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7004 · Kanadevia
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kanadevia’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7004) →
Where the money comes from
on EDINET →The biggest segment, Environmental Systems, is also where the profit is made: 78% of revenue and 98% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Machinery ran a ¥2.4B operating loss; Element ran a ¥2.5B operating loss.
- Environmental Systems78%¥505.7B98% of profit
- Machinery11%¥73.1Bloss of ¥2.4B
- Element11%¥69.3Bloss of ¥2.5B
- Other0%¥2.8B2% of profit
From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥399.3B | ¥376.4B | ¥378.1B | ¥402.4B | ¥408.6B | ¥441.8B | ¥492.7B | ¥555.8B | ¥610.5B | ¥645.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 17% | 18% | — | — | — | 19% | 17% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 14% | 14% | — | — | — | 14% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥14.9B | ¥5.9B | ¥7.4B | ¥13.9B | ¥15.4B | ¥15.5B | ¥20.1B | ¥24.3B | ¥26.9B | ¥12.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.7% | 1.6% | 1.9% | 3.5% | 3.8% | 3.5% | 4.1% | 4.4% | 4.4% | 1.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥5.9B | ¥2.2B | ¥5.4B | ¥2.2B | ¥4.3B | ¥7.9B | ¥15.6B | ¥19.0B | ¥22.1B | ¥11.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥17.3B | (¥3.4B) | (¥5.4B) | ¥32.8B | ¥22.7B | ¥26.9B | ¥28.0B | ¥478M | ¥24.8B | ¥11.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥8.5B | ¥9.1B | ¥8.9B | ¥10.1B | ¥10.2B | ¥10.7B | ¥10.5B | ¥11.1B | ¥11.9B | ¥15.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥2.9B | (¥14.7B) | (¥19.8B) | ¥20.5B | ¥8.2B | ¥8.3B | ¥1.9B | (¥29.7B) | (¥9.2B) | (¥15.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥8.0B | ¥10.1B | ¥7.0B | ¥10.0B | ¥10.5B | ¥7.5B | ¥6.6B | ¥7.8B | ¥25.2B | ¥21.7B | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 2.7% | 1.8% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 1.7% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 4.1% | 3.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥9.3B | (¥13.4B) | (¥12.4B) | ¥22.8B | ¥12.2B | ¥19.4B | ¥21.4B | (¥7.3B) | ¥12.9B | (¥4.0B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.3% | −3.6% | −3.3% | 5.7% | 3.0% | 4.4% | 4.4% | −1.3% | 2.1% | −0.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥9.3B | (¥13.4B) | (¥12.4B) | ¥22.8B | ¥12.2B | ¥19.4B | ¥21.4B | (¥7.3B) | (¥412M) | (¥10.0B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.3% | −3.6% | −3.3% | 5.7% | 3.0% | 4.4% | 4.4% | −1.3% | −0.1% | −1.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.0B | ¥3.0B | ¥3.9B | ¥4.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥5M | ¥3M | ¥2M | ¥1M | ¥2M | ¥3M | ¥3M | ¥4M | ¥299M | ¥16M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 7% | 2% | 3% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | 2% | 5% | 2% | 4% | 6% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 0% | 3% | 0% | 2% | 4% | 10% | 9% | 11% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥50.8B | ¥32.7B | ¥34.4B | ¥41.6B | ¥45.8B | ¥66.0B | ¥84.9B | ¥69.8B | ¥68.7B | ¥77.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥134.2B | ¥148.2B | ¥172.7B | ¥160.0B | ¥169.3B | ¥189.8B | ¥198.4B | ¥234.8B | ¥228.0B | ¥261.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥1.8B | ¥2.4B | ¥1.6B | ¥1.2B | ¥1.6B | ¥1.1B | ¥1.5B | ¥2.3B | ¥2.0B | ¥2.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥40.5B | ¥41.7B | ¥47.1B | ¥44.1B | ¥41.6B | ¥51.6B | ¥50.6B | ¥48.9B | ¥56.9B | ¥60.7B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥95.6B | ¥108.9B | ¥127.2B | ¥117.1B | ¥129.3B | ¥139.3B | ¥149.2B | ¥188.2B | ¥173.2B | ¥202.9B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥230.7B | ¥218.3B | ¥253.2B | ¥243.1B | ¥259.5B | ¥292.2B | ¥318.9B | ¥347.1B | ¥357.1B | ¥423.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥201.7B | ¥185.5B | ¥212.6B | ¥179.3B | ¥198.1B | ¥238.0B | ¥240.8B | ¥273.7B | ¥294.3B | ¥378.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥4.4B | ¥3.6B | ¥3.0B | ¥2.2B | ¥1.6B | ¥1.5B | ¥1.1B | ¥4.3B | ¥14.1B | ¥31.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥393.6B | ¥391.9B | ¥429.0B | ¥409.5B | ¥429.3B | ¥461.2B | ¥479.7B | ¥533.6B | ¥609.7B | ¥718.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥108.0B | ¥106.5B | ¥126.3B | ¥99.6B | ¥98.1B | ¥91.9B | ¥86.5B | ¥91.4B | ¥135.8B | ¥184.1B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥57.1B | ¥73.8B | ¥91.9B | ¥58.0B | ¥52.3B | ¥25.9B | ¥1.6B | ¥21.7B | ¥67.1B | ¥106.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 18.8× | 6.6× | 8.5× | 16.4× | 20.9× | 19.2× | 25.5× | 28.5× | 33.0× | 5.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥117.8B | ¥119.0B | ¥120.4B | ¥118.0B | ¥120.2B | ¥132.9B | ¥141.3B | ¥168.9B | ¥170.8B | ¥177.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2346.05 | ¥2211.55 | ¥2221.56 | ¥2364.38 | ¥2400.46 | ¥2595.54 | ¥2894.54 | ¥3265.56 | ¥3586.80 | ¥3790.65 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥34.45 | ¥12.75 | ¥31.99 | ¥12.91 | ¥25.02 | ¥46.41 | ¥91.51 | ¥111.62 | ¥129.85 | ¥65.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥54.41 | ¥-78.89 | ¥-72.80 | ¥133.90 | ¥71.49 | ¥113.88 | ¥125.92 | ¥-42.84 | ¥75.53 | ¥-23.43 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥54.41 | ¥-78.89 | ¥-72.80 | ¥133.90 | ¥71.49 | ¥113.88 | ¥125.92 | ¥-42.84 | ¥-2.42 | ¥-59.03 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥11.88 | ¥17.82 | ¥22.77 | ¥24.75 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥47.25 | ¥59.07 | ¥40.91 | ¥58.84 | ¥61.75 | ¥43.91 | ¥38.62 | ¥45.65 | ¥147.94 | ¥127.45 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥692.13 | ¥699.20 | ¥707.40 | ¥693.30 | ¥706.44 | ¥780.93 | ¥830.20 | ¥992.55 | ¥1003.33 | ¥1044.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.5%/yr | +9.6%/yr |
| EPS | +7.4%/yr | +21.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.5%/yr | +15.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +11.7%/yr | +15.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.7%/yr | +8.1%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned (¥4.0B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥15.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥6.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥10.0B).
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥11.1B | ¥22.1B | ¥19.0B | ¥15.6B | ¥7.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥15.6B | +¥11.9B | +¥11.1B | +¥10.5B | +¥10.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥15.1B | −¥9.2B | −¥29.7B | +¥1.9B | +¥8.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥11.6B | ¥24.8B | ¥478M | ¥28.0B | ¥26.9B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥15.6B | −¥11.9B | −¥7.8B | −¥6.6B | −¥7.5B |
| Owner earnings | (¥4.0B) | ¥12.9B | (¥7.3B) | ¥21.4B | ¥19.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥6.1B | −¥13.3B | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | (¥10.0B) | (¥412M) | (¥7.3B) | ¥21.4B | ¥19.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | 2% | -1% | 4% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥15.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥6.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥12.2B ÷ interest expense ¥2.3B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥106.8B · 8.8× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥77.3B + ST investments ¥1M − debt ¥184.1B
What this means
Netting ¥77.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥184.1B of debt leaves ¥106.8B owed, about 8.8× a year's operating profit (15.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 148 + DIO 2 − DPO 41 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–11%; 3% latest = NOPAT ¥9.6B ÷ invested capital ¥284.5BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -4%–6%; latest (¥4.0B) = operating cash ¥11.6B − maintenance capex ¥15.6BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥11.6B ÷ net income ¥11.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.39×ExpandingCapex ¥21.7B ÷ depreciation ¥15.6B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 4% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · 1.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥155.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥114.3B · 73%
- Dividends¥25.3B · 16%
- Buybacks¥338M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥15.9B · 10%
- Returned to owners¥25.6B
42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥25.3B as dividends and ¥338M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥76.1B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥26.5B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥338M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (170M to 170M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥24.75/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥70.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥6.0B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kanadevia is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥108.0B → ¥184.1B
Debt rose from ¥108.0B to ¥184.1B while owner earnings went from about (¥5.5B) to ¥525M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kanadevia has delivered.
Kanadevia’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Kanadevia earns about ¥14.3B on its 2.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow (¥10.0B) on 170M diluted shares; net debt ¥106.8B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥21.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥15.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about (¥4.0B), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 6988 its page in the Manual 7011 →
Industry order: ← 1963 the Construction & Engineering chapter ACM →