Owner Scorecard


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AGRO, Adecoagro S.A.

Agricultural Products capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

Revenue is led by Sugar (28%) and Ethanol (19%), with 7 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
AGRO · Adecoagro S.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$1.4B
+6.7% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.2B
Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 23%
Operating margin 8.2% 5-yr avg 19.4%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 17%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 19% through the cycle, a thin spread, but one where almost nothing separates the gross and operating lines — the mark of cost-plus or fixed-price program work, so the contract structure and the order book set the result more than unit volume against a price. Capital spending runs about 19% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Sugar at 28%.

Revenue by product line, FY2024
  • Sugar28%$392M
  • Ethanol19%$265M
  • Rice16%$224M
  • Fluid milk (UHT)10%$137M
  • Other dairy products6%$78M
  • Peanut4%$59M
  • Other12%$167M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMSep 2025
Income statement
$674M$869M$933M$793M$887M$818M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
17%22%18%23%24%25%24%20%25%21%18%Gross marginGross mgn
$95M$185M$130M$156M$121M$189M$278M$250M$242M$182M$114MOperating incomeOp. inc.
14.2%21.2%13.9%19.7%13.7%23.1%24.7%18.5%18.6%12.0%8.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($6M)$12M$13M($25M)($772K)$412K$131M$108M$226M$92M$23MNet incomeNet inc.
53%25%20%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$145M$255M$237M$219M$322M$257M$349M$370M$435M$328M$302MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$91M$109M$127M$128M$141M$114M$135M$156M$158M$189M$171MDepreciationDeprec.
$60M$135M$97M$116M$182M$142M$83M$106M$51M$47M$108MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$141M$132M$199M$207M$252M$169M$199M$218M$242M$260M$247MCapexCapex
21.0%15.2%21.3%26.1%28.5%20.6%17.7%16.2%18.6%17.1%17.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$55M$123M$110M$91M$181M$143M$214M$214M$277M$139M$132MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.1%14.2%11.8%11.5%20.4%17.4%19.0%15.9%21.3%9.2%9.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4M$123M$39M$11M$70M$89M$149M$152M$193M$68M$55MFree cash flowFCF
0.6%14.2%4.1%1.4%7.9%10.8%13.3%11.3%14.9%4.5%4.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3M$408K$497K$0$0$35M$35M$35M$35MDividends paidDiv. paid
$320K$5M$38M$16M$4M$4M$66M$37M$26M$67MBuybacksBuybacks
9%12%4%7%14%12%11%10%5%ROICROIC
-1%2%2%-2%-0%0%13%10%18%7%2%Return on equityROE
2%−2%−0%0%13%6%16%4%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$199M$159M$269M$274M$290M$336M$200M$231M$340M$211M$340MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$158M$150M$159M$127M$146M$146M$184M$179M$213M$389MReceivablesReceiv.
$112M$109M$128M$113M$133M$240M$274M$256M$290M$407MInventoryInvent.
$92M$98M$106M$107M$126M$169M$242M$191M$207M$210MAccounts payablePayables
$177M$161M$181M$133M$153M$217M$215M$244M$296M$586MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$568M$689M$661M$649M$767M$762M$1.0B$1.1B$1.0B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$332M$282M$278M$364M$359M$357M$611M$494M$400M$486MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×2.4×2.4×1.8×2.1×2.1×1.7×2.1×2.5×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$13M$12M$12MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.6B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5B$2.6B$3.1B$3.2B$3.1B$3.6BTotal assetsAssets
$430M$663M$718M$780M$813M$705M$728M$698M$680M$1.1BTotal debtDebt
$272M$394M$445M$490M$477M$506M$497M$358M$469M$714MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.8×1.1×1.0×1.0×0.6×0.9×1.8×1.8×2.0×1.1×0.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$564M$700M$674M$1.1B$988M$925M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
121M121M121M117M117M117M115M110M107M103M103MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.58$7.16$7.74$6.80$7.57$6.96$9.76$12.24$12.13$14.80$13.51Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.05$0.10$0.11$-0.21$-0.01$0.00$1.13$0.98$2.11$0.90$0.23EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.45$1.01$0.91$0.78$1.55$1.21$1.86$1.95$2.58$1.36$1.28Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.03$1.01$0.32$0.10$0.59$0.75$1.30$1.38$1.80$0.66$0.54Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.32$0.33$0.34$0.34Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.17$1.09$1.65$1.78$2.15$1.43$1.73$1.98$2.26$2.54$2.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.67$5.77$5.59$9.12$8.43$7.88$8.79$10.23$11.48$13.34$13.37Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.5%/yr+14.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.0%/yr−2.6%/yr
Dividends / share+46.4%/yr (7-yr)+140.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.0%/yr+3.3%/yr
Book value / share+12.4%/yr+9.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
103Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
10%low FY2019
Gross margin
21%low FY2015
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$139Mowner earningsvs.$92Mnet incomelow FY2015

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned $139M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $189M it takes just to hold its position. It put $71M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $68M.

Reported net income$92M
Owner earnings$139M · 9% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$92M$226M$108M$131M$412K
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$189M+$158M+$156M+$135M+$114M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$47M+$51M+$106M+$83M+$142M
Cash from operations$328M$435M$370M$349M$257M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$189M−$158M−$156M−$135M−$114M
Owner earnings$139M$277M$214M$214M$143M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$71M−$84M−$62M−$65M−$54M
Free cash flow$68M$193M$152M$149M$89M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%21%16%19%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $189M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $71M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $114M ÷ interest expense $139M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $714M · 6.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $340M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $340M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $714M owed, about 6.3× a year's operating profit (9.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 102 + DIO 130 − DPO 67 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 4%–14%; 5% latest = NOPAT $114M ÷ invested capital $2.1B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–21%; latest $132M = operating cash $302M − maintenance capex $171M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put $76M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $55M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $302M ÷ net income $23M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $102M ÷ Owner Earnings $132M
    What this means

    Of $132M Owner Earnings, $102M (77%) went back to shareholders, $35M dividends, $67M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.45×
    Expanding
    Capex $247M ÷ depreciation $171M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $875M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +2126%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.00/share (latest year $0.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 16% early, 16% lately, median 19%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 18%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 12.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Our use of AI, including generative AI, may expose us to additional risks and uncertainties that could adversely affect our business.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$340M
  • Receivables$389M
  • Inventory$407M
  • Other current assets$225M
Current liabilities$486M
  • Accounts payable$210M
  • Other current liabilities$276M
Current ratio2.80×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.96×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$875Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($847M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$368M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$2.0B · 69%
  • Dividends$109M · 4%
  • Buybacks$264M · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$525M · 18%
  • Returned to owners$373M

    24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $109M as dividends and $264M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $264M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−15.1%

    The diluted count fell from 121M to 103M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.34/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 46% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained64%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($179M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $114M, so each retained $1 added about 0.64 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Adecoagro S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Agricultural Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CTVACorteva Inc. Common Stock$17.4B41%7.4%5%8%
DMCDel Monte Corporation$4.3B8%3.2%5%2%
AGROAdecoagro S.A.$1.4B23%18.6%11%15%
VFFVillage Farms International Inc.$216M13%-3.6%-4%-1%
Group median18%5.3%5%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Adecoagro S.A.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Adecoagro S.A. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Adecoagro S.A. earns about $208M on its 15.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $55M on 143M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $714M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($247M) runs well above depreciation ($171M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $132M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Adecoagro S.A. (AGRO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AGRO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AGI its page in the Manual AHG →

Industry order: ← ADM the Agricultural Products chapter ANDE →