← Japan catalog ← 1925 Manual 1963 → ← 1925 Homebuilders BZH →
1928 · Sekisui House
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Sekisui House’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1928) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥2.03T | ¥2.16T | ¥2.16T | ¥2.42T | ¥2.45T | ¥2.59T | ¥2.93T | ¥3.11T | ¥4.06T | ¥4.20T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 20% | 19% | — | — | — | 19% | 20% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 11% | 12% | — | — | — | 11% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥184.2B | ¥195.5B | ¥189.2B | ¥205.3B | ¥186.5B | ¥230.2B | ¥261.5B | ¥271.0B | ¥331.4B | ¥341.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 9.1% | 9.1% | 8.8% | 8.5% | 7.6% | 8.9% | 8.9% | 8.7% | 8.2% | 8.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥121.9B | ¥133.2B | ¥128.6B | ¥141.3B | ¥123.5B | ¥153.9B | ¥184.5B | ¥202.3B | ¥217.7B | ¥232.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥115.8B | ¥165.4B | ¥125.1B | ¥363.8B | ¥192.0B | ¥118.0B | ¥125.5B | ¥15.7B | ¥62.9B | ¥216.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥23.1B | ¥22.0B | ¥22.2B | ¥21.5B | ¥21.7B | ¥24.1B | ¥26.7B | ¥27.7B | ¥35.2B | ¥42.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥29.2B) | ¥10.1B | (¥25.6B) | ¥201.0B | ¥46.7B | (¥59.9B) | (¥85.8B) | (¥214.4B) | (¥190.1B) | (¥58.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥94.6B | ¥62.9B | ¥53.9B | ¥66.6B | ¥87.5B | ¥83.0B | ¥92.2B | ¥76.9B | ¥76.7B | ¥66.9B | CapexCapex |
| 4.7% | 2.9% | 2.5% | 2.8% | 3.6% | 3.2% | 3.1% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 1.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥92.7B | ¥143.4B | ¥102.9B | ¥342.2B | ¥170.2B | ¥94.0B | ¥98.8B | (¥12.1B) | ¥27.6B | ¥173.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.6% | 6.6% | 4.8% | 14.2% | 7.0% | 3.6% | 3.4% | −0.4% | 0.7% | 4.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥21.2B | ¥102.5B | ¥71.2B | ¥297.1B | ¥104.5B | ¥35.1B | ¥33.3B | (¥61.3B) | (¥13.8B) | ¥149.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.0% | 4.7% | 3.3% | 12.3% | 4.3% | 1.4% | 1.1% | −2.0% | −0.3% | 3.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥41.1B | ¥47.6B | ¥54.5B | ¥55.1B | ¥58.7B | ¥55.6B | ¥66.4B | ¥76.9B | ¥83.0B | ¥92.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥22.0B | ¥19M | ¥3.4B | ¥10.0B | ¥5.0B | ¥15.0B | ¥30.0B | ¥40.0B | ¥18M | ¥14M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 10% | 10% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 10% | 8% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 13% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 8% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥204.7B | ¥324.7B | ¥342.9B | ¥583.3B | ¥600.2B | ¥515.2B | ¥332.7B | ¥292.9B | ¥390.3B | ¥434.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥7.2B | ¥7.6B | ¥8.5B | ¥8.3B | ¥7.3B | ¥9.5B | ¥12.2B | ¥12.5B | ¥12.2B | ¥11.9B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥7.2B | ¥7.6B | ¥8.5B | ¥8.3B | ¥7.3B | ¥9.5B | ¥12.2B | ¥12.5B | ¥12.2B | ¥11.9B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.36T | ¥1.57T | ¥1.57T | ¥1.82T | ¥1.78T | ¥1.95T | ¥2.09T | ¥2.50T | ¥3.71T | ¥3.91T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥713.9B | ¥706.9B | ¥781.3B | ¥821.9B | ¥835.8B | ¥867.9B | ¥1.04T | ¥1.14T | ¥1.56T | ¥1.40T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.1× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.4× | 2.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥48M | ¥6.2B | ¥4.6B | ¥3.1B | ¥1.6B | ¥250M | ¥31.4B | ¥17.8B | ¥134.2B | ¥114.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.18T | ¥2.42T | ¥2.41T | ¥2.63T | ¥2.63T | ¥2.80T | ¥3.01T | ¥3.35T | ¥4.81T | ¥5.01T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥486.8B | ¥616.6B | ¥633.6B | ¥580.5B | ¥556.4B | ¥543.3B | ¥585.6B | ¥751.6B | ¥1.85T | ¥1.85T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥282.1B | ¥291.9B | ¥290.7B | (¥2.8B) | (¥43.9B) | ¥28.2B | ¥252.8B | ¥458.7B | ¥1.46T | ¥1.42T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 79.2× | 52.4× | 40.1× | 41.8× | 67.4× | 60.0× | 49.2× | 21.9× | 9.9× | 8.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥1.12T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.23T | ¥1.29T | ¥1.52T | ¥1.67T | ¥1.79T | ¥1.69T | ¥1.83T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 710M | 691M | 691M | 691M | 685M | 685M | 685M | 663M | 663M | 663M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2856.11 | ¥3126.41 | ¥3127.79 | ¥3496.81 | ¥3573.77 | ¥3782.16 | ¥4277.65 | ¥4687.61 | ¥6121.57 | ¥6330.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥171.70 | ¥192.89 | ¥186.17 | ¥204.52 | ¥180.44 | ¥224.78 | ¥269.50 | ¥305.23 | ¥328.37 | ¥350.00 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥130.61 | ¥207.58 | ¥149.03 | ¥495.52 | ¥248.65 | ¥137.24 | ¥144.23 | ¥-18.20 | ¥41.70 | ¥261.74 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥29.92 | ¥148.34 | ¥103.10 | ¥430.22 | ¥152.60 | ¥51.24 | ¥48.64 | ¥-92.41 | ¥-20.83 | ¥225.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥57.89 | ¥68.96 | ¥78.95 | ¥79.74 | ¥85.77 | ¥81.22 | ¥96.98 | ¥115.96 | ¥125.14 | ¥139.81 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥133.28 | ¥91.07 | ¥78.01 | ¥96.46 | ¥127.78 | ¥121.15 | ¥134.61 | ¥116.07 | ¥115.68 | ¥100.93 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1575.72 | ¥1749.17 | ¥1732.95 | ¥1787.37 | ¥1890.92 | ¥2221.40 | ¥2435.50 | ¥2706.52 | ¥2548.16 | ¥2758.40 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.2%/yr | +12.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.0%/yr | +1.0%/yr |
| EPS | +8.2%/yr | +14.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.3%/yr | +10.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −3.0%/yr | −4.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.4%/yr | +7.8%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥173.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥42.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥24.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥149.4B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥232.1B | ¥217.7B | ¥202.3B | ¥184.5B | ¥153.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥42.8B | +¥35.2B | +¥27.7B | +¥26.7B | +¥24.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥58.5B | −¥190.1B | −¥214.4B | −¥85.8B | −¥59.9B |
| Cash from operations | ¥216.3B | ¥62.9B | ¥15.7B | ¥125.5B | ¥118.0B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥42.8B | −¥35.2B | −¥27.7B | −¥26.7B | −¥24.1B |
| Owner earnings | ¥173.6B | ¥27.6B | (¥12.1B) | ¥98.8B | ¥94.0B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥24.2B | −¥41.5B | −¥49.2B | −¥65.5B | −¥58.9B |
| Free cash flow | ¥149.4B | (¥13.8B) | (¥61.3B) | ¥33.3B | ¥35.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 1% | 0% | 3% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥42.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥24.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥341.4B ÷ interest expense ¥39.2B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.42T · 4.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥434.9B − debt ¥1.85T
What this means
Netting ¥434.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.85T of debt leaves ¥1.42T owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit (5.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–13%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥269.7B ÷ invested capital ¥3.24TIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -0%–14%; latest ¥173.6B = operating cash ¥216.3B − maintenance capex ¥42.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops ¥216.3B ÷ net income ¥232.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥92.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥173.6B
What this means
Of ¥173.6B Owner Earnings, ¥92.7B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥92.7B dividends, ¥14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.57×ExpandingCapex ¥66.9B ÷ depreciation ¥42.8B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 8% lately, median 9%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · 7.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥1.50T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥761.1B · 51%
- Dividends¥631.6B · 42%
- Buybacks¥125.5B · 8%
- Returned to owners¥757.1B
61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥631.6B as dividends and ¥125.5B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥1.36T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥230.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥125.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−6.6%
The diluted count fell from 710M to 663M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥139.81/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−6%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥881.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥49.9B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sekisui House is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.5% vs 5.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.3% early in the record and 1.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥486.8B → ¥1.85T
Debt rose from ¥486.8B to ¥1.85T while owner earnings went from about ¥113.0B to ¥63.1B — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 29 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sekisui House has delivered.
Through the cycle, Sekisui House earns about ¥182.8B on its 4.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥149.4B on 663M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.42T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥66.9B) runs well above depreciation (¥42.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥173.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1925 its page in the Manual 1963 →
Industry order: ← 1925 the Homebuilders chapter BZH →