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6361 · Ebara
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Ebara’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6361) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥476.1B | ¥382.0B | ¥509.2B | ¥522.4B | ¥523.7B | ¥603.2B | ¥680.9B | ¥759.3B | ¥866.7B | ¥958.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 26% | 28% | — | — | — | 33% | 33% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 19% | 20% | — | — | — | 21% | 21% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 2% | 2% | — | — | — | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥30.0B | ¥18.1B | ¥32.5B | ¥35.3B | ¥37.9B | ¥61.4B | ¥70.6B | ¥86.0B | ¥98.0B | ¥113.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.3% | 4.7% | 6.4% | 6.8% | 7.2% | 10.2% | 10.4% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥20.6B | ¥9.5B | ¥18.3B | ¥23.3B | ¥24.5B | ¥43.6B | ¥50.5B | ¥60.3B | ¥71.4B | ¥76.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥33.8B | ¥44.2B | ¥34.6B | ¥26.7B | ¥64.2B | ¥72.9B | ¥37.1B | ¥70.0B | ¥100.9B | ¥40.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥13.7B | ¥11.9B | ¥15.3B | ¥15.1B | ¥16.0B | ¥21.4B | ¥24.1B | ¥26.6B | ¥30.0B | ¥34.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥510M) | ¥22.7B | ¥1.1B | (¥11.8B) | ¥23.8B | ¥7.8B | (¥37.5B) | (¥16.9B) | (¥472M) | (¥70.7B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | ¥31.3B | ¥25.8B | ¥24.3B | ¥34.5B | ¥50.9B | ¥92.2B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | — | 6.0% | 4.3% | 3.6% | 4.5% | 5.9% | 9.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | — | ¥48.3B | ¥47.1B | ¥12.7B | ¥43.4B | ¥70.9B | ¥6.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | — | 9.2% | 7.8% | 1.9% | 5.7% | 8.2% | 0.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | — | ¥33.0B | ¥47.1B | ¥12.7B | ¥35.5B | ¥50.0B | (¥51.5B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | — | 6.3% | 7.8% | 1.9% | 4.7% | 5.8% | −5.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥5.6B | ¥6.1B | ¥4.6B | ¥5.9B | ¥5.7B | ¥10.5B | ¥18.2B | ¥18.9B | ¥22.8B | ¥27.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥17M | ¥5M | ¥5.0B | ¥15.0B | ¥3M | ¥20.1B | ¥8M | ¥11M | ¥17M | ¥20.1B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 8% | 5% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 19% | 17% | 18% | 18% | 16% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 3% | 6% | 8% | 8% | 14% | 14% | 15% | 15% | 15% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 1% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 11% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥90.7B | ¥139.1B | ¥110.6B | ¥94.4B | ¥121.6B | ¥136.5B | ¥116.1B | ¥148.1B | ¥171.0B | ¥143.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥202.9B | ¥169.3B | ¥176.9B | ¥182.9B | ¥187.3B | ¥130.1B | ¥151.7B | ¥163.4B | ¥170.3B | ¥209.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥12.7B | ¥15.2B | ¥18.1B | ¥18.4B | ¥20.3B | — | — | — | — | — | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥64.2B | ¥61.8B | ¥63.3B | ¥60.6B | ¥60.5B | ¥162.6B | ¥195.4B | ¥172.4B | ¥167.5B | ¥148.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥151.4B | ¥122.7B | ¥131.7B | ¥140.8B | ¥147.1B | (¥32.4B) | (¥43.7B) | (¥9.0B) | ¥2.8B | ¥61.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥423.4B | ¥447.5B | ¥430.2B | ¥421.9B | ¥438.6B | ¥499.9B | ¥580.7B | ¥648.3B | ¥705.3B | ¥717.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥254.2B | ¥270.7B | ¥258.6B | ¥260.1B | ¥258.2B | ¥177.4B | ¥187.9B | ¥173.8B | ¥214.4B | ¥265.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 2.8× | 3.1× | 3.7× | 3.3× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥2.3B | ¥1.8B | ¥1.1B | ¥774M | ¥369M | ¥5.5B | ¥15.3B | ¥15.5B | ¥10.1B | ¥10.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥588.5B | ¥612.9B | ¥591.6B | ¥595.2B | ¥621.6B | ¥719.7B | ¥828.0B | ¥913.9B | ¥1.01T | ¥1.08T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥96.8B | ¥115.2B | ¥79.7B | ¥83.1B | ¥78.4B | ¥81.3B | ¥80.4B | ¥118.0B | ¥134.3B | ¥212.3B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥6.1B | (¥23.9B) | (¥30.9B) | (¥11.3B) | (¥43.1B) | (¥55.2B) | (¥35.7B) | (¥30.1B) | (¥36.7B) | ¥68.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 25.3× | 15.9× | 21.4× | 24.4× | 32.6× | 22.8× | 25.6× | 19.7× | 23.4× | 16.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥277.5B | ¥284.8B | ¥286.8B | ¥295.5B | ¥310.9B | ¥312.3B | ¥360.0B | ¥409.9B | ¥473.3B | ¥508.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 509M | 509M | 510M | 476M | 477M | 478M | 460M | 462M | 462M | 462M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥935.96 | ¥750.60 | ¥998.80 | ¥1098.35 | ¥1098.06 | ¥1263.10 | ¥1478.77 | ¥1644.47 | ¥1875.68 | ¥2073.32 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥40.47 | ¥18.73 | ¥35.82 | ¥49.09 | ¥51.31 | ¥91.33 | ¥109.65 | ¥130.55 | ¥154.53 | ¥165.80 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | — | ¥101.21 | ¥98.63 | ¥27.63 | ¥94.04 | ¥153.51 | ¥12.88 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | — | ¥69.16 | ¥98.63 | ¥27.63 | ¥76.98 | ¥108.32 | ¥-111.34 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥10.97 | ¥11.97 | ¥8.97 | ¥12.36 | ¥11.98 | ¥21.89 | ¥39.56 | ¥41.02 | ¥49.26 | ¥59.97 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | — | ¥65.52 | ¥53.93 | ¥52.88 | ¥74.65 | ¥110.14 | ¥199.51 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥545.55 | ¥559.60 | ¥562.55 | ¥621.27 | ¥651.85 | ¥653.96 | ¥781.80 | ¥887.67 | ¥1024.29 | ¥1100.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.2%/yr | +13.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −33.8%/yr (5-yr) | −33.8%/yr |
| EPS | +17.0%/yr | +26.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +20.8%/yr | +38.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +24.9%/yr (5-yr) | +24.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.1%/yr | +11.1%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥6.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥34.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥57.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥51.5B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥76.6B | ¥71.4B | ¥60.3B | ¥50.5B | ¥43.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥34.8B | +¥30.0B | +¥26.6B | +¥24.1B | +¥21.4B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥70.7B | −¥472M | −¥16.9B | −¥37.5B | +¥7.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥40.8B | ¥100.9B | ¥70.0B | ¥37.1B | ¥72.9B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥34.8B | −¥30.0B | −¥26.6B | −¥24.3B | −¥25.8B |
| Owner earnings | ¥6.0B | ¥70.9B | ¥43.4B | ¥12.7B | ¥47.1B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥57.4B | −¥20.9B | −¥7.9B | — | — |
| Free cash flow | (¥51.5B) | ¥50.0B | ¥35.5B | ¥12.7B | ¥47.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 8% | 6% | 2% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥34.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥57.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 16.8×ComfortableOperating income ¥113.8B ÷ interest expense ¥6.8B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥68.8B · 0.6× operating profitModest net debtCash ¥143.5B − debt ¥212.3B
What this means
Netting ¥143.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥212.3B of debt leaves ¥68.8B owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (1.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–19%; 16% latest = NOPAT ¥89.9B ÷ invested capital ¥577.7BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle6-yr median margin, range 1%–9%; latest ¥6.0B = operating cash ¥40.8B − maintenance capex ¥34.8BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 6 years. It chose to put ¥57.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥51.5B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ¥40.8B ÷ net income ¥76.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥47.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥6.0B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥6.0B of Owner Earnings, ¥47.8B (803%) went back to shareholders, ¥27.7B dividends, ¥20.1B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.65×ExpandingCapex ¥92.2B ÷ depreciation ¥34.8B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 12% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 29%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · 4.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥385.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥258.9B · 67%
- Dividends¥103.8B · 27%
- Buybacks¥40.2B · 10%
- Returned to owners¥144.0B
63% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥103.8B as dividends and ¥40.2B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥17.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥17.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥78.4B to ¥212.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥40.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−3.1%
The diluted count fell from 477M to 462M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥59.97/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 38% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained2%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥182.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥4.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ebara is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.8% vs 6.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.3% early in the record and 4.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥96.8B → ¥212.3B
Debt rose from ¥96.8B to ¥212.3B while owner earnings went from about ¥36.0B to ¥40.1B — about 2.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ebara has delivered.
Ebara’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Ebara earns about ¥64.8B on its 6.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow (¥51.5B) on 462M diluted shares; net debt ¥68.8B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥92.2B) runs well above depreciation (¥34.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥6.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 6326 its page in the Manual 6367 →
Industry order: ← 6302 the Industrial Machinery chapter 6471 →