Owner Scorecard


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AEP, American Electric Power Company Inc.

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityCapital build-out

Electric markets served by AEP's public utility subsidiaries.

The service areas of AEP's public utility subsidiaries cover portions of the states of Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.

The public utility subsidiaries of AEP have traditionally provided electric service, consisting of generation, transmission and distribution, on an integrated basis to their retail customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AEP · American Electric Power Company Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$21.7B
+8.7% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $22.0B 5-yr avg $19.5B
Operating margin 24.5% 5-yr avg 20.5%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 24%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 16% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$16.4B$15.4B$16.2B$15.6B$14.9B$16.8B$19.4B$19.5B$20.0B$21.7B$22.0BRevenueRevenue
$1.2B$3.5B$2.7B$2.6B$3.0B$3.4B$3.5B$3.6B$4.3B$5.3B$5.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.1%22.9%16.6%16.7%20.0%20.3%18.0%18.3%21.6%24.5%24.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$611M$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$2.2B$2.5B$2.3B$2.2B$3.0B$3.6B$3.7BNet incomeNet inc.
34%6%-1%2%4%0%2%-1%3%1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.5B$4.3B$5.2B$4.3B$3.8B$3.8B$5.3B$5.0B$6.8B$6.9B$7.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$2.5B$2.7B$3.1B$2.9B$3.1B$3.3B$3.3BDepreciationDeprec.
$2.2B$649M$1.3B$145M($855M)($1.4B)($92M)($123M)$688M$39M$34MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$108M$0$0$918M$0$155M$399M$3.5B$4.4BCapexCapex
0.7%0.0%0.0%5.9%0.0%0.8%2.0%15.9%20.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$4.4B$4.3B$5.2B$3.4B$3.8B$4.9B$6.4B$3.5B$3.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
26.9%27.7%32.3%21.5%25.7%25.0%32.1%16.1%16.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.4B$4.3B$5.2B$3.4B$3.8B$4.9B$6.4B$3.5B$2.6BFree cash flowFCF
26.9%27.7%32.3%21.5%25.7%25.0%32.1%16.1%11.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
3%6%6%6%6%6%6%5%6%7%7%ROICROIC
4%10%10%10%11%11%10%9%11%11%11%Return on equityROE
−3%4%4%3%4%4%3%2%4%5%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$349M$376M$393M$450M$594M$624M$697M$544M$418M$417M$516MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.7B$2.4B$2.6B$2.9B$3.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.7B$2.1B$1.9B$2.1B$1.7B$2.1B$2.7B$2.0B$2.6B$3.4B$3.1BAccounts payablePayables
$228M($174M)$52M($381M)$133M($113M)($3M)$415M($6M)($562M)($178M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6.0B$4.3B$4.1B$4.1B$4.4B$7.8B$6.8B$6.1B$5.8B$6.1B$6.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$9.5B$8.3B$8.6B$10.3B$9.9B$12.4B$13.3B$11.6B$13.0B$13.3B$12.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.5×0.5×0.4×0.4×0.6×0.5×0.5×0.4×0.5×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53M$53MGoodwillGoodwill
$63.5B$64.7B$68.8B$75.9B$80.8B$87.7B$93.4B$96.7B$103.1B$114.5B$117.8BTotal assetsAssets
$20.3B$21.2B$23.3B$26.7B$31.1B$33.5B$36.8B$40.1B$42.6B$47.3B$49.6BTotal debtDebt
$19.9B$20.8B$23.0B$26.3B$30.5B$32.8B$36.1B$39.6B$42.2B$46.9B$49.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.3×3.9×2.7×2.4×2.6×2.8×2.5×2.0×2.3×2.6×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$17.4B$18.3B$19.0B$19.6B$20.6B$22.4B$23.9B$25.2B$26.9B$31.1B$31.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
492M493M494M495M497M502M513M520M531M537M547MShares out (diluted)Shares
$33.32$31.31$32.80$31.42$30.00$33.46$37.76$37.40$37.58$40.38$40.20Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.24$3.88$3.90$3.88$4.42$4.96$4.49$4.24$5.58$6.66$6.68EPS (diluted)EPS
$8.98$8.67$10.58$6.77$7.71$9.34$12.05$6.50$6.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$8.98$8.67$10.58$6.77$7.71$9.34$12.05$6.50$4.74Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.28$2.42$2.54$2.73$2.87$3.03$3.20$3.37$3.57$3.74$3.71Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.22$0.00$0.00$1.85$0.00$0.30$0.75$6.42$8.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$35.38$37.12$38.54$39.64$41.33$44.71$46.53$48.53$50.71$57.93$58.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.2%/yr+6.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.5%/yr−3.4%/yr
EPS+20.5%/yr+8.5%/yr
Dividends / share+5.6%/yr+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+45.5%/yr
Book value / share+5.6%/yr+7.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
537Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
7%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
13.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.5Bowner earningsvs.$3.6Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $3.6B of profit but $3.5B of owner earnings: $89M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$3.6B
Owner earnings$3.5B · 16% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2020FY2019
Reported net income$3.6B$3.0B$2.2B$2.2B$1.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3.3B+$3.1B+$2.9B+$2.5B+$2.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$39M+$688M−$123M−$855M+$145M
Cash from operations$6.9B$6.8B$5.0B$3.8B$4.3B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$3.5B−$399M−$155M−$918M
Owner earnings$3.5B$6.4B$4.9B$3.8B$3.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%32%25%26%22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $5.3B ÷ interest expense $2.0B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $46.9B · 8.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $197M + ST investments $220M − debt $47.3B
    What this means

    Netting $417M of cash and short-term investments against $47.3B of debt leaves $46.9B owed, about 8.8× a year's operating profit (8.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–7%; 7% latest = NOPAT $5.1B ÷ invested capital $78.3B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 16%–32%; latest $3.5B = operating cash $6.9B − maintenance capex $3.5B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 8 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $6.9B ÷ net income $3.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.5B
    What this means

    Of $3.5B Owner Earnings, $2.0B (58%) went back to shareholders, $2.0B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.04×
    Maintaining
    Capex $3.5B ÷ depreciation $3.3B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $21.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.45×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $47.3B vs ($7.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +97%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.36/share (latest year $6.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $57.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 16% early to 21% lately, median 18% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 7.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Information technology failure, including failure of AI technology, that impairs AEP's information technology infrastructure or disrupts normal business operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$6.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$516M
  • Receivables$3.0B
  • Other current assets$3.1B
Current liabilities$12.6B
  • Debt due within a year$2.7B
  • Accounts payable$3.1B
  • Other current liabilities$6.7B
Current ratio0.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.53×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($6.0B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.7B due · $516M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$31.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($78.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$50.2B$667M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$521Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$3.2B
'27$2.5B
'28$3.5B
'29$2.9B
'30$1.8B
later$33.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3.2Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$5.6Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$3.5Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$47.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$516M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.5B
Together, against $3.2B due next year1.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.0B against the $3.2B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $40.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$5.0B · 12%
  • Dividends$12.0B · 29%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$23.8B · 58%
  • Returned to owners$12.0B

    33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $12.0B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $29.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $167M.

  • Net change in share count11.3%

    The diluted count rose from 492M to 547M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$3.74/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $282M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • CEO pay ratio261:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why American Electric Power Company Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?24.4% vs 29.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.0% early in the record and 24.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.3%

    Diluted shares grew 11.3% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$20.3B → $49.6B

    Debt rose from $20.3B to $49.6B while owner earnings went from about $4.6B to $4.9B — about 4.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 10 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NRGNRG Energy$30.3B24%7.6%13%9%
NEENextEra Energy Inc.$27.4B28.2%6%
CEGConstellation Energy$22.7B5.0%8%-17%
AEPAmerican Electric Power Company Inc.$21.7B19.2%6%26%
EIXEdison International$19.3B13.1%4%7%
VSTVistra$17.6B10.8%7%17%
DDominion Energy Inc.$16.5B23.1%4%21%
FEFirstEnergy Corp.$15.1B18.4%5%11%
Group median15.8%6%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what American Electric Power Company Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, American Electric Power Company Inc. earns about $5.7B on its 26.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2.6B on 544M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $49.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.4B) runs well above depreciation ($3.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "American Electric Power Company Inc. (AEP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AEP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AEO its page in the Manual AES →

Industry order: ← 9503 the Electric Utilities chapter AES →