥196.47 | ¥211.46 | ¥217.60 | ¥237.99 | ¥335.44 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥318.17 | ¥203.81 | ¥13.21 | ¥62.61 | ¥253.51 | ¥14.38 | ¥-101.82 | ¥182.47 | ¥-0.41 | ¥153.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥307.41 | ¥203.81 | ¥13.21 | ¥-53.15 | ¥201.90 | ¥-36.32 | ¥-169.96 | ¥155.55 | ¥-68.06 | ¥121.25 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥31.42 | ¥45.16 | ¥51.04 | ¥49.76 | ¥48.49 | ¥53.20 | ¥55.90 | ¥69.71 | ¥90.50 | ¥102.17 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥47.35 | ¥24.08 | ¥44.27 | ¥153.52 | ¥87.70 | ¥93.47 | ¥114.89 | ¥78.50 | ¥126.00 | ¥95.54 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1045.20 | ¥1266.98 | ¥1431.79 | ¥1308.41 | ¥1423.75 | ¥1803.76 | ¥2007.25 | ¥2314.65 | ¥1890.05 | ¥2088.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.0%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −7.8%/yr | −9.5%/yr |
| EPS | +6.0%/yr | +12.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +14.0%/yr | +16.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.1%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.0%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥81.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥33.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥17.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥64.1B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥177.3B | ¥125.8B | ¥115.0B | ¥111.8B | ¥103.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥33.5B | +¥30.9B | +¥27.3B | +¥24.7B | +¥22.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥96.2B | −¥126.0B | −¥18.6B | −¥165.6B | −¥96.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥114.6B | ¥30.6B | ¥123.7B | (¥29.1B) | ¥30.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥33.5B | −¥30.9B | −¥27.3B | −¥24.7B | −¥22.6B |
| Owner earnings | ¥81.1B | (¥219M) | ¥96.5B | (¥53.8B) | ¥7.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥17.0B | −¥35.8B | −¥14.2B | −¥36.0B | −¥26.8B |
| Free cash flow | ¥64.1B | (¥36.0B) | ¥82.2B | (¥89.9B) | (¥19.2B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 0% | 4% | -2% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥33.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥17.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥240.8B ÷ interest expense ¥26.1B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥444.5B · 1.8× operating profitModest net debtCash ¥392.3B + ST investments ¥367M − debt ¥837.2B
What this means
Netting ¥392.6B of cash and short-term investments against ¥837.2B of debt leaves ¥444.5B owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 7%–22%; 12% latest = NOPAT ¥190.2B ÷ invested capital ¥1.55TIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -2%–9%; latest ¥81.1B = operating cash ¥114.6B − maintenance capex ¥33.5BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops ¥114.6B ÷ net income ¥177.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks ¥74.0B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥81.1B
What this means
Of ¥81.1B Owner Earnings, ¥74.0B (91%) went back to shareholders, ¥54.0B dividends, ¥20.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.51×ExpandingCapex ¥50.5B ÷ depreciation ¥33.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (6%) sits below the early years (8%), but the latest year (8%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 7% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 5.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥814.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥457.5B · 56%
- Dividends¥315.8B · 39%
- Buybacks¥115.4B · 14%
- Returned to owners¥431.2B
74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥315.8B as dividends and ¥115.4B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥74.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥74.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥374.0B to ¥837.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥115.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (529M to 529M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥102.17/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥745.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥35.2B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kajima is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.1% vs 5.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.2% early in the record and 2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥374.0B → ¥837.2B
Debt rose from ¥374.0B to ¥837.2B while owner earnings went from about ¥94.3B to ¥59.1B — about 4.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 14 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.69×
Across the record the business reported ¥1.18T of net income but generated ¥814.6B of operating cash, a 0.69-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kajima has delivered.
Kajima’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Kajima earns about ¥65.8B on its 2.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥64.1B on 529M diluted shares; net debt ¥444.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥50.5B) runs well above depreciation (¥33.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥81.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1808 its page in the Manual 1925 →
Industry order: ← 1803 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1963 →