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5214 · Nippon Electric Glass
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nippon Electric Glass’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5214) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥239.4B | ¥282.4B | ¥300.3B | ¥257.5B | ¥242.9B | ¥292.0B | ¥324.6B | ¥280.0B | ¥299.2B | ¥311.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 21% | 21% | — | — | — | 18% | 26% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 15% | 14% | — | — | — | 16% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥19.6B | ¥32.2B | ¥24.9B | ¥16.3B | ¥17.7B | ¥32.8B | ¥26.2B | (¥10.4B) | ¥6.1B | ¥34.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.2% | 11.4% | 8.3% | 6.3% | 7.3% | 11.2% | 8.1% | −3.7% | 2.0% | 11.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥5.0B | ¥27.2B | ¥15.2B | (¥33.7B) | ¥15.3B | ¥27.9B | ¥28.2B | (¥26.2B) | ¥12.1B | ¥29.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥48.3B | ¥46.2B | ¥52.0B | ¥21.6B | ¥47.9B | ¥69.9B | ¥31.6B | (¥1.4B) | ¥52.2B | ¥52.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥31.3B | ¥28.7B | ¥29.8B | ¥28.6B | ¥24.9B | ¥26.7B | ¥29.0B | ¥37.2B | ¥28.9B | ¥24.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥12.0B | (¥9.8B) | ¥7.0B | ¥26.7B | ¥7.7B | ¥15.3B | (¥25.6B) | (¥12.4B) | ¥11.2B | (¥1.8B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥8.0B | ¥8.0B | ¥9.9B | ¥9.7B | ¥9.7B | ¥9.7B | ¥11.2B | ¥11.2B | ¥11.0B | ¥10.6B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥4M | ¥13M | ¥10.0B | ¥0 | ¥0 | ¥10.0B | ¥1M | ¥11.9B | ¥28.1B | ¥20.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 3% | 5% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 6% | 4% | -2% | 1% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 1% | 5% | 3% | -7% | 3% | 6% | 5% | -5% | 3% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 4% | 1% | −9% | 1% | 4% | 3% | −8% | 0% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥126.2B | ¥113.8B | ¥116.2B | ¥101.0B | ¥121.2B | ¥134.7B | ¥106.9B | ¥75.1B | ¥123.6B | ¥120.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥49.1B | ¥61.1B | ¥56.8B | ¥52.8B | ¥59.3B | ¥59.6B | ¥52.4B | ¥58.2B | ¥58.7B | ¥61.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥39.0B | ¥44.2B | ¥40.5B | ¥52.6B | ¥35.3B | ¥32.0B | ¥53.4B | ¥62.8B | ¥51.6B | ¥50.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥31.6B | ¥38.0B | ¥38.8B | ¥34.9B | ¥28.5B | ¥42.5B | ¥52.1B | ¥43.2B | ¥39.4B | ¥39.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥56.5B | ¥67.3B | ¥58.5B | ¥70.5B | ¥66.1B | ¥49.1B | ¥53.7B | ¥77.8B | ¥70.9B | ¥73.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥254.9B | ¥262.9B | ¥247.7B | ¥241.5B | ¥246.4B | ¥264.5B | ¥271.7B | ¥253.1B | ¥285.5B | ¥283.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥86.0B | ¥103.8B | ¥113.0B | ¥96.5B | ¥103.6B | ¥117.9B | ¥131.7B | ¥109.0B | ¥123.0B | ¥117.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.0× | 2.5× | 2.2× | 2.5× | 2.4× | 2.2× | 2.1× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥1.9B | ¥21.8B | ¥19.1B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥693.9B | ¥764.4B | ¥725.3B | ¥664.8B | ¥658.1B | ¥698.1B | ¥747.9B | ¥703.9B | ¥695.2B | ¥701.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥100.0B | ¥118.7B | ¥110.0B | ¥98.5B | ¥101.7B | ¥94.8B | ¥103.5B | ¥118.3B | ¥111.3B | ¥97.4B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥26.2B) | ¥4.8B | (¥6.2B) | (¥2.5B) | (¥19.5B) | (¥39.9B) | (¥3.3B) | ¥43.3B | (¥12.3B) | (¥22.9B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 17.8× | 46.0× | 15.3× | 23.4× | 30.1× | 65.0× | 28.3× | -8.2× | 5.5× | 24.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥509.6B | ¥543.8B | ¥521.5B | ¥461.8B | ¥467.4B | ¥499.7B | ¥528.9B | ¥490.1B | ¥417.5B | ¥416.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 99.5M | 89.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2405.58 | ¥2838.00 | ¥3017.65 | ¥2587.45 | ¥2440.50 | ¥2934.32 | ¥3261.89 | ¥2813.15 | ¥3006.70 | ¥3478.45 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥49.92 | ¥273.14 | ¥152.72 | ¥-338.30 | ¥153.25 | ¥280.38 | ¥283.02 | ¥-263.13 | ¥121.49 | ¥330.82 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥79.95 | ¥79.96 | ¥99.90 | ¥97.07 | ¥97.06 | ¥97.08 | ¥112.11 | ¥112.15 | ¥110.30 | ¥118.89 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥5120.05 | ¥5463.94 | ¥5240.45 | ¥4640.27 | ¥4696.64 | ¥5021.36 | ¥5314.46 | ¥4924.78 | ¥4194.52 | ¥4652.01 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.2%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| EPS | +23.4%/yr | +16.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +4.5%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | −1.1%/yr | −0.2%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 24.9×ComfortableOperating income ¥34.1B ÷ interest expense ¥1.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash ¥120.3B − debt ¥97.4B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥22.9B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 72 + DIO 79 − DPO 61 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–7%; 7% latest = NOPAT ¥27.0B ÷ invested capital ¥393.5BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥52.0B ÷ net income ¥29.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (3%) sits below the early years (9%), but the latest year (11%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 8% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · −3.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Nippon Electric Glass is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFNippon Electric Glass is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered3%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 5201 its page in the Manual 5233 →
Industry order: ← 4901 the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter 5333 →