← All companies ← BYND Manual C → ← 1928 Homebuilders CCS →

BZH, Beazer Homes USA Inc.

Homebuilders capital-intensive Cyclical

Beazer Homes offers a diverse portfolio of products tailored to meet the evolving needs of homebuyers that value a well-constructed and energy efficient home .

In response to changing market conditions, we intend to balance decreasing leverage and returning capital to investors through stock repurchases, as we make investments to grow the business long-term .

We have become a leading energy-efficient homebuilder, delivering proven efficiency and lowering monthly utility costs to our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BZH · Beazer Homes USA Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.4B

+1.8% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $2.3B

Gross margin 16%

Operating margin −1.4% 5-yr avg 6.9%

ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 8%

Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 16% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.3% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.1B	RevenueRevenue
16%	17%	15%	—	—	—	—	—	—	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	9%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$62M	$82M	($90M)	$79M	$147M	$272M	$177M	$143M	$37M	($30M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.2%	3.9%	−4.3%	3.7%	6.9%	11.8%	8.0%	6.1%	1.5%	−1.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$32M	($45M)	($80M)	$52M	$122M	$221M	$159M	$140M	$46M	($4M)	Net incomeNet inc.
8%	—	—	26%	15%	19%	13%	12%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$105M	$55M	$114M	$289M	$32M	$81M	$178M	($138M)	$32M	($41M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$14M	$14M	$15M	$16M	$14M	$13M	$12M	$15M	$19M	$19M	DepreciationDeprec.
$51M	$76M	$168M	$211M	($117M)	($161M)	($27K)	($300M)	($40M)	($63M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$12M	$17M	$21M	$11M	$15M	$15M	$20M	$22M	$29M	$29M	CapexCapex
0.6%	0.8%	1.0%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	0.9%	1.0%	1.2%	1.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$92M	$38M	$99M	$278M	$17M	$66M	$166M	($152M)	$13M	($59M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.8%	1.8%	4.7%	13.1%	0.8%	2.8%	7.5%	−6.5%	0.5%	−2.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$92M	$38M	$92M	$278M	$17M	$66M	$158M	($160M)	$3M	($70M)	Free cash flowFCF
4.8%	1.8%	4.4%	13.1%	0.8%	2.8%	7.1%	−6.9%	0.1%	−3.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$57M	$4M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$0	$35M	$3M	$0	$8M	$0	$13M	$33M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
3%	—	-4%	4%	8%	13%	9%	6%	2%	-1%	ROICROIC
5%	-7%	-15%	9%	17%	23%	14%	11%	4%	-0%	Return on equityROE
5%	−7%	−15%	9%	17%	23%	14%	11%	4%	−0%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$292M	$140M	$107M	$328M	$247M	$215M	$346M	$204M	$215M	$116M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$36M	$25M	$26M	$20M	$26M	$36M	$46M	$65M	$78M	$85M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$36M	$25M	$26M	$20M	$26M	$36M	$46M	$65M	$78M	$85M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$10M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.8B	Total assetsAssets
$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$983M	$978M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.6B	Total debtDebt
$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$803M	$807M	$769M	$632M	$821M	$814M	$1.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.0×	15.3×	-28.9×	9.3×	52.8×	—	—	—	—	—	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$682M	$644M	$539M	$593M	$725M	$939M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
32.4M	32.1M	30.6M	29.9M	30.4M	30.8M	30.7M	31.0M	30.0M	28.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$59.10	$65.56	$68.19	$71.03	$70.32	$75.24	$71.77	$75.28	$79.02	$74.15	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.98	$-1.41	$-2.60	$1.74	$4.01	$7.17	$5.16	$4.53	$1.52	$-0.13	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.85	$1.18	$3.23	$9.30	$0.56	$2.14	$5.39	$-4.92	$0.43	$-2.09	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.85	$1.18	$3.01	$9.30	$0.56	$2.14	$5.13	$-5.17	$0.12	$-2.45	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.38	$0.53	$0.70	$0.36	$0.48	$0.49	$0.66	$0.72	$0.95	$1.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$21.05	$20.04	$17.60	$19.81	$23.82	$30.50	$35.87	$39.81	$41.61	$41.13	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.7%/yr	+2.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−21.1%/yr	−46.0%/yr
EPS	+5.6%/yr	−2.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+12.0%/yr	+21.7%/yr
Book value / share	+8.9%/yr	+16.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income-74.4%
“Our operating income decreased by $106.4 million to $36.6 million for the year ended September 30, 2025, compared to operating income of $143.0 million for year ended September 30, 2024, primarily driven by the previously discussed decrease in gross profit, including the impact of $13.0 million inventory impairments and abandonments recognized.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

30Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

2%low FY2019

Gross margin

15%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

63.6×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$13Mowner earningsvs.$46Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $13M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $19M it takes just to hold its position. It put $9M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3M.

Reported net income$46M

Owner earnings$13M · 1% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$46M	$140M	$159M	$221M	$122M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$19M	+$15M	+$12M	+$13M	+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$7M	+$7M	+$7M	+$8M	+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$40M	−$300M	−$27K	−$161M	−$117M
Cash from operations	$32M	($138M)	$178M	$81M	$32M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$19M	−$15M	−$12M	−$15M	−$15M
Owner earnings	$13M	($152M)	$166M	$66M	$17M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$9M	−$7M	−$8M	—	—
Free cash flow	$3M	($160M)	$158M	$66M	$17M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	-7%	8%	3%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $19M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $9M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $5M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 35.9× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $215M − debt $1.5B

What this means
Netting $215M of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 35.9× a year's operating profit (41.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -4%–13%; 1% latest = NOPAT $37M ÷ invested capital $2.6B

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -7%–13%; latest $13M = operating cash $32M − maintenance capex $19M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $5M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.70×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $32M ÷ net income $46M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 258%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $13M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $13M of Owner Earnings, $33M (258%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $33M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $7M stock comp, the real buyback was about $26M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.49×

Expanding

Capex $29M ÷ depreciation $19M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.20/share (latest year $1.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 5% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2019 · −4.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors or other entities may also integrate AI into their information systems and business operations more swiftly or effectively than us, potentially impairing our competitive edge and negatively impacting our financial performance.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $748M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$162M · 22%
Buybacks$92M · 12%
Retained (debt / cash)$493M · 66%

Returned to owners$92M
15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $92M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $227M and cash and short-term investments fell $176M.
Average price paid for buybacks$19.91
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $57M, about $19.91 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $9.19 (2020) to $28.41 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $22.05 ($33M).
Net change in share count−12.2%
The diluted count fell from 32M to 28M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($554M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $68M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Allan P. Merrill	$5.5M	$10.9M	$17M
2022	Allan P. Merrill	$7.0M	$4.8M	$66M
2023	Allan P. Merrill	$6.7M	$13.5M	$166M
2024	Allan P. Merrill	$5.3M	$9.5M	($152M)
2025	Allan P. Merrill	$6.4M	$3.8M	$13M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio56:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Beazer Homes USA Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.5% vs 3.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 0.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 4% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $36M to $85M while revenue grew 10%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 4% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Homebuilders

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MHOM/I Homes Inc.	$4.4B	23%	11.0%	20%	3%
DFHDream Finders Homes Inc.	$4.3B	16%	7.8%	41%	3%
CCSCentury Communities Inc.	$4.1B	—	7.9%	6%	-1%
ECGEverus Construction Group Inc.	$3.7B	12%	6.7%	29%	4%
HOVHovnanian Enterprises Inc.	$3.0B	—	1.8%	3%	7%
BZHBeazer Homes USA Inc.	$2.4B	16%	3.9%	5%	3%
GRBKGreen Brick Partners Inc.	$2.0B	26%	15.8%	15%	-0%
LGIHLGI Homes Inc.	$1.7B	25%	13.3%	11%	-7%
Group median	—	20%	7.8%	13%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Beazer Homes USA Inc. has delivered.

Beazer Homes USA Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Beazer Homes USA Inc. earns about $68M on its 2.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($68M) Net of stock comp (−$7M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($60M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($70M) on 27M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $1.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 28M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($29M) runs well above depreciation ($19M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($60M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BZH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Beazer Homes USA Inc. (BZH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BZH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BYND its page in the Manual C →

Industry order: ← 1928 the Homebuilders chapter CCS →