Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 5233 Manual 5332 → ← 4208 Chemicals 6988 →

5301 · Tokai Carbon

Specialty chemicals Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Tokai Carbon’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5301) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥88.6B¥106.3B¥231.3B¥262.0B¥201.5B¥258.9B¥340.4B¥363.9B¥350.1B¥323.0BRevenueRevenue
35%25%23%25%Gross marginGross mgn
15%21%17%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥1.1B¥11.1B¥73.1B¥54.3B¥7.9B¥24.6B¥40.6B¥38.7B¥19.4B¥25.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.3%10.4%31.6%20.7%3.9%9.5%11.9%10.6%5.5%8.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
(¥7.9B)¥12.3B¥73.4B¥32.0B¥1.0B¥16.1B¥22.4B¥25.5B(¥56.5B)¥20.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥17.5B¥10.5B¥44.1B¥41.7B¥55.0B¥38.1B¥41.2B¥62.1B¥64.5B¥55.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥8.1B¥6.6B¥10.4B¥18.5B¥20.9B¥22.9B¥27.5B¥29.1B¥33.0B¥27.7BDepreciationDeprec.
¥17.3B(¥8.4B)(¥39.7B)(¥8.8B)¥33.1B(¥933M)(¥8.7B)¥7.5B¥87.9B¥8.1BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥5.2B¥4.3B¥8.5B¥24.0B¥26.8B¥29.0B¥44.0B¥45.4B¥53.6B¥41.1BCapexCapex
5.8%4.1%3.7%9.2%13.3%11.2%12.9%12.5%15.3%12.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥12.3B¥6.2B¥35.6B¥23.2B¥34.1B¥15.2B¥13.7B¥33.0B¥31.4B¥28.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.9%5.8%15.4%8.8%16.9%5.9%4.0%9.1%9.0%8.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥12.3B¥6.2B¥35.6B¥17.7B¥28.2B¥9.1B(¥2.8B)¥16.7B¥10.9B¥14.8BFree cash flowFCF
13.9%5.8%15.4%6.7%14.0%3.5%−0.8%4.6%3.1%4.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥1.3B¥1.9B¥3.8B¥7.7B¥8.3B¥6.4B¥6.4B¥7.0B¥7.0B¥6.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥8M¥3M¥5M¥1M¥1M¥3M¥2M¥2M¥1M¥0BuybacksBuybacks
1%7%27%14%2%5%8%6%5%6%ROICROIC
-7%10%35%16%1%6%7%7%-33%11%Return on equityROE
−8%8%33%12%−4%4%5%5%−37%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥28.5B¥22.1B¥41.1B¥46.4B¥57.7B¥64.4B¥49.4B¥56.5B¥65.1B¥64.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥24.2B¥30.3B¥55.1B¥50.6B¥41.4B¥56.7B¥65.2B¥65.5B¥69.2B¥66.8BReceivablesReceiv.
¥7.5B¥9.4B¥17.1B¥20.2B¥14.9B¥20.2B¥26.2B¥28.9B¥30.3B¥28.7BInventoryInvent.
¥7.5B¥11.5B¥22.4B¥24.9B¥15.5B¥22.3B¥28.1B¥25.7B¥23.1B¥20.4BAccounts payablePayables
¥24.3B¥28.2B¥49.9B¥46.0B¥40.8B¥54.5B¥63.3B¥68.8B¥76.4B¥75.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥77.6B¥85.4B¥164.2B¥196.4B¥177.7B¥215.1B¥246.7B¥262.9B¥270.6B¥258.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥29.0B¥36.9B¥91.7B¥117.5B¥92.7B¥130.4B¥146.7B¥137.0B¥148.1B¥126.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.3×1.8×1.7×1.9×1.6×1.7×1.9×1.8×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥5.6B¥9.5B¥29.7B¥64.5B¥60.3B¥55.6B¥52.8B¥49.2B¥30.4B¥26.7BGoodwillGoodwill
¥158.8B¥184.7B¥329.9B¥462.9B¥459.7B¥512.5B¥576.5B¥640.0B¥643.5B¥664.0BTotal assetsAssets
¥17.0B¥16.1B¥49.7B¥148.0B¥158.6B¥168.2B¥171.5B¥170.2B¥199.1B¥207.3BTotal debtDebt
(¥11.5B)(¥6.0B)¥8.6B¥101.6B¥100.9B¥103.8B¥122.1B¥113.7B¥134.0B¥143.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.7×33.2×119.0×101.4×8.3×23.6×39.0×24.7×9.9×10.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥113.0B¥127.1B¥207.8B¥203.8B¥196.5B¥256.6B¥300.9B¥360.1B¥170.7B¥183.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
225M225M225M225M225M225M225M225M225M225MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥393.79¥472.35¥1028.27¥1164.86¥895.97¥1150.84¥1513.14¥1617.95¥1556.46¥1435.74Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥-35.25¥54.88¥326.27¥142.23¥4.53¥71.60¥99.66¥113.22¥-251.11¥89.26EPS (diluted)EPS
¥54.84¥27.59¥158.34¥102.96¥151.74¥67.45¥61.10¥146.74¥139.78¥125.24Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥54.84¥27.59¥158.34¥78.60¥125.29¥40.53¥-12.38¥74.29¥48.52¥65.67Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥5.69¥8.53¥17.05¥34.11¥36.96¥28.43¥28.43¥31.27¥31.28¥28.47Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥22.97¥19.28¥37.75¥106.62¥119.31¥128.72¥195.56¥201.66¥238.09¥182.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥502.30¥565.17¥923.94¥906.09¥873.75¥1140.60¥1337.53¥1600.86¥758.94¥814.03Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+15.5%/yr+9.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.6%/yr−3.8%/yr
EPS+81.5%/yr
Dividends / share+19.6%/yr−5.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+25.9%/yr+8.9%/yr
Book value / share+5.5%/yr−1.4%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥28.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥27.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥13.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥14.8B.

Reported net income¥20.1B
Owner earnings¥28.2B · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥20.1B(¥56.5B)¥25.5B¥22.4B¥16.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥27.7B+¥33.0B+¥29.1B+¥27.5B+¥22.9B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥8.1B+¥87.9B+¥7.5B−¥8.7B−¥933M
Cash from operations¥55.9B¥64.5B¥62.1B¥41.2B¥38.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥27.7B−¥33.0B−¥29.1B−¥27.5B−¥22.9B
Owner earnings¥28.2B¥31.4B¥33.0B¥13.7B¥15.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥13.4B−¥20.5B−¥16.3B−¥16.5B−¥6.1B
Free cash flow¥14.8B¥10.9B¥16.7B(¥2.8B)¥9.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%9%9%4%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥27.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥13.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥25.9B ÷ interest expense ¥2.4B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥143.0B · 5.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥64.3B − debt ¥207.3B
    What this means

    Netting ¥64.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥207.3B of debt leaves ¥143.0B owed, about 5.5× a year's operating profit (8.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 75 + DIO 43 − DPO 31 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–27%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥20.4B ÷ invested capital ¥326.1B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–17%; latest ¥28.2B = operating cash ¥55.9B − maintenance capex ¥27.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥13.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥14.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥55.9B ÷ net income ¥20.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥6.4B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥28.2B
    What this means

    Of ¥28.2B Owner Earnings, ¥6.4B (23%) went back to shareholders, ¥6.4B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.48×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥41.1B ÷ depreciation ¥27.7B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 14% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 8% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −0%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 1.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥430.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥281.8B · 65%
  • Dividends¥56.3B · 13%
  • Buybacks¥26M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥92.4B · 21%
  • Returned to owners¥56.3B

    24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥56.3B as dividends and ¥26M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥190.3B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥35.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥26M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (225M to 225M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥28.47/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 20% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained16%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥82.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥12.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tokai Carbon is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.9% vs 11.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.7% early in the record and 8.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥17.0B → ¥207.3B

    Debt rose from ¥17.0B to ¥207.3B while owner earnings went from about ¥18.1B to ¥30.9B — about 0.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tokai Carbon has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Tokai Carbon earns about ¥28.8B on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥14.8B on 225M diluted shares; net debt ¥143.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥41.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥27.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥28.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 5233 its page in the Manual 5332 →

Industry order: ← 4208 the Chemicals chapter 6988 →