← Japan catalog ← 6301 Manual 6305 → ← 6273 Industrial Machinery 6361 →
6302 · Sumitomo Heavy Industries
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Sumitomo Heavy Industries’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6302) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥700.8B | ¥674.3B | ¥791.0B | ¥903.1B | ¥864.5B | ¥944.0B | ¥854.1B | ¥1.08T | ¥1.07T | ¥1.07T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 23% | 22% | — | — | — | 24% | 24% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 15% | 16% | — | — | — | 19% | 20% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 2% | 2% | — | — | — | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| — | ¥48.4B | ¥69.9B | ¥75.2B | ¥56.8B | ¥65.7B | ¥44.8B | ¥74.4B | ¥55.1B | ¥51.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| — | 7.2% | 8.8% | 8.3% | 6.6% | 7.0% | 5.2% | 6.9% | 5.1% | 4.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥33.1B | ¥33.6B | ¥34.7B | ¥45.6B | ¥32.8B | ¥44.1B | ¥5.8B | ¥32.7B | ¥7.7B | ¥30.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥18.3B | ¥38.2B | ¥71.1B | ¥55.2B | ¥36.3B | ¥61.7B | ¥21.4B | ¥65.4B | ¥12.8B | ¥63.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | ¥20.3B | ¥23.0B | ¥26.0B | ¥27.9B | ¥30.9B | ¥29.6B | ¥36.4B | ¥37.4B | ¥38.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥14.8B) | (¥15.8B) | ¥13.4B | (¥16.5B) | (¥24.4B) | (¥13.3B) | (¥14.1B) | (¥3.7B) | (¥32.3B) | (¥5.9B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | ¥24.6B | ¥29.9B | ¥33.9B | ¥41.3B | ¥45.6B | ¥36.5B | ¥39.5B | ¥47.7B | ¥52.3B | CapexCapex |
| — | 3.6% | 3.8% | 3.7% | 4.8% | 4.8% | 4.3% | 3.6% | 4.5% | 4.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | ¥13.6B | ¥48.1B | ¥29.2B | ¥8.4B | ¥30.7B | (¥15.2B) | ¥25.9B | (¥24.6B) | ¥25.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 2.0% | 6.1% | 3.2% | 1.0% | 3.3% | −1.8% | 2.4% | −2.3% | 2.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | ¥13.6B | ¥41.2B | ¥21.3B | (¥5.1B) | ¥16.0B | (¥15.2B) | ¥25.9B | (¥34.9B) | ¥11.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | 2.0% | 5.2% | 2.4% | −0.6% | 1.7% | −1.8% | 2.4% | −3.3% | 1.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | ¥9.8B | ¥10.4B | ¥11.6B | ¥14.5B | ¥11.1B | ¥15.3B | ¥12.9B | ¥14.5B | ¥15.0B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | ¥55M | ¥86M | ¥49M | ¥34M | ¥25M | ¥213M | ¥29M | ¥10.0B | ¥14M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 9% | 13% | 15% | 10% | 9% | 5% | 9% | 7% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 9% | 8% | 8% | 11% | 8% | 8% | 1% | 5% | 2% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 6% | 5% | 8% | 4% | 6% | −2% | 3% | −1% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| — | ¥61.0B | ¥85.5B | ¥69.8B | ¥83.6B | ¥85.0B | ¥93.7B | ¥100.2B | ¥107.5B | ¥107.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | ¥242.5B | ¥269.4B | ¥291.6B | ¥271.4B | ¥294.8B | ¥300.3B | ¥289.9B | ¥307.4B | ¥313.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | ¥147.3B | ¥184.2B | ¥188.1B | ¥158.5B | ¥172.6B | ¥186.3B | ¥180.8B | ¥153.2B | ¥146.4B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ¥95.1B | ¥85.2B | ¥103.5B | ¥112.9B | ¥122.2B | ¥114.0B | ¥109.0B | ¥154.3B | ¥167.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | ¥507.6B | ¥551.6B | ¥583.6B | ¥592.8B | ¥648.1B | ¥711.4B | ¥748.3B | ¥784.5B | ¥786.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | ¥290.6B | ¥347.7B | ¥382.4B | ¥365.7B | ¥366.8B | ¥418.2B | ¥416.3B | ¥415.9B | ¥409.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.6× | 1.8× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | ¥2.0B | ¥18.0B | ¥24.0B | ¥33.5B | ¥31.1B | ¥19.2B | ¥19.3B | ¥8.0B | ¥11.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥782.9B | ¥796.5B | ¥894.8B | ¥954.1B | ¥995.2B | ¥1.09T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.26T | ¥1.32T | Total assetsAssets |
| — | ¥60.6B | ¥64.4B | ¥73.5B | ¥124.8B | ¥111.4B | ¥160.9B | ¥162.3B | ¥238.8B | ¥252.8B | Total debtDebt |
| — | (¥445M) | (¥21.1B) | ¥3.7B | ¥41.1B | ¥26.4B | ¥67.1B | ¥62.1B | ¥131.2B | ¥145.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | 159.3× | 225.6× | 250.8× | 207.4× | 180.4× | 143.1× | 145.8× | 53.0× | 23.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥382.8B | ¥409.2B | ¥445.0B | ¥404.8B | ¥423.1B | ¥566.8B | ¥576.9B | ¥627.5B | ¥473.6B | ¥488.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | 123M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥5702.26 | ¥5486.56 | ¥6436.07 | ¥7347.55 | ¥7033.81 | ¥7680.56 | ¥6949.21 | ¥8799.75 | ¥8715.07 | ¥8680.53 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥269.58 | ¥273.49 | ¥282.01 | ¥371.43 | ¥266.93 | ¥358.43 | ¥47.04 | ¥266.40 | ¥62.82 | ¥251.71 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | ¥110.38 | ¥391.42 | ¥237.57 | ¥68.33 | ¥250.19 | ¥-123.49 | ¥210.82 | ¥-200.27 | ¥203.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | ¥110.38 | ¥335.19 | ¥173.48 | ¥-41.11 | ¥130.52 | ¥-123.49 | ¥210.82 | ¥-284.15 | ¥92.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | ¥79.70 | ¥84.70 | ¥94.67 | ¥117.58 | ¥90.67 | ¥124.37 | ¥104.69 | ¥118.37 | ¥122.06 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | ¥200.09 | ¥243.39 | ¥275.43 | ¥336.16 | ¥371.32 | ¥297.34 | ¥321.05 | ¥388.00 | ¥425.83 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥3114.73 | ¥3329.15 | ¥3620.39 | ¥3293.25 | ¥3442.42 | ¥4612.04 | ¥4694.05 | ¥5105.28 | ¥3853.74 | ¥3973.61 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.8%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.0%/yr (8-yr) | +24.5%/yr |
| EPS | −0.8%/yr | −1.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +5.5%/yr (8-yr) | +0.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.9%/yr (8-yr) | +4.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +2.7%/yr | +2.9%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥25.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥38.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥13.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥11.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥30.9B | ¥7.7B | ¥32.7B | ¥5.8B | ¥44.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥38.6B | +¥37.4B | +¥36.4B | +¥29.6B | +¥30.9B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥5.9B | −¥32.3B | −¥3.7B | −¥14.1B | −¥13.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥63.7B | ¥12.8B | ¥65.4B | ¥21.4B | ¥61.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥38.6B | −¥37.4B | −¥39.5B | −¥36.5B | −¥30.9B |
| Owner earnings | ¥25.1B | (¥24.6B) | ¥25.9B | (¥15.2B) | ¥30.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥13.7B | −¥10.3B | — | — | −¥14.7B |
| Free cash flow | ¥11.3B | (¥34.9B) | ¥25.9B | (¥15.2B) | ¥16.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | -2% | 2% | -2% | 3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥38.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥13.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 23.4×ComfortableOperating income ¥51.5B ÷ interest expense ¥2.2B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥145.2B · 2.8× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash ¥107.6B − debt ¥252.8B
What this means
Netting ¥107.6B of cash and short-term investments against ¥252.8B of debt leaves ¥145.2B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median, range 5%–15%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥40.7B ÷ invested capital ¥633.6BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -2%–6%; latest ¥25.1B = operating cash ¥63.7B − maintenance capex ¥38.6BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. It chose to put ¥13.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥11.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥63.7B ÷ net income ¥30.9B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥15.0B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥25.1B
What this means
Of ¥25.1B Owner Earnings, ¥15.0B (60%) went back to shareholders, ¥15.0B dividends, ¥14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.36×ExpandingCapex ¥52.3B ÷ depreciation ¥38.6B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 6% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −46%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 46% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 4.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥425.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥351.3B · 83%
- Dividends¥115.1B · 27%
- Buybacks¥10.5B · 2%
- Returned to owners¥125.7B
89% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥115.1B as dividends and ¥10.5B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥51.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥51.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥60.6B to ¥252.8B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥10.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (123M to 123M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥122.06/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥142.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥21.5B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sumitomo Heavy Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.8% vs 3.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 0.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sumitomo Heavy Industries has delivered.
Through the cycle, Sumitomo Heavy Industries earns about ¥25.1B on its 2.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥11.3B on 123M diluted shares; net debt ¥145.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥52.3B) runs well above depreciation (¥38.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥25.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 6301 its page in the Manual 6305 →
Industry order: ← 6273 the Industrial Machinery chapter 6361 →