← Japan catalog ← 7951 Manual 8001 → ← 3659 Video Games 9697 →
7974 · Nintendo
The numbers below are read directly from Nintendo’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 7974) →
The business in brief
- What it is
- Nintendo makes video-game machines and the games that run on them, and sells both to players at home and on the go the world over. The machines matter, but the profit comes mainly from the software and from the characters Nintendo has owned and built over decades — Mario, Zelda, Pokemon and the rest. Those same characters are lent out for toys, films and theme parks, so a creation made once can be sold many times.
- What moves the needle
- The whole case rests on the characters. The test is whether owning them buys real pricing power and a player who comes back for the next machine and the next game — a franchise — or whether each console generation is a fresh roll of the dice in a hit-driven trade. Hardware sells in cycles, so a machine that misses can drain the installed base and the profit with it, while deeper-pocketed rivals and the phone as a rival place to play press from every side. Watch whether the same characters keep earning across games, films and parks without wearing thin, and whether reported profit turns into cash an owner could keep — the record below holds the margins, the returns on capital, and the gap between the two.
Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥489.1B | ¥1.06T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.31T | ¥1.76T | ¥1.70T | ¥1.60T | ¥1.67T | ¥1.16T | ¥2.31T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 49% | 55% | — | — | — | 61% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 22% | 19% | — | — | — | 37% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 6% | 5% | — | — | — | 12% | 8% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥29.4B | ¥177.6B | ¥249.7B | ¥352.4B | ¥640.6B | ¥592.8B | ¥504.4B | ¥528.9B | ¥282.6B | ¥360.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.0% | 16.8% | 20.8% | 26.9% | 36.4% | 35.0% | 31.5% | 31.6% | 24.3% | 15.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥102.6B | ¥139.6B | ¥194.0B | ¥258.6B | ¥480.4B | ¥477.7B | ¥432.8B | ¥490.6B | ¥278.8B | ¥424.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥19.1B | ¥152.2B | ¥170.5B | ¥347.8B | ¥612.1B | ¥289.7B | ¥322.8B | ¥462.1B | ¥12.1B | ¥289.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥8.4B | ¥9.1B | ¥9.6B | ¥9.6B | ¥10.8B | ¥10.5B | ¥11.0B | ¥17.9B | ¥15.4B | ¥15.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥91.8B) | ¥3.6B | (¥33.0B) | ¥79.6B | ¥120.9B | (¥198.6B) | (¥121.0B) | (¥46.4B) | (¥282.1B) | (¥150.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥10.5B | ¥9.6B | ¥10.7B | ¥9.8B | ¥7.0B | ¥7.6B | ¥22.2B | ¥16.1B | ¥19.0B | ¥27.2B | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 1.6% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥10.7B | ¥142.6B | ¥159.8B | ¥337.9B | ¥605.1B | ¥282.1B | ¥311.8B | ¥446.0B | (¥6.9B) | ¥273.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.2% | 13.5% | 13.3% | 25.8% | 34.4% | 16.6% | 19.5% | 26.7% | −0.6% | 11.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥8.6B | ¥142.6B | ¥159.8B | ¥337.9B | ¥605.1B | ¥282.1B | ¥300.7B | ¥446.0B | (¥6.9B) | ¥262.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.8% | 13.5% | 13.3% | 25.8% | 34.4% | 16.6% | 18.8% | 26.7% | −0.6% | 11.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥14.4B | ¥64.8B | ¥78.0B | ¥108.3B | ¥194.0B | ¥240.6B | ¥238.7B | ¥236.2B | ¥193.2B | ¥147.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥38M | ¥78M | ¥31.0B | ¥43M | ¥53M | ¥95.3B | ¥50.7B | ¥2M | ¥2M | ¥99.9B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 8% | 11% | 14% | 16% | 26% | 23% | 19% | 19% | 11% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 6% | 8% | 10% | 15% | 11% | 9% | 10% | 3% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥331.0B | ¥484.5B | ¥585.4B | ¥947.8B | ¥1.49T | ¥1.02T | ¥1.19T | ¥853.4B | ¥1.89T | ¥1.74T | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥106.1B | ¥69.8B | ¥78.2B | ¥133.1B | ¥140.6B | ¥141.1B | ¥119.9B | ¥93.6B | ¥65.2B | ¥147.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥39.1B | ¥141.8B | ¥135.5B | ¥89.0B | ¥86.8B | ¥204.2B | ¥258.6B | ¥156.0B | ¥486.4B | ¥539.8B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥104.2B | ¥138.0B | ¥59.7B | ¥98.1B | ¥114.7B | ¥150.9B | ¥149.2B | ¥58.1B | ¥201.1B | ¥236.1B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥41.0B | ¥73.6B | ¥153.9B | ¥124.0B | ¥112.7B | ¥194.4B | ¥229.3B | ¥191.5B | ¥350.5B | ¥451.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.14T | ¥1.27T | ¥1.34T | ¥1.50T | ¥2.02T | ¥2.13T | ¥2.31T | ¥2.57T | ¥2.75T | ¥3.01T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥184.1B | ¥278.1B | ¥245.0B | ¥355.7B | ¥526.3B | ¥540.7B | ¥533.5B | ¥479.3B | ¥597.6B | ¥760.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 6.2× | 4.6× | 5.5× | 4.2× | 3.8× | 3.9× | 4.3× | 5.4× | 4.6× | 4.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥1.47T | ¥1.63T | ¥1.69T | ¥1.93T | ¥2.45T | ¥2.66T | ¥2.85T | ¥3.15T | ¥3.40T | ¥3.81T | Total assetsAssets |
| 157.9× | 280.1× | 292.0× | 2912.1× | 3619.4× | 2109.5× | 4134.2× | 3186.4× | 1441.6× | 1714.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥1.25T | ¥1.32T | ¥1.41T | ¥1.58T | ¥1.86T | ¥2.07T | ¥2.27T | ¥2.60T | ¥2.49T | ¥2.66T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.42B | 1.42B | 1.32B | 1.32B | 1.32B | 1.30B | 1.30B | 1.30B | 1.30B | 1.29B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥345.24 | ¥745.18 | ¥911.80 | ¥993.79 | ¥1335.86 | ¥1305.43 | ¥1233.30 | ¥1287.35 | ¥897.00 | ¥1796.88 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥72.40 | ¥98.53 | ¥147.35 | ¥196.43 | ¥364.84 | ¥367.83 | ¥333.23 | ¥377.77 | ¥214.68 | ¥329.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥7.58 | ¥100.66 | ¥121.36 | ¥256.64 | ¥459.56 | ¥217.20 | ¥240.09 | ¥343.40 | ¥-5.34 | ¥212.80 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥6.10 | ¥100.66 | ¥121.36 | ¥256.64 | ¥459.56 | ¥217.20 | ¥231.50 | ¥343.40 | ¥-5.34 | ¥204.01 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥10.15 | ¥45.76 | ¥59.22 | ¥82.28 | ¥147.36 | ¥185.23 | ¥183.80 | ¥181.91 | ¥148.76 | ¥114.86 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥7.38 | ¥6.78 | ¥8.15 | ¥7.48 | ¥5.32 | ¥5.84 | ¥17.09 | ¥12.41 | ¥14.64 | ¥21.11 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥883.02 | ¥934.27 | ¥1074.51 | ¥1196.51 | ¥1413.83 | ¥1593.38 | ¥1745.19 | ¥2005.87 | ¥1914.81 | ¥2068.86 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +20.1%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +44.9%/yr | −14.3%/yr |
| EPS | +18.3%/yr | −2.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +30.9%/yr | −4.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.4%/yr | +31.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.9%/yr | +7.9%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥273.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥15.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥11.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥262.6B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥424.1B | ¥278.8B | ¥490.6B | ¥432.8B | ¥477.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥15.9B | +¥15.4B | +¥17.9B | +¥11.0B | +¥10.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥150.1B | −¥282.1B | −¥46.4B | −¥121.0B | −¥198.6B |
| Cash from operations | ¥289.8B | ¥12.1B | ¥462.1B | ¥322.8B | ¥289.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥15.9B | −¥19.0B | −¥16.1B | −¥11.0B | −¥7.6B |
| Owner earnings | ¥273.9B | (¥6.9B) | ¥446.0B | ¥311.8B | ¥282.1B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥11.3B | — | — | −¥11.2B | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥262.6B | (¥6.9B) | ¥446.0B | ¥300.7B | ¥282.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 12% | -1% | 27% | 19% | 17% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥15.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥11.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 1714.8×ComfortableOperating income ¥360.1B ÷ interest expense ¥210M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 23 + DIO 140 − DPO 61 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -1%–34%; latest ¥273.9B = operating cash ¥289.8B − maintenance capex ¥15.9BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops ¥289.8B ÷ net income ¥424.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks ¥247.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥273.9B
What this means
Of ¥273.9B Owner Earnings, ¥247.8B (90%) went back to shareholders, ¥147.9B dividends, ¥99.9B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.71×ExpandingCapex ¥27.2B ÷ depreciation ¥15.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 15% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 24% lately, median 24% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · 6.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥2.68T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested¥139.7B · 5%
- Dividends¥1.52T · 57%
- Buybacks¥277.3B · 10%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥745.1B · 28%
- Returned to owners¥1.79T
70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥1.52T as dividends and ¥277.3B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose ¥1.41T.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥277.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−9.1%
The diluted count fell from 1417M to 1287M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥114.86/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 31% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.49T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥133.3B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Nintendo is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.82×
Across the record the business reported ¥3.28T of net income but generated ¥2.68T of operating cash, a 0.82-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nintendo has delivered.
Through the cycle, Nintendo earns about ¥348.6B on its 15.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥262.6B on 1287M diluted shares; net cash ¥1.74T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥27.2B) runs well above depreciation (¥15.9B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥273.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 7951 its page in the Manual 8001 →
Industry order: ← 3659 the Video Games chapter 9697 →