Owner Scorecard


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6302 · Sumitomo Heavy Industries

Industrial conglomerate Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Sumitomo Heavy Industries’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6302) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥700.8B¥674.3B¥791.0B¥903.1B¥864.5B¥944.0B¥854.1B¥1.08T¥1.07T¥1.07TRevenueRevenue
23%22%24%24%Gross marginGross mgn
15%16%19%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥48.4B¥69.9B¥75.2B¥56.8B¥65.7B¥44.8B¥74.4B¥55.1B¥51.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.2%8.8%8.3%6.6%7.0%5.2%6.9%5.1%4.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥33.1B¥33.6B¥34.7B¥45.6B¥32.8B¥44.1B¥5.8B¥32.7B¥7.7B¥30.9BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥18.3B¥38.2B¥71.1B¥55.2B¥36.3B¥61.7B¥21.4B¥65.4B¥12.8B¥63.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥20.3B¥23.0B¥26.0B¥27.9B¥30.9B¥29.6B¥36.4B¥37.4B¥38.6BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥14.8B)(¥15.8B)¥13.4B(¥16.5B)(¥24.4B)(¥13.3B)(¥14.1B)(¥3.7B)(¥32.3B)(¥5.9B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥24.6B¥29.9B¥33.9B¥41.3B¥45.6B¥36.5B¥39.5B¥47.7B¥52.3BCapexCapex
3.6%3.8%3.7%4.8%4.8%4.3%3.6%4.5%4.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥13.6B¥48.1B¥29.2B¥8.4B¥30.7B(¥15.2B)¥25.9B(¥24.6B)¥25.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.0%6.1%3.2%1.0%3.3%−1.8%2.4%−2.3%2.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥13.6B¥41.2B¥21.3B(¥5.1B)¥16.0B(¥15.2B)¥25.9B(¥34.9B)¥11.3BFree cash flowFCF
2.0%5.2%2.4%−0.6%1.7%−1.8%2.4%−3.3%1.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥9.8B¥10.4B¥11.6B¥14.5B¥11.1B¥15.3B¥12.9B¥14.5B¥15.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥55M¥86M¥49M¥34M¥25M¥213M¥29M¥10.0B¥14MBuybacksBuybacks
9%13%15%10%9%5%9%7%6%ROICROIC
9%8%8%11%8%8%1%5%2%6%Return on equityROE
6%5%8%4%6%−2%3%−1%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥61.0B¥85.5B¥69.8B¥83.6B¥85.0B¥93.7B¥100.2B¥107.5B¥107.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥242.5B¥269.4B¥291.6B¥271.4B¥294.8B¥300.3B¥289.9B¥307.4B¥313.7BReceivablesReceiv.
¥147.3B¥184.2B¥188.1B¥158.5B¥172.6B¥186.3B¥180.8B¥153.2B¥146.4BAccounts payablePayables
¥95.1B¥85.2B¥103.5B¥112.9B¥122.2B¥114.0B¥109.0B¥154.3B¥167.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥507.6B¥551.6B¥583.6B¥592.8B¥648.1B¥711.4B¥748.3B¥784.5B¥786.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥290.6B¥347.7B¥382.4B¥365.7B¥366.8B¥418.2B¥416.3B¥415.9B¥409.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.6×1.5×1.6×1.8×1.7×1.8×1.9×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥2.0B¥18.0B¥24.0B¥33.5B¥31.1B¥19.2B¥19.3B¥8.0B¥11.0BGoodwillGoodwill
¥782.9B¥796.5B¥894.8B¥954.1B¥995.2B¥1.09T¥1.15T¥1.20T¥1.26T¥1.32TTotal assetsAssets
¥60.6B¥64.4B¥73.5B¥124.8B¥111.4B¥160.9B¥162.3B¥238.8B¥252.8BTotal debtDebt
(¥445M)(¥21.1B)¥3.7B¥41.1B¥26.4B¥67.1B¥62.1B¥131.2B¥145.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
159.3×225.6×250.8×207.4×180.4×143.1×145.8×53.0×23.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥382.8B¥409.2B¥445.0B¥404.8B¥423.1B¥566.8B¥576.9B¥627.5B¥473.6B¥488.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
123M123M123M123M123M123M123M123M123M123MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥5702.26¥5486.56¥6436.07¥7347.55¥7033.81¥7680.56¥6949.21¥8799.75¥8715.07¥8680.53Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥269.58¥273.49¥282.01¥371.43¥266.93¥358.43¥47.04¥266.40¥62.82¥251.71EPS (diluted)EPS
¥110.38¥391.42¥237.57¥68.33¥250.19¥-123.49¥210.82¥-200.27¥203.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥110.38¥335.19¥173.48¥-41.11¥130.52¥-123.49¥210.82¥-284.15¥92.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥79.70¥84.70¥94.67¥117.58¥90.67¥124.37¥104.69¥118.37¥122.06Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥200.09¥243.39¥275.43¥336.16¥371.32¥297.34¥321.05¥388.00¥425.83Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥3114.73¥3329.15¥3620.39¥3293.25¥3442.42¥4612.04¥4694.05¥5105.28¥3853.74¥3973.61Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.8%/yr+4.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.0%/yr (8-yr)+24.5%/yr
EPS−0.8%/yr−1.2%/yr
Dividends / share+5.5%/yr (8-yr)+0.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.9%/yr (8-yr)+4.8%/yr
Book value / share+2.7%/yr+2.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥25.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥38.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥13.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥11.3B.

Reported net income¥30.9B
Owner earnings¥25.1B · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥30.9B¥7.7B¥32.7B¥5.8B¥44.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥38.6B+¥37.4B+¥36.4B+¥29.6B+¥30.9B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥5.9B−¥32.3B−¥3.7B−¥14.1B−¥13.3B
Cash from operations¥63.7B¥12.8B¥65.4B¥21.4B¥61.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥38.6B−¥37.4B−¥39.5B−¥36.5B−¥30.9B
Owner earnings¥25.1B(¥24.6B)¥25.9B(¥15.2B)¥30.7B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥13.7B−¥10.3B−¥14.7B
Free cash flow¥11.3B(¥34.9B)¥25.9B(¥15.2B)¥16.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%-2%2%-2%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥38.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥13.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥51.5B ÷ interest expense ¥2.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥145.2B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash ¥107.6B − debt ¥252.8B
    What this means

    Netting ¥107.6B of cash and short-term investments against ¥252.8B of debt leaves ¥145.2B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 5%–15%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥40.7B ÷ invested capital ¥633.6B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -2%–6%; latest ¥25.1B = operating cash ¥63.7B − maintenance capex ¥38.6B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. It chose to put ¥13.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥11.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥63.7B ÷ net income ¥30.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥15.0B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥25.1B
    What this means

    Of ¥25.1B Owner Earnings, ¥15.0B (60%) went back to shareholders, ¥15.0B dividends, ¥14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.36×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥52.3B ÷ depreciation ¥38.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 6% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −46%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 46% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 4.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥425.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥351.3B · 83%
  • Dividends¥115.1B · 27%
  • Buybacks¥10.5B · 2%
  • Returned to owners¥125.7B

    89% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥115.1B as dividends and ¥10.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥51.5B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥51.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥60.6B to ¥252.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥10.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (123M to 123M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥122.06/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−15%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥142.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥21.5B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sumitomo Heavy Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.8% vs 3.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 0.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sumitomo Heavy Industries has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Sumitomo Heavy Industries earns about ¥25.1B on its 2.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−59%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥11.3B on 123M diluted shares; net debt ¥145.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥52.3B) runs well above depreciation (¥38.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥25.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6301 its page in the Manual 6305 →

Industry order: ← 6273 the Industrial Machinery chapter 6361 →