Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 6988 Manual 7011 → ← 1963 Construction & Engineering ACM →

7004 · Kanadevia

Engineering Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kanadevia’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7004) →

Where the money comes from

on EDINET →

The biggest segment, Environmental Systems, is also where the profit is made: 78% of revenue and 98% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Machinery ran a ¥2.4B operating loss; Element ran a ¥2.5B operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Environmental Systems78%¥505.7B98% of profit
  • Machinery11%¥73.1Bloss of ¥2.4B
  • Element11%¥69.3Bloss of ¥2.5B
  • Other0%¥2.8B2% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥399.3B¥376.4B¥378.1B¥402.4B¥408.6B¥441.8B¥492.7B¥555.8B¥610.5B¥645.2BRevenueRevenue
17%18%19%17%Gross marginGross mgn
14%14%14%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥14.9B¥5.9B¥7.4B¥13.9B¥15.4B¥15.5B¥20.1B¥24.3B¥26.9B¥12.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.7%1.6%1.9%3.5%3.8%3.5%4.1%4.4%4.4%1.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥5.9B¥2.2B¥5.4B¥2.2B¥4.3B¥7.9B¥15.6B¥19.0B¥22.1B¥11.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥17.3B(¥3.4B)(¥5.4B)¥32.8B¥22.7B¥26.9B¥28.0B¥478M¥24.8B¥11.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥8.5B¥9.1B¥8.9B¥10.1B¥10.2B¥10.7B¥10.5B¥11.1B¥11.9B¥15.6BDepreciationDeprec.
¥2.9B(¥14.7B)(¥19.8B)¥20.5B¥8.2B¥8.3B¥1.9B(¥29.7B)(¥9.2B)(¥15.1B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥8.0B¥10.1B¥7.0B¥10.0B¥10.5B¥7.5B¥6.6B¥7.8B¥25.2B¥21.7BCapexCapex
2.0%2.7%1.8%2.5%2.6%1.7%1.3%1.4%4.1%3.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥9.3B(¥13.4B)(¥12.4B)¥22.8B¥12.2B¥19.4B¥21.4B(¥7.3B)¥12.9B(¥4.0B)Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.3%−3.6%−3.3%5.7%3.0%4.4%4.4%−1.3%2.1%−0.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥9.3B(¥13.4B)(¥12.4B)¥22.8B¥12.2B¥19.4B¥21.4B(¥7.3B)(¥412M)(¥10.0B)Free cash flowFCF
2.3%−3.6%−3.3%5.7%3.0%4.4%4.4%−1.3%−0.1%−1.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥2.0B¥2.0B¥2.0B¥2.0B¥2.0B¥2.0B¥2.0B¥3.0B¥3.9B¥4.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥5M¥3M¥2M¥1M¥2M¥3M¥3M¥4M¥299M¥16MBuybacksBuybacks
7%2%3%6%7%8%11%10%9%3%ROICROIC
5%2%5%2%4%6%11%11%13%6%Return on equityROE
3%0%3%0%2%4%10%9%11%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥50.8B¥32.7B¥34.4B¥41.6B¥45.8B¥66.0B¥84.9B¥69.8B¥68.7B¥77.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥134.2B¥148.2B¥172.7B¥160.0B¥169.3B¥189.8B¥198.4B¥234.8B¥228.0B¥261.2BReceivablesReceiv.
¥1.8B¥2.4B¥1.6B¥1.2B¥1.6B¥1.1B¥1.5B¥2.3B¥2.0B¥2.4BInventoryInvent.
¥40.5B¥41.7B¥47.1B¥44.1B¥41.6B¥51.6B¥50.6B¥48.9B¥56.9B¥60.7BAccounts payablePayables
¥95.6B¥108.9B¥127.2B¥117.1B¥129.3B¥139.3B¥149.2B¥188.2B¥173.2B¥202.9BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥230.7B¥218.3B¥253.2B¥243.1B¥259.5B¥292.2B¥318.9B¥347.1B¥357.1B¥423.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥201.7B¥185.5B¥212.6B¥179.3B¥198.1B¥238.0B¥240.8B¥273.7B¥294.3B¥378.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.2×1.2×1.4×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.3×1.2×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥4.4B¥3.6B¥3.0B¥2.2B¥1.6B¥1.5B¥1.1B¥4.3B¥14.1B¥31.1BGoodwillGoodwill
¥393.6B¥391.9B¥429.0B¥409.5B¥429.3B¥461.2B¥479.7B¥533.6B¥609.7B¥718.6BTotal assetsAssets
¥108.0B¥106.5B¥126.3B¥99.6B¥98.1B¥91.9B¥86.5B¥91.4B¥135.8B¥184.1BTotal debtDebt
¥57.1B¥73.8B¥91.9B¥58.0B¥52.3B¥25.9B¥1.6B¥21.7B¥67.1B¥106.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
18.8×6.6×8.5×16.4×20.9×19.2×25.5×28.5×33.0×5.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥117.8B¥119.0B¥120.4B¥118.0B¥120.2B¥132.9B¥141.3B¥168.9B¥170.8B¥177.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
170M170M170M170M170M170M170M170M170M170MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2346.05¥2211.55¥2221.56¥2364.38¥2400.46¥2595.54¥2894.54¥3265.56¥3586.80¥3790.65Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥34.45¥12.75¥31.99¥12.91¥25.02¥46.41¥91.51¥111.62¥129.85¥65.43EPS (diluted)EPS
¥54.41¥-78.89¥-72.80¥133.90¥71.49¥113.88¥125.92¥-42.84¥75.53¥-23.43Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥54.41¥-78.89¥-72.80¥133.90¥71.49¥113.88¥125.92¥-42.84¥-2.42¥-59.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥11.88¥11.88¥11.88¥11.88¥11.88¥11.88¥11.88¥17.82¥22.77¥24.75Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥47.25¥59.07¥40.91¥58.84¥61.75¥43.91¥38.62¥45.65¥147.94¥127.45Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥692.13¥699.20¥707.40¥693.30¥706.44¥780.93¥830.20¥992.55¥1003.33¥1044.21Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.5%/yr+9.6%/yr
EPS+7.4%/yr+21.2%/yr
Dividends / share+8.5%/yr+15.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.7%/yr+15.6%/yr
Book value / share+4.7%/yr+8.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned (¥4.0B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥15.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥6.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥10.0B).

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥11.1B¥22.1B¥19.0B¥15.6B¥7.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥15.6B+¥11.9B+¥11.1B+¥10.5B+¥10.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥15.1B−¥9.2B−¥29.7B+¥1.9B+¥8.3B
Cash from operations¥11.6B¥24.8B¥478M¥28.0B¥26.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥15.6B−¥11.9B−¥7.8B−¥6.6B−¥7.5B
Owner earnings(¥4.0B)¥12.9B(¥7.3B)¥21.4B¥19.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥6.1B−¥13.3B
Free cash flow(¥10.0B)(¥412M)(¥7.3B)¥21.4B¥19.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%2%-1%4%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥15.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥6.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥12.2B ÷ interest expense ¥2.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥106.8B · 8.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥77.3B + ST investments ¥1M − debt ¥184.1B
    What this means

    Netting ¥77.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥184.1B of debt leaves ¥106.8B owed, about 8.8× a year's operating profit (15.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 148 + DIO 2 − DPO 41 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–11%; 3% latest = NOPAT ¥9.6B ÷ invested capital ¥284.5B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–6%; latest (¥4.0B) = operating cash ¥11.6B − maintenance capex ¥15.6B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥11.6B ÷ net income ¥11.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.39×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥21.7B ÷ depreciation ¥15.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 4% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2018 · 1.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥155.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥114.3B · 73%
  • Dividends¥25.3B · 16%
  • Buybacks¥338M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥15.9B · 10%
  • Returned to owners¥25.6B

    42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥25.3B as dividends and ¥338M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥76.1B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥26.5B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥338M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (170M to 170M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥24.75/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥70.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥6.0B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kanadevia is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥108.0B → ¥184.1B

    Debt rose from ¥108.0B to ¥184.1B while owner earnings went from about (¥5.5B) to ¥525M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kanadevia has delivered.

Kanadevia’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Kanadevia earns about ¥14.3B on its 2.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−32%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥10.0B) on 170M diluted shares; net debt ¥106.8B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥21.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥15.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about (¥4.0B), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6988 its page in the Manual 7011 →

Industry order: ← 1963 the Construction & Engineering chapter ACM →