← Japan catalog ← 1812 Manual 1928 → ← 1808 Homebuilders 1928 →
1925 · Daiwa House Industry
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Daiwa House Industry’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1925) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥3.51T | ¥3.80T | ¥4.14T | ¥4.38T | ¥4.13T | ¥4.44T | ¥4.91T | ¥5.20T | ¥5.43T | ¥5.58T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 20% | 20% | — | — | — | 20% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 11% | 11% | — | — | — | 10% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥310.1B | ¥347.1B | ¥372.2B | ¥381.1B | ¥357.1B | ¥383.3B | ¥465.4B | ¥440.2B | ¥546.3B | ¥614.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.8% | 9.1% | 9.0% | 8.7% | 8.7% | 8.6% | 9.5% | 8.5% | 10.1% | 11.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥201.7B | ¥236.4B | ¥237.4B | ¥233.6B | ¥195.1B | ¥225.3B | ¥308.4B | ¥298.8B | ¥325.1B | ¥350.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥287.7B | ¥382.4B | ¥355.6B | ¥149.7B | ¥430.3B | ¥336.4B | ¥230.3B | ¥302.3B | ¥420.6B | ¥189.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥59.6B | ¥64.2B | ¥71.0B | ¥75.2B | ¥78.4B | ¥100.3B | ¥113.5B | ¥117.2B | ¥131.8B | ¥140.3B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥26.4B | ¥81.8B | ¥47.1B | (¥159.6B) | ¥156.7B | ¥10.8B | (¥191.6B) | (¥113.7B) | (¥37.1B) | (¥302.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥323.2B | ¥276.9B | ¥255.9B | ¥291.5B | ¥334.7B | ¥411.0B | ¥486.5B | ¥356.0B | ¥381.8B | ¥493.8B | CapexCapex |
| 9.2% | 7.3% | 6.2% | 6.7% | 8.1% | 9.3% | 9.9% | 6.8% | 7.0% | 8.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥228.1B | ¥318.2B | ¥284.6B | ¥74.4B | ¥351.9B | ¥236.1B | ¥116.8B | ¥185.1B | ¥288.8B | ¥48.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.5% | 8.4% | 6.9% | 1.7% | 8.5% | 5.3% | 2.4% | 3.6% | 5.3% | 0.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (¥35.5B) | ¥105.4B | ¥99.7B | (¥141.8B) | ¥95.6B | (¥74.5B) | (¥256.2B) | (¥53.8B) | ¥38.8B | (¥304.6B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.0% | 2.8% | 2.4% | −3.2% | 2.3% | −1.7% | −5.2% | −1.0% | 0.7% | −5.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥56.5B | ¥64.6B | ¥74.6B | ¥79.0B | ¥72.6B | ¥79.2B | ¥86.1B | ¥87.5B | ¥95.6B | ¥95.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥12.2B | ¥26M | ¥8.0B | ¥244M | ¥26.1B | ¥12M | ¥10M | ¥87.2B | ¥100.0B | ¥14M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 14% | 14% | 13% | 12% | 10% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 10% | 9% | ROICROIC |
| 15% | 16% | 14% | 14% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 12% | 14% | 13% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 7% | 7% | 9% | 8% | 10% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥213.3B | ¥326.1B | ¥276.3B | ¥276.9B | ¥416.9B | ¥326.3B | ¥346.2B | ¥439.6B | ¥327.4B | ¥424.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥5.9B | ¥3.3B | ¥1.8B | ¥3.2B | ¥1.8B | — | — | — | — | — | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥14.7B | ¥16.3B | ¥17.0B | ¥18.6B | ¥17.4B | ¥17.9B | ¥20.3B | ¥19.6B | ¥20.6B | ¥22.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥20.7B | ¥19.6B | ¥18.8B | ¥21.8B | ¥19.2B | ¥17.9B | ¥20.3B | ¥19.6B | ¥20.6B | ¥22.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.41T | ¥1.73T | ¥1.92T | ¥2.10T | ¥2.35T | ¥2.69T | ¥3.25T | ¥3.65T | ¥3.88T | ¥4.70T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥1.02T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.40T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.28T | ¥1.44T | ¥1.53T | ¥1.53T | ¥1.83T | ¥2.66T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 2.4× | 2.1× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥52.9B | ¥60.9B | ¥72.9B | ¥63.5B | ¥74.0B | ¥93.9B | ¥94.5B | ¥95.4B | ¥94.7B | ¥159.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥3.56T | ¥4.04T | ¥4.33T | ¥4.63T | ¥5.05T | ¥5.52T | ¥6.14T | ¥6.53T | ¥7.05T | ¥8.41T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥667.5B | ¥817.6B | ¥831.4B | ¥1.13T | ¥1.37T | ¥1.53T | ¥1.95T | ¥2.20T | ¥2.43T | ¥3.21T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥454.2B | ¥491.5B | ¥555.1B | ¥849.8B | ¥956.5B | ¥1.21T | ¥1.61T | ¥1.76T | ¥2.11T | ¥2.79T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 60.3× | 62.6× | 49.6× | 42.4× | 35.7× | 29.4× | 24.7× | 14.0× | 13.1× | 13.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥1.33T | ¥1.51T | ¥1.64T | ¥1.68T | ¥1.77T | ¥2.11T | ¥2.39T | ¥2.52T | ¥2.41T | ¥2.66T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 666M | 666M | 666M | 666M | 666M | 666M | 666M | 659M | 659M | 660M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥5272.75 | ¥5697.65 | ¥6219.26 | ¥6574.54 | ¥6194.14 | ¥6663.59 | ¥7366.46 | ¥7890.97 | ¥8241.09 | ¥8454.45 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥302.74 | ¥354.76 | ¥356.39 | ¥350.63 | ¥292.80 | ¥338.13 | ¥462.86 | ¥453.10 | ¥492.90 | ¥531.46 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥342.36 | ¥477.61 | ¥427.14 | ¥111.74 | ¥528.21 | ¥354.39 | ¥175.35 | ¥280.72 | ¥437.88 | ¥74.19 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥-53.27 | ¥158.24 | ¥149.58 | ¥-212.86 | ¥143.52 | ¥-111.89 | ¥-384.54 | ¥-81.53 | ¥58.80 | ¥-461.70 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥84.83 | ¥96.99 | ¥111.99 | ¥118.60 | ¥108.90 | ¥118.93 | ¥129.21 | ¥132.74 | ¥145.02 | ¥145.37 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥485.09 | ¥415.68 | ¥384.16 | ¥437.48 | ¥502.37 | ¥616.87 | ¥730.19 | ¥540.00 | ¥578.92 | ¥748.64 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1996.14 | ¥2271.84 | ¥2467.16 | ¥2519.63 | ¥2660.96 | ¥3169.12 | ¥3585.40 | ¥3827.65 | ¥3648.48 | ¥4029.58 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.4%/yr | +6.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −15.6%/yr | −32.5%/yr |
| EPS | +6.5%/yr | +12.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +6.2%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.9%/yr | +8.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.1%/yr | +8.7%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥48.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥140.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥353.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥304.6B).
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥350.6B | ¥325.1B | ¥298.8B | ¥308.4B | ¥225.3B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥140.3B | +¥131.8B | +¥117.2B | +¥113.5B | +¥100.3B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +¥893M | +¥789M | — | — | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥302.5B | −¥37.1B | −¥113.7B | −¥191.6B | +¥10.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥189.3B | ¥420.6B | ¥302.3B | ¥230.3B | ¥336.4B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥140.3B | −¥131.8B | −¥117.2B | −¥113.5B | −¥100.3B |
| Owner earnings | ¥48.9B | ¥288.8B | ¥185.1B | ¥116.8B | ¥236.1B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥353.5B | −¥250.0B | −¥238.8B | −¥373.1B | −¥310.7B |
| Free cash flow | (¥304.6B) | ¥38.8B | (¥53.8B) | (¥256.2B) | (¥74.5B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 5% | 4% | 2% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥140.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥353.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less ¥893M), owner earnings is nearer ¥48.0B.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 13.9×ComfortableOperating income ¥614.9B ÷ interest expense ¥44.3B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥2.79T · 4.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥424.6B + ST investments ¥195M − debt ¥3.21T
What this means
Netting ¥424.8B of cash and short-term investments against ¥3.21T of debt leaves ¥2.79T owed, about 4.5× a year's operating profit (5.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–14%; 9% latest = NOPAT ¥485.8B ÷ invested capital ¥5.44TIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–9%; latest ¥48.9B = operating cash ¥189.3B − maintenance capex ¥140.3BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥353.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥304.6B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less ¥893M of SBC) leaves ¥48.0B.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ¥189.3B ÷ net income ¥350.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥95.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥48.9B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥48.9B of Owner Earnings, ¥95.9B (196%) went back to shareholders, ¥95.9B dividends, ¥14M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees (¥893M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.52×ExpandingCapex ¥493.8B ÷ depreciation ¥140.3B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 10% lately, median 9%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 8.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥3.08T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥3.61T · 117%
- Dividends¥791.7B · 26%
- Buybacks¥233.7B · 8%
- Returned to owners¥1.03T
48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥791.7B as dividends and ¥233.7B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥1.55T
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥1.55T beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥667.5B to ¥3.21T.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥233.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.0%
The diluted count barely moved (666M to 660M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥145.37/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−6%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.59T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥102.7B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Daiwa House Industry is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.2% vs 7.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.2% early in the record and 3.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥667.5B → ¥3.21T
Debt rose from ¥667.5B to ¥3.21T while owner earnings went from about ¥277.0B to ¥174.3B — about 2.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 18 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Daiwa House Industry has delivered.
Daiwa House Industry’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Daiwa House Industry earns about ¥296.5B on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow (¥304.6B) on 660M diluted shares; net debt ¥2.79T. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥493.8B) runs well above depreciation (¥140.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥48.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1812 its page in the Manual 1928 →
Industry order: ← 1808 the Homebuilders chapter 1928 →