Owner Scorecard


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3289 · Tokyu Fudosan Holdings

Real estate Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Tokyu Fudosan Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 3289) →

Where the money comes from

on EDINET →

The biggest segment, Urban Development, is also where the profit is made: 32% of revenue and 42% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
Operating profit same segments
  • Urban Development32%¥397.4B42% of profit
  • Real Estate Agents29%¥356.8B36% of profit
  • Property Management And Operation28%¥350.6B15% of profit
  • Strategic Investment11%¥141.3B7% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥808.5B¥866.1B¥901.9B¥963.2B¥907.7B¥989.0B¥1.01T¥1.10T¥1.15T¥1.25TRevenueRevenue
13%12%9%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥73.2B¥77.5B¥80.2B¥79.3B¥56.5B¥83.8B¥110.4B¥120.2B¥140.8B¥166.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.1%9.0%8.9%8.2%6.2%8.5%11.0%10.9%12.2%13.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥31.5B¥35.2B¥37.5B¥38.6B¥21.7B¥35.1B¥48.2B¥68.5B¥77.6B¥96.7BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥68.9B¥12.3B¥44.5B(¥6.7B)¥100.4B¥76.5B¥94.7B¥156.5B¥47.4B¥129.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥23.5B¥23.1B¥24.6B¥32.3B¥39.8B¥43.3B¥44.5B¥44.6B¥51.5B¥68.6BDepreciationDeprec.
¥13.9B(¥46.1B)(¥17.5B)(¥77.6B)¥38.9B(¥2.0B)¥2.0B¥43.3B(¥81.7B)(¥35.8B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥7.9B¥8.2B¥9.1B¥11.5B¥11.5B¥11.5B¥13.0B¥20.5B¥24.5B¥29.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥1M¥2M¥1M¥0¥0¥159M¥6.2B¥1M¥1M¥9.4BBuybacksBuybacks
4%4%4%3%2%3%4%4%5%5%ROICROIC
7%7%7%7%4%5%7%9%11%12%Return on equityROE
5%6%5%5%2%4%5%6%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥61.9B¥61.7B¥184.8B¥121.5B¥210.4B¥153.9B¥170.6B¥246.2B¥178.8B¥206.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥27.4B¥31.0B¥33.8B¥35.9B¥41.8B¥39.2B¥45.8B¥56.2B¥59.7B¥59.1BReceivablesReceiv.
¥40.8B¥37.0B¥45.8B¥51.8B¥56.7B¥43.9B¥41.8B¥69.6B¥52.9B¥56.4BAccounts payablePayables
(¥13.4B)(¥5.9B)(¥12.0B)(¥15.8B)(¥14.9B)(¥4.7B)¥3.9B(¥13.4B)¥6.8B¥2.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥588.0B¥649.8B¥872.7B¥889.0B¥1.00T¥1.04T¥1.12T¥1.36T¥1.37T¥1.48TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥537.7B¥394.3B¥435.8B¥480.6B¥399.0B¥438.8B¥406.1B¥508.1B¥621.3B¥525.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.6×2.0×1.8×2.5×2.4×2.7×2.7×2.2×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥88.0B¥82.6B¥77.1B¥71.7B¥66.4B¥60.7B¥53.4B¥43.5B¥53.4B¥49.3BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.07T¥2.17T¥2.41T¥2.49T¥2.65T¥2.63T¥2.74T¥3.03T¥3.25T¥3.42TTotal assetsAssets
¥1.14T¥1.21T¥1.29T¥1.36T¥1.48T¥1.42T¥1.48T¥1.59T¥1.75T¥1.83TTotal debtDebt
¥1.08T¥1.15T¥1.11T¥1.24T¥1.27T¥1.27T¥1.31T¥1.34T¥1.57T¥1.62TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
8.8×9.8×8.6×7.7×4.8×7.6×10.3×10.0×10.1×8.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥446.3B¥475.3B¥568.7B¥569.5B¥577.9B¥643.3B¥700.7B¥771.9B¥731.4B¥788.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
641M641M720M720M720M720M720M720M720M720MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1261.65¥1351.57¥1252.91¥1338.09¥1261.04¥1374.00¥1397.32¥1532.37¥1598.02¥1731.03Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥49.18¥54.91¥52.04¥53.64¥30.10¥48.81¥67.00¥95.22¥107.75¥134.33EPS (diluted)EPS
¥12.35¥12.83¥12.70¥15.99¥15.99¥16.00¥18.00¥28.50¥34.00¥41.50Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥696.45¥741.76¥790.04¥791.14¥802.82¥893.68¥973.43¥1072.34¥1016.09¥1095.29Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.6%/yr+6.5%/yr
EPS+11.8%/yr+34.9%/yr
Dividends / share+14.4%/yr+21.0%/yr
Book value / share+5.2%/yr+6.4%/yr
II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥166.9B ÷ interest expense ¥20.9B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.62T · 9.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥180.5B + ST investments ¥26.0B − debt ¥1.83T
    What this means

    Netting ¥206.6B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.83T of debt leaves ¥1.62T owed, about 9.7× a year's operating profit (10.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT ¥131.8B ÷ invested capital ¥2.43T
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥129.5B ÷ net income ¥96.7B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 12% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2021 · 6.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tokyu Fudosan Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 5% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥27.4B to ¥59.1B while revenue grew 54%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Tokyu Fudosan Holdings is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

¥
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered6%/yr’21→’26

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 3099 its page in the Manual 3382 →

Industry order: the Real Estate Development & Services chapter 8801 →