← Japan catalog ← 4188 Manual 4307 → ← 4188 Chemicals 5301 →
4208 · UBE
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from UBE’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 4208) →
Where the money comes from
on EDINET →The largest slice of sales is Polymers And Chemicals at 54%, but the profit engine is Specialty Products: 13% of revenue and 37% of the profitable segments' operating profit. High Performance Urethans ran a ¥548M operating loss; Pharmaceutical ran a ¥1.3B operating loss.
- Polymers And Chemicals54%¥251.2B31% of profit
- Machinery15%¥68.4B24% of profit
- Specialty Products13%¥61.9B37% of profit
- High Performance Urethans10%¥46.5Bloss of ¥548M
- Other7%¥34.5B7% of profit
- Pharmaceutical5%¥21.0Bloss of ¥1.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥616.6B | ¥695.6B | ¥730.2B | ¥667.9B | ¥613.9B | ¥655.3B | ¥494.7B | ¥468.2B | ¥486.8B | ¥462.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 18% | 17% | — | — | — | 19% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 13% | 13% | — | — | — | 15% | 18% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 2% | 2% | — | — | — | 2% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥35.0B | ¥50.3B | ¥44.6B | ¥34.0B | ¥25.9B | ¥44.0B | ¥16.2B | ¥22.5B | ¥18.0B | ¥18.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.7% | 7.2% | 6.1% | 5.1% | 4.2% | 6.7% | 3.3% | 4.8% | 3.7% | 4.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥24.2B | ¥31.7B | ¥32.5B | ¥23.0B | ¥22.9B | ¥24.5B | (¥7.0B) | ¥29.0B | (¥4.8B) | ¥23.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥53.4B | ¥73.4B | ¥50.5B | ¥68.5B | ¥66.1B | ¥32.7B | ¥18.1B | ¥53.0B | ¥35.8B | ¥60.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥34.5B | ¥35.4B | ¥36.4B | ¥36.8B | ¥36.4B | ¥36.5B | ¥25.5B | ¥26.6B | ¥27.2B | ¥25.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥5.3B) | ¥6.4B | (¥18.5B) | ¥8.7B | ¥6.7B | (¥28.3B) | (¥345M) | (¥2.6B) | ¥13.5B | ¥10.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥41.9B | ¥33.8B | ¥42.8B | ¥42.7B | ¥38.2B | ¥36.4B | ¥26.8B | ¥31.0B | ¥58.9B | ¥72.4B | CapexCapex |
| 6.8% | 4.9% | 5.9% | 6.4% | 6.2% | 5.6% | 5.4% | 6.6% | 12.1% | 15.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥11.6B | ¥39.6B | ¥7.7B | ¥25.8B | ¥27.8B | (¥3.7B) | (¥8.7B) | ¥22.0B | (¥23.1B) | (¥12.5B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.9% | 5.7% | 1.1% | 3.9% | 4.5% | −0.6% | −1.8% | 4.7% | −4.7% | −2.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥11.6B | ¥39.6B | ¥7.7B | ¥25.8B | ¥27.8B | (¥3.7B) | (¥8.7B) | ¥22.0B | (¥23.1B) | (¥12.5B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.9% | 5.7% | 1.1% | 3.9% | 4.5% | −0.6% | −1.8% | 4.7% | −4.7% | −2.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥5.3B | ¥6.3B | ¥7.9B | ¥12.6B | ¥9.1B | ¥8.9B | ¥9.7B | ¥9.2B | ¥10.6B | ¥10.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥63M | ¥5.0B | ¥10.0B | ¥7M | ¥5M | ¥10.0B | ¥38M | ¥8M | ¥6M | ¥6M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 8% | 7% | 6% | 4% | 6% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 2% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 9% | 9% | 7% | 7% | 6% | -2% | 7% | -1% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 8% | 7% | 3% | 4% | 4% | −4% | 5% | −5% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥35.8B | ¥48.5B | ¥32.3B | ¥40.6B | ¥79.6B | ¥78.8B | ¥30.7B | ¥35.9B | ¥115.4B | ¥52.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥157.8B | ¥162.7B | ¥171.6B | ¥158.1B | ¥149.6B | ¥137.5B | ¥96.3B | ¥97.4B | ¥96.5B | ¥92.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥35.9B | ¥40.4B | ¥42.6B | ¥43.2B | ¥35.7B | ¥53.6B | ¥56.8B | ¥58.0B | ¥57.7B | ¥66.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥92.3B | ¥104.5B | ¥102.2B | ¥92.6B | ¥90.8B | ¥110.8B | ¥69.2B | ¥62.1B | ¥48.3B | ¥53.7B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥101.4B | ¥98.6B | ¥112.0B | ¥108.7B | ¥94.5B | ¥80.3B | ¥83.8B | ¥93.3B | ¥105.9B | ¥104.8B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥295.0B | ¥316.9B | ¥315.7B | ¥304.0B | ¥331.7B | ¥394.7B | ¥283.1B | ¥295.7B | ¥358.4B | ¥308.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥245.8B | ¥253.1B | ¥226.1B | ¥199.3B | ¥200.4B | ¥249.2B | ¥172.2B | ¥198.2B | ¥197.7B | ¥203.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.8× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | ¥643M | ¥524M | ¥720M | ¥857M | ¥1.5B | ¥1.4B | ¥2.0B | ¥32.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥709.4B | ¥742.4B | ¥740.3B | ¥727.3B | ¥769.7B | ¥838.0B | ¥732.7B | ¥789.0B | ¥866.2B | ¥946.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥210.5B | ¥195.5B | ¥187.3B | ¥190.7B | ¥214.8B | ¥241.8B | ¥218.1B | ¥213.4B | ¥330.5B | ¥358.2B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥174.7B | ¥147.0B | ¥155.0B | ¥150.1B | ¥135.1B | ¥163.1B | ¥187.4B | ¥177.6B | ¥215.1B | ¥305.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 21.9× | 35.7× | 41.1× | 35.0× | 27.8× | 49.0× | 20.8× | 21.6× | 10.4× | 5.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥310.4B | ¥336.9B | ¥354.6B | ¥332.1B | ¥346.5B | ¥394.0B | ¥381.6B | ¥429.4B | ¥338.2B | ¥351.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | 106M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥5805.67 | ¥6549.66 | ¥6875.30 | ¥6289.00 | ¥5780.50 | ¥6170.10 | ¥4658.55 | ¥4409.01 | ¥4583.82 | ¥4353.51 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥227.73 | ¥298.31 | ¥306.02 | ¥216.35 | ¥215.97 | ¥230.70 | ¥-66.23 | ¥272.89 | ¥-45.35 | ¥224.78 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥108.77 | ¥373.04 | ¥72.50 | ¥243.30 | ¥262.20 | ¥-34.54 | ¥-81.94 | ¥207.04 | ¥-217.45 | ¥-117.37 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥108.77 | ¥373.04 | ¥72.50 | ¥243.30 | ¥262.20 | ¥-34.54 | ¥-81.94 | ¥207.04 | ¥-217.45 | ¥-117.37 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥49.78 | ¥59.76 | ¥74.16 | ¥118.88 | ¥85.58 | ¥84.02 | ¥91.03 | ¥86.54 | ¥100.27 | ¥100.34 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥394.23 | ¥317.98 | ¥402.66 | ¥401.61 | ¥359.77 | ¥342.55 | ¥252.63 | ¥291.64 | ¥554.90 | ¥682.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥2922.79 | ¥3171.95 | ¥3338.53 | ¥3126.84 | ¥3262.90 | ¥3710.31 | ¥3593.51 | ¥4042.89 | ¥3184.80 | ¥3309.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −3.1%/yr | −5.5%/yr |
| EPS | −0.1%/yr | +0.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.1%/yr | +3.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.3%/yr | +13.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.4%/yr | +0.3%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥23.9B of profit but (¥12.5B) of owner earnings: ¥36.3B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥23.9B | (¥4.8B) | ¥29.0B | (¥7.0B) | ¥24.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥25.7B | +¥27.2B | +¥26.6B | +¥25.5B | +¥36.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥10.4B | +¥13.5B | −¥2.6B | −¥345M | −¥28.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥60.0B | ¥35.8B | ¥53.0B | ¥18.1B | ¥32.7B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥72.4B | −¥58.9B | −¥31.0B | −¥26.8B | −¥36.4B |
| Owner earnings | (¥12.5B) | (¥23.1B) | ¥22.0B | (¥8.7B) | (¥3.7B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -3% | -5% | 5% | -2% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥18.9B ÷ interest expense ¥3.5B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥305.6B · 16.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥52.6B − debt ¥358.2B
What this means
Netting ¥52.6B of cash and short-term investments against ¥358.2B of debt leaves ¥305.6B owed, about 16.1× a year's operating profit (18.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 73 + DIO 67 − DPO 55 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–8%; 2% latest = NOPAT ¥15.0B ÷ invested capital ¥657.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -5%–6%; latest (¥12.5B) = operating cash ¥60.0B − maintenance capex ¥72.4BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥60.0B ÷ net income ¥23.9B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.82×ExpandingCapex ¥72.4B ÷ depreciation ¥25.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to 4% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · 3.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥511.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥424.8B · 83%
- Dividends¥90.3B · 18%
- Buybacks¥25.2B · 5%
- Returned to owners¥115.5B
133% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥90.3B as dividends and ¥25.2B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥28.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥28.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥210.5B to ¥358.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥25.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (106M to 106M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥100.34/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−29%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥84.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥24.1B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.29 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why UBE is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.9% vs 2.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.9% early in the record and −0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥210.5B → ¥358.2B
Debt rose from ¥210.5B to ¥358.2B while owner earnings went from about ¥19.6B to (¥4.5B): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what UBE has delivered.
UBE’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, UBE earns about ¥6.8B on its 1.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings (¥12.5B) on 106M diluted shares; net debt ¥305.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 4188 its page in the Manual 4307 →
Industry order: ← 4188 the Chemicals chapter 5301 →