← Japan catalog ← 5233 Manual 5332 → ← 4208 Chemicals 6988 →
5301 · Tokai Carbon
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Tokai Carbon’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5301) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥88.6B | ¥106.3B | ¥231.3B | ¥262.0B | ¥201.5B | ¥258.9B | ¥340.4B | ¥363.9B | ¥350.1B | ¥323.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 35% | 25% | — | — | — | 23% | 25% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 15% | 21% | — | — | — | 17% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 1% | 1% | — | — | — | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥1.1B | ¥11.1B | ¥73.1B | ¥54.3B | ¥7.9B | ¥24.6B | ¥40.6B | ¥38.7B | ¥19.4B | ¥25.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.3% | 10.4% | 31.6% | 20.7% | 3.9% | 9.5% | 11.9% | 10.6% | 5.5% | 8.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (¥7.9B) | ¥12.3B | ¥73.4B | ¥32.0B | ¥1.0B | ¥16.1B | ¥22.4B | ¥25.5B | (¥56.5B) | ¥20.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥17.5B | ¥10.5B | ¥44.1B | ¥41.7B | ¥55.0B | ¥38.1B | ¥41.2B | ¥62.1B | ¥64.5B | ¥55.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥8.1B | ¥6.6B | ¥10.4B | ¥18.5B | ¥20.9B | ¥22.9B | ¥27.5B | ¥29.1B | ¥33.0B | ¥27.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥17.3B | (¥8.4B) | (¥39.7B) | (¥8.8B) | ¥33.1B | (¥933M) | (¥8.7B) | ¥7.5B | ¥87.9B | ¥8.1B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥5.2B | ¥4.3B | ¥8.5B | ¥24.0B | ¥26.8B | ¥29.0B | ¥44.0B | ¥45.4B | ¥53.6B | ¥41.1B | CapexCapex |
| 5.8% | 4.1% | 3.7% | 9.2% | 13.3% | 11.2% | 12.9% | 12.5% | 15.3% | 12.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥12.3B | ¥6.2B | ¥35.6B | ¥23.2B | ¥34.1B | ¥15.2B | ¥13.7B | ¥33.0B | ¥31.4B | ¥28.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.9% | 5.8% | 15.4% | 8.8% | 16.9% | 5.9% | 4.0% | 9.1% | 9.0% | 8.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥12.3B | ¥6.2B | ¥35.6B | ¥17.7B | ¥28.2B | ¥9.1B | (¥2.8B) | ¥16.7B | ¥10.9B | ¥14.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 13.9% | 5.8% | 15.4% | 6.7% | 14.0% | 3.5% | −0.8% | 4.6% | 3.1% | 4.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥1.3B | ¥1.9B | ¥3.8B | ¥7.7B | ¥8.3B | ¥6.4B | ¥6.4B | ¥7.0B | ¥7.0B | ¥6.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥8M | ¥3M | ¥5M | ¥1M | ¥1M | ¥3M | ¥2M | ¥2M | ¥1M | ¥0 | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 1% | 7% | 27% | 14% | 2% | 5% | 8% | 6% | 5% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| -7% | 10% | 35% | 16% | 1% | 6% | 7% | 7% | -33% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| −8% | 8% | 33% | 12% | −4% | 4% | 5% | 5% | −37% | 7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥28.5B | ¥22.1B | ¥41.1B | ¥46.4B | ¥57.7B | ¥64.4B | ¥49.4B | ¥56.5B | ¥65.1B | ¥64.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥24.2B | ¥30.3B | ¥55.1B | ¥50.6B | ¥41.4B | ¥56.7B | ¥65.2B | ¥65.5B | ¥69.2B | ¥66.8B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥7.5B | ¥9.4B | ¥17.1B | ¥20.2B | ¥14.9B | ¥20.2B | ¥26.2B | ¥28.9B | ¥30.3B | ¥28.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥7.5B | ¥11.5B | ¥22.4B | ¥24.9B | ¥15.5B | ¥22.3B | ¥28.1B | ¥25.7B | ¥23.1B | ¥20.4B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥24.3B | ¥28.2B | ¥49.9B | ¥46.0B | ¥40.8B | ¥54.5B | ¥63.3B | ¥68.8B | ¥76.4B | ¥75.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥77.6B | ¥85.4B | ¥164.2B | ¥196.4B | ¥177.7B | ¥215.1B | ¥246.7B | ¥262.9B | ¥270.6B | ¥258.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥29.0B | ¥36.9B | ¥91.7B | ¥117.5B | ¥92.7B | ¥130.4B | ¥146.7B | ¥137.0B | ¥148.1B | ¥126.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.7× | 2.3× | 1.8× | 1.7× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.9× | 1.8× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥5.6B | ¥9.5B | ¥29.7B | ¥64.5B | ¥60.3B | ¥55.6B | ¥52.8B | ¥49.2B | ¥30.4B | ¥26.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥158.8B | ¥184.7B | ¥329.9B | ¥462.9B | ¥459.7B | ¥512.5B | ¥576.5B | ¥640.0B | ¥643.5B | ¥664.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥17.0B | ¥16.1B | ¥49.7B | ¥148.0B | ¥158.6B | ¥168.2B | ¥171.5B | ¥170.2B | ¥199.1B | ¥207.3B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥11.5B) | (¥6.0B) | ¥8.6B | ¥101.6B | ¥100.9B | ¥103.8B | ¥122.1B | ¥113.7B | ¥134.0B | ¥143.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.7× | 33.2× | 119.0× | 101.4× | 8.3× | 23.6× | 39.0× | 24.7× | 9.9× | 10.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥113.0B | ¥127.1B | ¥207.8B | ¥203.8B | ¥196.5B | ¥256.6B | ¥300.9B | ¥360.1B | ¥170.7B | ¥183.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | 225M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥393.79 | ¥472.35 | ¥1028.27 | ¥1164.86 | ¥895.97 | ¥1150.84 | ¥1513.14 | ¥1617.95 | ¥1556.46 | ¥1435.74 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥-35.25 | ¥54.88 | ¥326.27 | ¥142.23 | ¥4.53 | ¥71.60 | ¥99.66 | ¥113.22 | ¥-251.11 | ¥89.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥54.84 | ¥27.59 | ¥158.34 | ¥102.96 | ¥151.74 | ¥67.45 | ¥61.10 | ¥146.74 | ¥139.78 | ¥125.24 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥54.84 | ¥27.59 | ¥158.34 | ¥78.60 | ¥125.29 | ¥40.53 | ¥-12.38 | ¥74.29 | ¥48.52 | ¥65.67 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥5.69 | ¥8.53 | ¥17.05 | ¥34.11 | ¥36.96 | ¥28.43 | ¥28.43 | ¥31.27 | ¥31.28 | ¥28.47 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥22.97 | ¥19.28 | ¥37.75 | ¥106.62 | ¥119.31 | ¥128.72 | ¥195.56 | ¥201.66 | ¥238.09 | ¥182.71 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥502.30 | ¥565.17 | ¥923.94 | ¥906.09 | ¥873.75 | ¥1140.60 | ¥1337.53 | ¥1600.86 | ¥758.94 | ¥814.03 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.5%/yr | +9.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +9.6%/yr | −3.8%/yr |
| EPS | — | +81.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +19.6%/yr | −5.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +25.9%/yr | +8.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.5%/yr | −1.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥28.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥27.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥13.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥14.8B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥20.1B | (¥56.5B) | ¥25.5B | ¥22.4B | ¥16.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥27.7B | +¥33.0B | +¥29.1B | +¥27.5B | +¥22.9B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥8.1B | +¥87.9B | +¥7.5B | −¥8.7B | −¥933M |
| Cash from operations | ¥55.9B | ¥64.5B | ¥62.1B | ¥41.2B | ¥38.1B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥27.7B | −¥33.0B | −¥29.1B | −¥27.5B | −¥22.9B |
| Owner earnings | ¥28.2B | ¥31.4B | ¥33.0B | ¥13.7B | ¥15.2B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥13.4B | −¥20.5B | −¥16.3B | −¥16.5B | −¥6.1B |
| Free cash flow | ¥14.8B | ¥10.9B | ¥16.7B | (¥2.8B) | ¥9.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 9% | 9% | 4% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥27.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥13.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 10.8×ComfortableOperating income ¥25.9B ÷ interest expense ¥2.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥143.0B · 5.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥64.3B − debt ¥207.3B
What this means
Netting ¥64.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥207.3B of debt leaves ¥143.0B owed, about 5.5× a year's operating profit (8.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 75 + DIO 43 − DPO 31 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 1%–27%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥20.4B ÷ invested capital ¥326.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 4%–17%; latest ¥28.2B = operating cash ¥55.9B − maintenance capex ¥27.7BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥13.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥14.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥55.9B ÷ net income ¥20.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥6.4B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥28.2B
What this means
Of ¥28.2B Owner Earnings, ¥6.4B (23%) went back to shareholders, ¥6.4B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.48×ExpandingCapex ¥41.1B ÷ depreciation ¥27.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 8% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −0%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 1.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥430.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥281.8B · 65%
- Dividends¥56.3B · 13%
- Buybacks¥26M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥92.4B · 21%
- Returned to owners¥56.3B
24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥56.3B as dividends and ¥26M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥190.3B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥35.8B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥26M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (225M to 225M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥28.47/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 20% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained16%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥82.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥12.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Tokai Carbon is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.9% vs 11.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.7% early in the record and 8.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥17.0B → ¥207.3B
Debt rose from ¥17.0B to ¥207.3B while owner earnings went from about ¥18.1B to ¥30.9B — about 0.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tokai Carbon has delivered.
Through the cycle, Tokai Carbon earns about ¥28.8B on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥14.8B on 225M diluted shares; net debt ¥143.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥41.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥27.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥28.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 5233 its page in the Manual 5332 →
Industry order: ← 4208 the Chemicals chapter 6988 →