Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1812 Manual 1928 → ← 1808 Homebuilders 1928 →

1925 · Daiwa House Industry

General Bldg Contractors - Residential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Daiwa House Industry’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1925) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥3.51T¥3.80T¥4.14T¥4.38T¥4.13T¥4.44T¥4.91T¥5.20T¥5.43T¥5.58TRevenueRevenue
20%20%20%22%Gross marginGross mgn
11%11%10%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥310.1B¥347.1B¥372.2B¥381.1B¥357.1B¥383.3B¥465.4B¥440.2B¥546.3B¥614.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.8%9.1%9.0%8.7%8.7%8.6%9.5%8.5%10.1%11.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥201.7B¥236.4B¥237.4B¥233.6B¥195.1B¥225.3B¥308.4B¥298.8B¥325.1B¥350.6BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥287.7B¥382.4B¥355.6B¥149.7B¥430.3B¥336.4B¥230.3B¥302.3B¥420.6B¥189.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥59.6B¥64.2B¥71.0B¥75.2B¥78.4B¥100.3B¥113.5B¥117.2B¥131.8B¥140.3BDepreciationDeprec.
¥26.4B¥81.8B¥47.1B(¥159.6B)¥156.7B¥10.8B(¥191.6B)(¥113.7B)(¥37.1B)(¥302.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥323.2B¥276.9B¥255.9B¥291.5B¥334.7B¥411.0B¥486.5B¥356.0B¥381.8B¥493.8BCapexCapex
9.2%7.3%6.2%6.7%8.1%9.3%9.9%6.8%7.0%8.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥228.1B¥318.2B¥284.6B¥74.4B¥351.9B¥236.1B¥116.8B¥185.1B¥288.8B¥48.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.5%8.4%6.9%1.7%8.5%5.3%2.4%3.6%5.3%0.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(¥35.5B)¥105.4B¥99.7B(¥141.8B)¥95.6B(¥74.5B)(¥256.2B)(¥53.8B)¥38.8B(¥304.6B)Free cash flowFCF
−1.0%2.8%2.4%−3.2%2.3%−1.7%−5.2%−1.0%0.7%−5.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥56.5B¥64.6B¥74.6B¥79.0B¥72.6B¥79.2B¥86.1B¥87.5B¥95.6B¥95.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥12.2B¥26M¥8.0B¥244M¥26.1B¥12M¥10M¥87.2B¥100.0B¥14MBuybacksBuybacks
14%14%13%12%10%9%9%8%10%9%ROICROIC
15%16%14%14%11%11%13%12%14%13%Return on equityROE
11%11%10%9%7%7%9%8%10%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥213.3B¥326.1B¥276.3B¥276.9B¥416.9B¥326.3B¥346.2B¥439.6B¥327.4B¥424.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥5.9B¥3.3B¥1.8B¥3.2B¥1.8BReceivablesReceiv.
¥14.7B¥16.3B¥17.0B¥18.6B¥17.4B¥17.9B¥20.3B¥19.6B¥20.6B¥22.3BInventoryInvent.
¥20.7B¥19.6B¥18.8B¥21.8B¥19.2B¥17.9B¥20.3B¥19.6B¥20.6B¥22.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥1.41T¥1.73T¥1.92T¥2.10T¥2.35T¥2.69T¥3.25T¥3.65T¥3.88T¥4.70TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥1.02T¥1.20T¥1.40T¥1.30T¥1.28T¥1.44T¥1.53T¥1.53T¥1.83T¥2.66TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.4×1.6×1.8×1.9×2.1×2.4×2.1×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥52.9B¥60.9B¥72.9B¥63.5B¥74.0B¥93.9B¥94.5B¥95.4B¥94.7B¥159.9BGoodwillGoodwill
¥3.56T¥4.04T¥4.33T¥4.63T¥5.05T¥5.52T¥6.14T¥6.53T¥7.05T¥8.41TTotal assetsAssets
¥667.5B¥817.6B¥831.4B¥1.13T¥1.37T¥1.53T¥1.95T¥2.20T¥2.43T¥3.21TTotal debtDebt
¥454.2B¥491.5B¥555.1B¥849.8B¥956.5B¥1.21T¥1.61T¥1.76T¥2.11T¥2.79TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
60.3×62.6×49.6×42.4×35.7×29.4×24.7×14.0×13.1×13.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥1.33T¥1.51T¥1.64T¥1.68T¥1.77T¥2.11T¥2.39T¥2.52T¥2.41T¥2.66TShareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
666M666M666M666M666M666M666M659M659M660MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥5272.75¥5697.65¥6219.26¥6574.54¥6194.14¥6663.59¥7366.46¥7890.97¥8241.09¥8454.45Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥302.74¥354.76¥356.39¥350.63¥292.80¥338.13¥462.86¥453.10¥492.90¥531.46EPS (diluted)EPS
¥342.36¥477.61¥427.14¥111.74¥528.21¥354.39¥175.35¥280.72¥437.88¥74.19Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥-53.27¥158.24¥149.58¥-212.86¥143.52¥-111.89¥-384.54¥-81.53¥58.80¥-461.70Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥84.83¥96.99¥111.99¥118.60¥108.90¥118.93¥129.21¥132.74¥145.02¥145.37Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥485.09¥415.68¥384.16¥437.48¥502.37¥616.87¥730.19¥540.00¥578.92¥748.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1996.14¥2271.84¥2467.16¥2519.63¥2660.96¥3169.12¥3585.40¥3827.65¥3648.48¥4029.58Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.4%/yr+6.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−15.6%/yr−32.5%/yr
EPS+6.5%/yr+12.7%/yr
Dividends / share+6.2%/yr+5.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.9%/yr+8.3%/yr
Book value / share+8.1%/yr+8.7%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥48.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥140.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥353.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥304.6B).

Reported net income¥350.6B
Owner earnings¥48.9B · 1% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥350.6B¥325.1B¥298.8B¥308.4B¥225.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥140.3B+¥131.8B+¥117.2B+¥113.5B+¥100.3B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+¥893M+¥789M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥302.5B−¥37.1B−¥113.7B−¥191.6B+¥10.8B
Cash from operations¥189.3B¥420.6B¥302.3B¥230.3B¥336.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥140.3B−¥131.8B−¥117.2B−¥113.5B−¥100.3B
Owner earnings¥48.9B¥288.8B¥185.1B¥116.8B¥236.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥353.5B−¥250.0B−¥238.8B−¥373.1B−¥310.7B
Free cash flow(¥304.6B)¥38.8B(¥53.8B)(¥256.2B)(¥74.5B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%5%4%2%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥140.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥353.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less ¥893M), owner earnings is nearer ¥48.0B.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥614.9B ÷ interest expense ¥44.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥2.79T · 4.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥424.6B + ST investments ¥195M − debt ¥3.21T
    What this means

    Netting ¥424.8B of cash and short-term investments against ¥3.21T of debt leaves ¥2.79T owed, about 4.5× a year's operating profit (5.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 8%–14%; 9% latest = NOPAT ¥485.8B ÷ invested capital ¥5.44T
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–9%; latest ¥48.9B = operating cash ¥189.3B − maintenance capex ¥140.3B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥353.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥304.6B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less ¥893M of SBC) leaves ¥48.0B.

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥189.3B ÷ net income ¥350.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥95.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥48.9B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥48.9B of Owner Earnings, ¥95.9B (196%) went back to shareholders, ¥95.9B dividends, ¥14M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees (¥893M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 3.52×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥493.8B ÷ depreciation ¥140.3B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 10% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 8.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥3.08T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥3.61T · 117%
  • Dividends¥791.7B · 26%
  • Buybacks¥233.7B · 8%
  • Returned to owners¥1.03T

    48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥791.7B as dividends and ¥233.7B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥1.55T

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥1.55T beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥667.5B to ¥3.21T.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥233.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−1.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (666M to 660M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥145.37/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−6%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.59T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥102.7B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Daiwa House Industry is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.2% vs 7.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.2% early in the record and 3.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥667.5B → ¥3.21T

    Debt rose from ¥667.5B to ¥3.21T while owner earnings went from about ¥277.0B to ¥174.3B — about 2.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 18 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Daiwa House Industry has delivered.

Daiwa House Industry’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Daiwa House Industry earns about ¥296.5B on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥304.6B) on 660M diluted shares; net debt ¥2.79T. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥493.8B) runs well above depreciation (¥140.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥48.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1812 its page in the Manual 1928 →

Industry order: ← 1808 the Homebuilders chapter 1928 →