← Japan catalog ← 5802 Manual 6098 → ← 5802 Electrical Equipment 6501 →
5803 · Fujikura
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Fujikura’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5803) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥653.8B | ¥740.1B | ¥710.8B | ¥672.3B | ¥643.7B | ¥670.4B | ¥806.5B | ¥799.8B | ¥979.4B | ¥1.18T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 15% | 17% | — | — | — | 27% | 28% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 14% | 13% | — | — | — | 13% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥34.2B | ¥34.3B | ¥27.7B | ¥3.3B | ¥24.4B | ¥38.3B | ¥70.2B | ¥69.5B | ¥135.5B | ¥188.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.2% | 4.6% | 3.9% | 0.5% | 3.8% | 5.7% | 8.7% | 8.7% | 13.8% | 16.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥12.9B | ¥18.4B | ¥1.5B | (¥38.5B) | (¥5.4B) | ¥39.1B | ¥40.9B | ¥51.0B | ¥91.1B | ¥157.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥43.6B | ¥27.8B | ¥42.0B | ¥46.4B | ¥62.6B | ¥40.4B | ¥58.1B | ¥94.4B | ¥115.9B | ¥132.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥27.6B | ¥26.9B | ¥31.6B | ¥35.7B | ¥33.6B | ¥30.5B | ¥29.1B | ¥22.9B | ¥21.4B | ¥24.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥3.1B | (¥17.4B) | ¥9.0B | ¥49.2B | ¥34.4B | (¥29.2B) | (¥11.9B) | ¥20.6B | ¥3.4B | (¥49.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥46.5B | ¥41.0B | ¥56.1B | ¥32.6B | ¥18.6B | ¥15.8B | ¥15.4B | ¥20.8B | ¥29.1B | ¥39.1B | CapexCapex |
| 7.1% | 5.5% | 7.9% | 4.8% | 2.9% | 2.4% | 1.9% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 3.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥16.0B | ¥948M | ¥10.4B | ¥13.8B | ¥43.9B | ¥24.6B | ¥42.7B | ¥73.6B | ¥94.5B | ¥108.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.5% | 0.1% | 1.5% | 2.1% | 6.8% | 3.7% | 5.3% | 9.2% | 9.7% | 9.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (¥2.9B) | (¥13.1B) | (¥14.1B) | ¥13.8B | ¥43.9B | ¥24.6B | ¥42.7B | ¥73.6B | ¥86.8B | ¥93.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.4% | −1.8% | −2.0% | 2.1% | 6.8% | 3.7% | 5.3% | 9.2% | 8.9% | 7.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥2.6B | ¥3.4B | ¥4.0B | ¥2.9B | — | — | ¥6.4B | ¥10.9B | ¥18.2B | ¥44.6B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥7.9B | ¥1.0B | ¥0 | ¥4.6B | ¥1M | ¥3M | ¥2M | ¥2M | ¥6M | ¥40M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 6% | 5% | 1% | 6% | 8% | 14% | 13% | 34% | 40% | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 8% | 1% | -24% | -3% | 16% | 14% | 14% | 27% | 35% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 6% | −1% | −26% | — | — | 12% | 11% | 21% | 25% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥30.7B | ¥33.6B | ¥36.2B | ¥44.0B | ¥74.2B | ¥90.4B | ¥106.6B | ¥147.0B | ¥184.2B | ¥178.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥149.0B | ¥151.2B | ¥141.6B | ¥128.9B | ¥123.3B | ¥120.3B | ¥129.2B | ¥136.2B | ¥173.2B | ¥210.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥35.5B | ¥44.8B | ¥43.8B | ¥37.4B | ¥36.8B | ¥34.9B | ¥40.3B | ¥38.6B | ¥50.9B | ¥55.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥77.2B | ¥77.2B | ¥65.0B | ¥65.8B | ¥68.5B | ¥71.8B | ¥74.7B | ¥78.0B | ¥104.9B | ¥126.8B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥107.2B | ¥118.9B | ¥120.4B | ¥100.6B | ¥91.6B | ¥83.3B | ¥94.9B | ¥96.7B | ¥119.2B | ¥139.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥296.5B | ¥324.2B | ¥323.3B | ¥299.8B | ¥317.4B | ¥369.1B | ¥418.4B | ¥467.3B | ¥561.3B | ¥657.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥203.2B | ¥233.2B | ¥259.2B | ¥253.0B | ¥216.3B | ¥198.4B | ¥182.0B | ¥200.3B | ¥281.1B | ¥277.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.5× | 1.9× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.0× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥7.1B | ¥4.2B | ¥2.7B | ¥7.1B | ¥6.3B | ¥6.9B | ¥6.3B | ¥10.1B | ¥8.5B | ¥7.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥588.6B | ¥638.1B | ¥638.3B | ¥576.1B | ¥569.1B | ¥611.5B | ¥656.8B | ¥723.9B | ¥830.3B | ¥969.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥225.9B | ¥237.4B | ¥253.5B | ¥260.7B | ¥241.9B | ¥216.0B | ¥208.4B | ¥192.2B | ¥163.4B | ¥101.6B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥195.3B | ¥203.8B | ¥217.3B | ¥216.7B | ¥167.8B | ¥125.6B | ¥101.8B | ¥45.2B | (¥20.9B) | (¥77.3B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 13.0× | 11.4× | 7.3× | 0.9× | 9.5× | 15.3× | 23.0× | 18.2× | 42.2× | 91.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥224.5B | ¥242.0B | ¥240.9B | ¥159.9B | ¥157.5B | ¥243.7B | ¥294.4B | ¥366.6B | ¥339.8B | ¥452.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | 296M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2209.79 | ¥2501.33 | ¥2402.39 | ¥2272.38 | ¥2175.79 | ¥2265.74 | ¥2725.76 | ¥2703.14 | ¥3310.23 | ¥3996.30 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥43.60 | ¥62.05 | ¥4.91 | ¥-130.16 | ¥-18.15 | ¥132.16 | ¥138.21 | ¥172.41 | ¥307.99 | ¥531.20 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥54.19 | ¥3.20 | ¥35.20 | ¥46.68 | ¥148.51 | ¥83.22 | ¥144.36 | ¥248.81 | ¥319.52 | ¥365.11 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥-9.71 | ¥-44.39 | ¥-47.60 | ¥46.68 | ¥148.51 | ¥83.22 | ¥144.36 | ¥248.81 | ¥293.41 | ¥317.21 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥8.91 | ¥11.60 | ¥13.55 | ¥9.68 | — | — | ¥21.49 | ¥36.90 | ¥61.66 | ¥150.88 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥157.15 | ¥138.41 | ¥189.60 | ¥110.20 | ¥63.03 | ¥53.29 | ¥52.15 | ¥70.39 | ¥98.35 | ¥132.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥758.95 | ¥817.81 | ¥814.26 | ¥540.60 | ¥532.23 | ¥823.55 | ¥995.00 | ¥1239.03 | ¥1148.35 | ¥1529.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.8%/yr | +12.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +23.6%/yr | +19.7%/yr |
| EPS | +32.0%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +36.9%/yr | +91.5%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −1.9%/yr | +15.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.1%/yr | +23.5%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥108.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥24.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥14.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥93.8B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥157.2B | ¥91.1B | ¥51.0B | ¥40.9B | ¥39.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥24.9B | +¥21.4B | +¥22.9B | +¥29.1B | +¥30.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥49.1B | +¥3.4B | +¥20.6B | −¥11.9B | −¥29.2B |
| Cash from operations | ¥132.9B | ¥115.9B | ¥94.4B | ¥58.1B | ¥40.4B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥24.9B | −¥21.4B | −¥20.8B | −¥15.4B | −¥15.8B |
| Owner earnings | ¥108.0B | ¥94.5B | ¥73.6B | ¥42.7B | ¥24.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥14.2B | −¥7.7B | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥93.8B | ¥86.8B | ¥73.6B | ¥42.7B | ¥24.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 10% | 9% | 5% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥24.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥14.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 91.2×ComfortableOperating income ¥188.7B ÷ interest expense ¥2.1B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash ¥178.9B − debt ¥101.6B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥77.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 65 + DIO 24 − DPO 54 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 1%–40%; 40% latest = NOPAT ¥149.1B ÷ invested capital ¥375.2BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 40% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–10%; latest ¥108.0B = operating cash ¥132.9B − maintenance capex ¥24.9BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥14.2B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥93.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops ¥132.9B ÷ net income ¥157.2B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥44.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥108.0B
What this means
Of ¥108.0B Owner Earnings, ¥44.7B (41%) went back to shareholders, ¥44.6B dividends, ¥40M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.57×ExpandingCapex ¥39.1B ÷ depreciation ¥24.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 5% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 13% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +32%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 32% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 0.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥664.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥315.0B · 47%
- Dividends¥93.1B · 14%
- Buybacks¥13.6B · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥242.5B · 37%
- Returned to owners¥106.7B
25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥93.1B as dividends and ¥13.6B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell ¥124.3B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥148.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥13.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (296M to 296M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥150.88/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 50% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained32%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥261.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥82.9B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Fujikura is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Fujikura has delivered.
Fujikura’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Fujikura earns about ¥53.0B on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥93.8B on 296M diluted shares; net cash ¥77.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥39.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥24.9B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥108.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 5802 its page in the Manual 6098 →
Industry order: ← 5802 the Electrical Equipment chapter 6501 →