Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1925 Manual 1963 → ← 1925 Homebuilders BZH →

1928 · Sekisui House

General Bldg Contractors - Residential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Sekisui House’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1928) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥2.03T¥2.16T¥2.16T¥2.42T¥2.45T¥2.59T¥2.93T¥3.11T¥4.06T¥4.20TRevenueRevenue
20%19%19%20%Gross marginGross mgn
11%12%11%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥184.2B¥195.5B¥189.2B¥205.3B¥186.5B¥230.2B¥261.5B¥271.0B¥331.4B¥341.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.1%9.1%8.8%8.5%7.6%8.9%8.9%8.7%8.2%8.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥121.9B¥133.2B¥128.6B¥141.3B¥123.5B¥153.9B¥184.5B¥202.3B¥217.7B¥232.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥115.8B¥165.4B¥125.1B¥363.8B¥192.0B¥118.0B¥125.5B¥15.7B¥62.9B¥216.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥23.1B¥22.0B¥22.2B¥21.5B¥21.7B¥24.1B¥26.7B¥27.7B¥35.2B¥42.8BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥29.2B)¥10.1B(¥25.6B)¥201.0B¥46.7B(¥59.9B)(¥85.8B)(¥214.4B)(¥190.1B)(¥58.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥94.6B¥62.9B¥53.9B¥66.6B¥87.5B¥83.0B¥92.2B¥76.9B¥76.7B¥66.9BCapexCapex
4.7%2.9%2.5%2.8%3.6%3.2%3.1%2.5%1.9%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥92.7B¥143.4B¥102.9B¥342.2B¥170.2B¥94.0B¥98.8B(¥12.1B)¥27.6B¥173.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.6%6.6%4.8%14.2%7.0%3.6%3.4%−0.4%0.7%4.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥21.2B¥102.5B¥71.2B¥297.1B¥104.5B¥35.1B¥33.3B(¥61.3B)(¥13.8B)¥149.4BFree cash flowFCF
1.0%4.7%3.3%12.3%4.3%1.4%1.1%−2.0%−0.3%3.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥41.1B¥47.6B¥54.5B¥55.1B¥58.7B¥55.6B¥66.4B¥76.9B¥83.0B¥92.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥22.0B¥19M¥3.4B¥10.0B¥5.0B¥15.0B¥30.0B¥40.0B¥18M¥14MBuybacksBuybacks
10%10%10%13%12%12%11%10%8%8%ROICROIC
11%11%11%11%10%10%11%11%13%13%Return on equityROE
7%7%6%7%5%6%7%7%8%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥204.7B¥324.7B¥342.9B¥583.3B¥600.2B¥515.2B¥332.7B¥292.9B¥390.3B¥434.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥7.2B¥7.6B¥8.5B¥8.3B¥7.3B¥9.5B¥12.2B¥12.5B¥12.2B¥11.9BInventoryInvent.
¥7.2B¥7.6B¥8.5B¥8.3B¥7.3B¥9.5B¥12.2B¥12.5B¥12.2B¥11.9BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥1.36T¥1.57T¥1.57T¥1.82T¥1.78T¥1.95T¥2.09T¥2.50T¥3.71T¥3.91TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥713.9B¥706.9B¥781.3B¥821.9B¥835.8B¥867.9B¥1.04T¥1.14T¥1.56T¥1.40TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×2.2×2.0×2.2×2.1×2.2×2.0×2.2×2.4×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥48M¥6.2B¥4.6B¥3.1B¥1.6B¥250M¥31.4B¥17.8B¥134.2B¥114.6BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.18T¥2.42T¥2.41T¥2.63T¥2.63T¥2.80T¥3.01T¥3.35T¥4.81T¥5.01TTotal assetsAssets
¥486.8B¥616.6B¥633.6B¥580.5B¥556.4B¥543.3B¥585.6B¥751.6B¥1.85T¥1.85TTotal debtDebt
¥282.1B¥291.9B¥290.7B(¥2.8B)(¥43.9B)¥28.2B¥252.8B¥458.7B¥1.46T¥1.42TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
79.2×52.4×40.1×41.8×67.4×60.0×49.2×21.9×9.9×8.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥1.12T¥1.21T¥1.20T¥1.23T¥1.29T¥1.52T¥1.67T¥1.79T¥1.69T¥1.83TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
710M691M691M691M685M685M685M663M663M663MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2856.11¥3126.41¥3127.79¥3496.81¥3573.77¥3782.16¥4277.65¥4687.61¥6121.57¥6330.54Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥171.70¥192.89¥186.17¥204.52¥180.44¥224.78¥269.50¥305.23¥328.37¥350.00EPS (diluted)EPS
¥130.61¥207.58¥149.03¥495.52¥248.65¥137.24¥144.23¥-18.20¥41.70¥261.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥29.92¥148.34¥103.10¥430.22¥152.60¥51.24¥48.64¥-92.41¥-20.83¥225.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥57.89¥68.96¥78.95¥79.74¥85.77¥81.22¥96.98¥115.96¥125.14¥139.81Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥133.28¥91.07¥78.01¥96.46¥127.78¥121.15¥134.61¥116.07¥115.68¥100.93Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1575.72¥1749.17¥1732.95¥1787.37¥1890.92¥2221.40¥2435.50¥2706.52¥2548.16¥2758.40Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.2%/yr+12.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.0%/yr+1.0%/yr
EPS+8.2%/yr+14.2%/yr
Dividends / share+10.3%/yr+10.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−3.0%/yr−4.6%/yr
Book value / share+6.4%/yr+7.8%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥173.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥42.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥24.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥149.4B.

Reported net income¥232.1B
Owner earnings¥173.6B · 4% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥232.1B¥217.7B¥202.3B¥184.5B¥153.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥42.8B+¥35.2B+¥27.7B+¥26.7B+¥24.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥58.5B−¥190.1B−¥214.4B−¥85.8B−¥59.9B
Cash from operations¥216.3B¥62.9B¥15.7B¥125.5B¥118.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥42.8B−¥35.2B−¥27.7B−¥26.7B−¥24.1B
Owner earnings¥173.6B¥27.6B(¥12.1B)¥98.8B¥94.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥24.2B−¥41.5B−¥49.2B−¥65.5B−¥58.9B
Free cash flow¥149.4B(¥13.8B)(¥61.3B)¥33.3B¥35.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%1%0%3%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥42.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥24.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥341.4B ÷ interest expense ¥39.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.42T · 4.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥434.9B − debt ¥1.85T
    What this means

    Netting ¥434.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.85T of debt leaves ¥1.42T owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit (5.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 8%–13%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥269.7B ÷ invested capital ¥3.24T
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -0%–14%; latest ¥173.6B = operating cash ¥216.3B − maintenance capex ¥42.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥216.3B ÷ net income ¥232.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥92.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥173.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥173.6B Owner Earnings, ¥92.7B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥92.7B dividends, ¥14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.57×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥66.9B ÷ depreciation ¥42.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 8% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 7.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.50T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥761.1B · 51%
  • Dividends¥631.6B · 42%
  • Buybacks¥125.5B · 8%
  • Returned to owners¥757.1B

    61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥631.6B as dividends and ¥125.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥1.36T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥230.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥125.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−6.6%

    The diluted count fell from 710M to 663M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥139.81/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−6%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥881.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥49.9B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sekisui House is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.5% vs 5.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.3% early in the record and 1.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥486.8B → ¥1.85T

    Debt rose from ¥486.8B to ¥1.85T while owner earnings went from about ¥113.0B to ¥63.1B — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 29 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sekisui House has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Sekisui House earns about ¥182.8B on its 4.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥149.4B on 663M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.42T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥66.9B) runs well above depreciation (¥42.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥173.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1925 its page in the Manual 1963 →

Industry order: ← 1925 the Homebuilders chapter BZH →