Owner Scorecard


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8035 · Tokyo Electron

Semiconductor equipment Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

The numbers below are read directly from Tokyo Electron’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 8035) →

The business in brief

What it is
Tokyo Electron builds the machines that make semiconductors. Its customers are the chipmakers, who buy its coating, deposition, etching, cleaning and test equipment to run their fabrication plants; it also makes the equipment used to produce flat-panel displays. It earns its keep selling these tools, and the parts and service that keep them running.
What moves the needle
The business rests on a handful of large chipmakers, and what they spend to build new plants swings hard with their own cycle, so the first test is whether the company holds its margins and its returns through the lean years and not merely the fat ones. The second is whether it keeps pace on a technology roadmap that never sits still: the spending to stay current is the price of admission, and slipping a step behind a rival is the standing danger. Whether that earns real pricing power and a place customers cannot easily leave, rather than a good seat on a cyclical ride, is the question the returns on capital and the cash position in the record below are there to answer.

Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥799.7B¥1.13T¥1.28T¥1.13T¥1.40T¥2.00T¥2.21T¥1.83T¥2.43T¥2.44TRevenueRevenue
40%40%47%45%Gross marginGross mgn
19%17%18%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%10%10%11%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥155.7B¥281.2B¥310.6B¥237.3B¥320.7B¥599.3B¥617.7B¥456.3B¥697.3B¥624.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.5%24.9%24.3%21.0%22.9%29.9%28.0%24.9%28.7%25.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥115.2B¥204.4B¥248.2B¥185.2B¥242.9B¥437.1B¥471.6B¥364.0B¥544.1B¥574.5BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥136.9B¥186.6B¥189.6B¥253.1B¥145.9B¥283.4B¥426.3B¥434.7B¥582.2B¥539.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥17.9B¥20.6B¥24.3B¥29.1B¥33.8B¥36.7B¥42.9B¥52.3B¥62.1B¥81.0BDepreciationDeprec.
¥3.9B(¥38.4B)(¥83.0B)¥38.8B(¥130.9B)(¥190.4B)(¥88.2B)¥18.4B(¥24.1B)(¥115.7B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥17.6B¥41.8B¥46.5B¥49.4B¥53.8B¥56.2B¥66.9B¥117.0B¥158.4B¥209.0BCapexCapex
2.2%3.7%3.6%4.4%3.8%2.8%3.0%6.4%6.5%8.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥119.4B¥166.0B¥165.2B¥224.0B¥112.0B¥246.7B¥383.3B¥382.4B¥520.0B¥458.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.9%14.7%12.9%19.9%8.0%12.3%17.4%20.9%21.4%18.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥119.4B¥144.8B¥143.1B¥203.7B¥92.1B¥227.2B¥359.4B¥317.7B¥423.8B¥330.7BFree cash flowFCF
14.9%12.8%11.2%18.1%6.6%11.3%16.3%17.4%17.4%13.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥39.4B¥82.2B¥124.8B¥95.5B¥109.5B¥166.3B¥253.0B¥202.5B¥236.3B¥271.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥16M¥5.0B¥154.1B¥4.3B¥15M¥1.7B¥120.0B¥150.0B¥150.0BBuybacksBuybacks
18%26%28%23%26%32%29%21%33%32%Return on equityROE
12%16%14%11%14%20%14%9%19%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥164.4B¥257.9B¥232.6B¥436.5B¥391.0B¥335.6B¥472.5B¥461.6B¥565.1B¥560.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥133.9B¥159.6B¥147.0B¥150.1B¥191.7B¥433.9B¥464.9B¥391.4B¥485.6B¥525.9BReceivablesReceiv.
¥152.6B¥220.5B¥234.1B¥267.6B¥269.8B¥183.5B¥236.8B¥284.5B¥291.5B¥286.1BInventoryInvent.
¥79.2B¥108.6B¥75.4B¥95.9B¥90.6B¥120.9B¥116.3B¥92.4B¥108.0B¥127.8BAccounts payablePayables
¥207.3B¥271.5B¥305.6B¥321.8B¥370.9B¥496.6B¥585.4B¥583.5B¥669.1B¥684.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥775.9B¥946.6B¥982.9B¥962.5B¥1.02T¥1.41T¥1.74T¥1.70T¥1.80T¥1.84TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥247.8B¥368.5B¥304.9B¥382.6B¥327.7B¥468.6B¥629.9B¥611.9B¥677.9B¥679.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.1×2.6×3.2×2.5×3.1×3.0×2.8×2.8×2.7×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥957.4B¥1.20T¥1.26T¥1.28T¥1.43T¥1.89T¥2.31T¥2.46T¥2.63T¥2.86TTotal assetsAssets
¥0¥1M¥2M¥1M¥0¥0¥0¥6M¥3M¥7MTotal debtDebt
(¥164.4B)(¥257.9B)(¥232.6B)(¥436.5B)(¥391.0B)(¥335.6B)(¥472.5B)(¥461.6B)(¥565.1B)(¥560.4B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
357.1×377.9×244.0×289.7×638.8×1267.0×1017.7×3379.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥646.0B¥771.5B¥888.1B¥806.7B¥937.5B¥1.35T¥1.60T¥1.76T¥1.64T¥1.80TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
496M496M496M472M472M472M472M472M472M472MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1613.54¥2281.40¥2579.02¥2390.19¥2966.52¥4248.68¥4683.81¥3881.26¥5155.65¥5181.02Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥232.45¥412.35¥500.83¥392.69¥515.11¥926.73¥999.90¥771.71¥1153.72¥1218.01EPS (diluted)EPS
¥240.89¥334.85¥333.41¥474.97¥237.57¥522.99¥812.80¥810.76¥1102.61¥972.69Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥240.89¥292.22¥288.63¥432.01¥195.24¥481.81¥761.98¥673.68¥898.58¥701.28Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥79.44¥165.86¥251.71¥202.52¥232.26¥352.51¥536.41¥429.27¥500.98¥575.91Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥35.42¥84.24¥93.85¥104.68¥114.09¥119.06¥141.84¥248.06¥335.80¥443.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1303.39¥1556.62¥1791.90¥1710.35¥1987.72¥2856.15¥3391.48¥3732.10¥3475.58¥3807.38Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.8%/yr+11.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+16.8%/yr+32.6%/yr
EPS+20.2%/yr+18.8%/yr
Dividends / share+24.6%/yr+19.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+32.4%/yr+31.2%/yr
Book value / share+12.6%/yr+13.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥458.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥81.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥128.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥330.7B.

Reported net income¥574.5B
Owner earnings¥458.8B · 19% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥574.5B¥544.1B¥364.0B¥471.6B¥437.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥81.0B+¥62.1B+¥52.3B+¥42.9B+¥36.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥115.7B−¥24.1B+¥18.4B−¥88.2B−¥190.4B
Cash from operations¥539.7B¥582.2B¥434.7B¥426.3B¥283.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥81.0B−¥62.1B−¥52.3B−¥42.9B−¥36.7B
Owner earnings¥458.8B¥520.0B¥382.4B¥383.3B¥246.7B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥128.0B−¥96.2B−¥64.7B−¥24.0B−¥19.4B
Free cash flow¥330.7B¥423.8B¥317.7B¥359.4B¥227.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue19%21%21%17%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥81.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥128.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥505.4B + ST investments ¥55.0B − debt ¥7M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥560.4B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 79 + DIO 78 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%)
    NOPAT ¥493.7B ÷ invested capital ¥1.29T (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–21%; latest ¥458.8B = operating cash ¥539.7B − maintenance capex ¥81.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥128.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥330.7B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥539.7B ÷ net income ¥574.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥421.6B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥458.8B
    What this means

    Of ¥458.8B Owner Earnings, ¥421.6B (92%) went back to shareholders, ¥271.6B dividends, ¥150.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.58×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥209.0B ÷ depreciation ¥81.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 23% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 23% early to 26% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 39%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 19.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥3.18T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested¥816.4B · 26%
  • Dividends¥1.58T · 50%
  • Buybacks¥585.3B · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥195.8B · 6%
  • Returned to owners¥2.17T

    78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥1.58T as dividends and ¥585.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥585.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−4.8%

    The diluted count fell from 496M to 472M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥575.91/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 25% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained25%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.22T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥303.5B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.25 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tokyo Electron is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tokyo Electron has delivered.

Tokyo Electron’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Tokyo Electron earns about ¥394.4B on its 16.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥330.7B on 472M diluted shares; net cash ¥560.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥209.0B) runs well above depreciation (¥81.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥458.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 8031 its page in the Manual 8053 →

Industry order: ← 7735 the Semiconductor Equipment chapter ACLS →