Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 8035 Manual 8058 → ← 8031 Trading Companies & Distributors 8058 →

8053 · Sumitomo Corp.

Trading house Trading & distribution IFRS
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

The numbers below are read directly from Sumitomo Corp.’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 8053) →

The business in brief

What it is
Sumitomo is one of Japan's general trading houses — a sprawling collection of businesses that buys, sells, ships and finances goods of nearly every kind, and also takes ownership stakes in the companies that make and move them. It earns two ways: a margin on the trading and logistics it arranges, and its share of the profits from the many operating ventures it part-owns, spanning lines from metals and energy to machinery, chemicals and real estate. In plain terms, it is a diversified portfolio of trading and operating interests under one roof, funded in part with borrowed money.
What moves the needle
The enduring question here is not a single moat but capital allocation: a trading house lives or dies by where management points money across dozens of cyclical, largely commodity-linked businesses, and whether the returns it earns clear the cost of the capital — including the debt — that it ties up. Watch for pricing power or a durable cost edge in the few lines that could have one, but assume most of the book is price-taking, where margins are thin and earnings ride the commodity cycle. The bad case is the familiar conglomerate trap: a wide, capital-hungry sprawl that earns less than it consumes and obscures the weak parts behind the strong. Whether this collection actually compounds owner capital is a matter for the figures in the record below — the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt load.

Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥4.00T¥4.83T¥5.34T¥5.30T¥4.65T¥5.50T¥6.82T¥6.91T¥7.29T¥7.34TRevenueRevenue
16%16%20%21%Gross marginGross mgn
13%15%14%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥170.9B¥308.5B¥320.5B¥171.4B(¥153.1B)¥463.7B¥565.3B¥386.4B¥561.9B¥600.3BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥345.8B¥295.3B¥268.9B¥326.6B¥467.1B¥194.1B¥232.8B¥608.9B¥612.3B¥813.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥174.9B(¥13.3B)(¥51.6B)¥155.3B¥620.2B(¥269.6B)(¥332.5B)¥222.5B¥50.4B¥213.1BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥97.8B¥110.0B¥76.9B¥66.3B¥69.7B¥70.3B¥93.4B¥102.8B¥105.9BCapexCapex
2.0%2.1%1.5%1.4%1.3%1.0%1.4%1.4%1.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥197.5B¥158.9B¥249.7B¥400.8B¥124.3B¥162.5B¥515.5B¥509.5B¥707.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.1%3.0%4.7%8.6%2.3%2.4%7.5%7.0%9.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥197.5B¥158.9B¥249.7B¥400.8B¥124.3B¥162.5B¥515.5B¥509.5B¥707.5BFree cash flowFCF
4.1%3.0%4.7%8.6%2.3%2.4%7.5%7.0%9.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥62.4B¥66.2B¥88.7B¥103.7B¥87.5B¥100.0B¥153.1B¥147.3B¥155.0B¥162.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥3M¥6M¥6M¥5M¥4M¥4M¥38.0B¥32.1B¥50.0B¥80.0BBuybacksBuybacks
7%12%12%7%-6%15%15%9%12%13%Return on equityROE
5%9%8%3%−10%11%11%5%9%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥188.2B¥667.2B¥660.4B¥744.7B¥609.4B¥733.8B¥656.9B¥667.9B¥588.3B¥1.16TCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥480.5B¥1.27T¥1.34T¥1.23T¥1.30T¥1.62T¥1.68T¥1.91T¥2.03T¥2.41TReceivablesReceiv.
¥1.04T¥1.18T¥1.08T¥1.27T¥1.61T¥1.65T¥1.71T¥1.82T¥2.47TAccounts payablePayables
¥480.5B¥228.1B¥161.9B¥152.0B¥34.0B¥9.4B¥30.0B¥198.7B¥206.0B(¥52.6B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
¥1.53T¥3.48T¥3.55T¥3.54T¥3.50T¥4.65T¥4.87T¥4.94T¥5.07T¥6.64TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥1.17T¥1.15T¥1.17T¥1.09T¥1.13T¥1.51T¥1.36T¥1.40T¥1.36T¥2.06TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×3.0×3.0×3.2×3.1×3.1×3.6×3.5×3.7×3.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥107.8B¥110.3B¥123.3B¥109.8B¥105.5B¥115.7B¥141.8B¥321.5B¥346.6BGoodwillGoodwill
¥7.76T¥7.77T¥7.92T¥8.13T¥8.08T¥9.58T¥10.11T¥11.03T¥11.63T¥13.64TTotal assetsAssets
¥2.26T¥3.20T¥3.17T¥3.68T¥3.41T¥3.51T¥3.65T¥3.71T¥3.78T¥4.71TTotal debtDebt
¥2.07T¥2.54T¥2.51T¥2.94T¥2.80T¥2.77T¥2.99T¥3.04T¥3.20T¥3.55TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.0×-1.0×-0.6×-1.0×-4.0×-2.4×-1.0×-0.7×-0.3×-0.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥2.37T¥2.56T¥2.77T¥2.54T¥2.53T¥3.20T¥3.78T¥4.45T¥4.65T¥4.63TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.25B1.25B1.25B1.25B1.25B1.25B1.25B1.22B1.21B1.21BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥3196.04¥3860.00¥4268.70¥4236.51¥3712.32¥4391.08¥5447.45¥5649.90¥6021.05¥6056.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥136.65¥246.70¥256.26¥136.98¥-122.33¥370.54¥451.70¥315.88¥463.92¥495.56EPS (diluted)EPS
¥157.93¥127.00¥199.59¥320.28¥99.37¥129.84¥421.45¥420.68¥584.06Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥157.93¥127.00¥199.59¥320.28¥99.37¥129.84¥421.45¥420.68¥584.06Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥49.90¥52.90¥70.88¥82.87¥69.90¥79.90¥122.36¥120.45¥128.00¥134.45Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥78.17¥87.97¥61.50¥53.02¥55.71¥56.17¥76.35¥84.88¥87.43Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1892.28¥2045.54¥2215.79¥2033.70¥2020.33¥2555.38¥3019.16¥3634.66¥3838.22¥3820.75Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.4%/yr+10.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+17.8%/yr (8-yr)+12.8%/yr
EPS+15.4%/yr
Dividends / share+11.6%/yr+14.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.4%/yr (8-yr)+10.5%/yr
Book value / share+8.1%/yr+13.6%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned ¥600.3B of profit into ¥707.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income¥600.3B
Owner earnings¥707.5B · 10% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥600.3B¥561.9B¥386.4B¥565.3B¥463.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥213.1B+¥50.4B+¥222.5B−¥332.5B−¥269.6B
Cash from operations¥813.5B¥612.3B¥608.9B¥232.8B¥194.1B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥105.9B−¥102.8B−¥93.4B−¥70.3B−¥69.7B
Owner earnings¥707.5B¥509.5B¥515.5B¥162.5B¥124.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%7%7%2%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Not the right lens here
    What this means

    This business earns through equity-method affiliates, so interest coverage on its operating line isn't meaningful. Read its solvency on net debt against equity instead.

  • Net debt
    Cash ¥1.01T + ST investments ¥150.6B − debt ¥4.71T
    What this means

    Netting ¥1.16T of cash and short-term investments against ¥4.71T of debt leaves ¥3.55T owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Operating income not meaningful here
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    This business earns mostly through equity-method affiliates, so its operating line understates its earning power and a ROIC built on it would mislead. Read it on return on equity and the record instead.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 2%–10%; latest ¥707.5B = operating cash ¥813.5B − maintenance capex ¥105.9B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 9 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥813.5B ÷ net income ¥600.3B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥242.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥707.5B
    What this means

    Of ¥707.5B Owner Earnings, ¥242.9B (34%) went back to shareholders, ¥162.9B dividends, ¥80.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −1% early, −1% lately, median −1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −0%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −2.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2018–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥3.82T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested¥793.2B · 21%
  • Dividends¥1.06T · 28%
  • Buybacks¥200.1B · 5%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥1.76T · 46%
  • Returned to owners¥1.26T

    42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥1.06T as dividends and ¥200.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥1.50T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥488.9B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥200.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.1%

    The diluted count fell from 1251M to 1211M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥134.45/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained19%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.96T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥375.5B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sumitomo Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?12% → 33% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥480.5B to ¥2.41T while revenue grew 84%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (12% of revenue then, 33% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sumitomo Corp. has delivered.

Sumitomo Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Sumitomo Corp. earns about ¥345.7B on its 4.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+44%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’26+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥707.5B on 1211M diluted shares; net debt ¥3.55T. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 8035 its page in the Manual 8058 →

Industry order: ← 8031 the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter 8058 →