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CTVA, Corteva Inc. Common Stock
Corteva is a leading global provider of seed and crop protection solutions focused on the agriculture industry and contributing to a healthier, more secure and sustainable food supply.
With one of the broadest and most productive new product pipelines in the agriculture industry, Corteva is focused on progressing science-based innovations, which aim to deliver a wide range of improved agriculture products and services to its customers.
The company's investments seek to generate returns through providing farmers with technology-based and solution-based product offerings to meet these evolving production needs.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 6.5% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −33% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 34% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →52% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States48%$8.3B
- Latin America23%$3.9B
- EMEA18%$3.1B
- Asia Pacific8%$1.3B
- Canada4%$755M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $14.3B | $13.8B | $14.2B | $15.7B | $17.5B | $17.2B | $16.9B | $17.4B | $17.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 30% | 38% | 40% | 41% | 40% | 42% | 44% | 47% | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 22% | 21% | 20% | 18% | 18% | 19% | 20% | 20% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 8% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($4.8B) | ($869M) | $645M | $2.3B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −33.3% | −6.3% | 4.5% | 14.8% | 8.2% | 6.5% | 9.2% | 10.1% | 10.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($5.1B) | ($959M) | $681M | $1.8B | $1.1B | $735M | $907M | $1.1B | $1.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 23% | 15% | 17% | 31% | 31% | 30% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $483M | $1.1B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $872M | $1.8B | $2.1B | $3.4B | $2.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.8B | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $2.8B | $430M | $206M | ($275M) | ($1.5B) | ($177M) | $11M | $1.1B | $258M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.5B | $1.2B | $475M | $573M | $605M | $595M | $597M | $591M | $578M | CapexCapex |
| 10.5% | 8.4% | 3.3% | 3.7% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.4% | 3.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($1.0B) | ($93M) | $1.6B | $2.2B | $267M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.8B | $2.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −7.1% | −0.7% | 11.2% | 13.8% | 1.5% | 6.8% | 9.2% | 16.2% | 11.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($1.0B) | ($93M) | $1.6B | $2.2B | $267M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.8B | $2.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −7.1% | −0.7% | 11.2% | 13.8% | 1.5% | 6.8% | 9.2% | 16.2% | 11.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $10M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $1.5B | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $194M | $388M | $397M | $418M | $439M | $458M | $475M | $480M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $25M | $275M | $950M | $1.0B | $756M | $1.0B | $1.1B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -5% | — | 3% | 8% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 6% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| -7% | -4% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| −7% | −5% | 1% | 5% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $2.3B | $1.8B | $3.8B | $4.5B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $3.2B | $4.5B | $2.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3.6B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.9B | $7.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $5.3B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $5.2B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $5.4B | $5.7B | $5.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.9B | $4.3B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.0B | $4.5B | $6.1B | $6.8B | $5.8B | $6.2B | $8.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $23.0B | $13.5B | $14.8B | $15.5B | $16.8B | $16.3B | $15.1B | $17.3B | $17.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $13.3B | $8.2B | $8.5B | $9.6B | $10.7B | $10.4B | $10.4B | $12.1B | $11.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.4× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $10.2B | $10.2B | $10.3B | $10.1B | $10.0B | $10.6B | $10.4B | $10.5B | $10.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $108.7B | $42.4B | $42.6B | $42.3B | $42.6B | $43.0B | $40.8B | $42.8B | $42.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $5.8B | $115M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $3.5B | ($1.7B) | ($2.7B) | ($3.4B) | ($2.0B) | ($451M) | ($1.2B) | ($2.8B) | ($284M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -14.1× | -6.4× | 14.3× | 77.1× | 18.2× | 4.8× | 6.7× | 9.8× | 10.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $74.7B | $24.3B | $24.8B | $25.4B | $25.3B | $25.0B | $23.8B | $24.1B | $24.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 749M | 750M | 751M | 742M | 725M | 712M | 696M | 681M | 674M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $19.06 | $18.47 | $18.93 | $21.11 | $24.09 | $24.20 | $24.29 | $25.54 | $26.56 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-6.76 | $-1.28 | $0.91 | $2.37 | $1.58 | $1.03 | $1.30 | $1.61 | $1.73 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.36 | $-0.12 | $2.12 | $2.90 | $0.37 | $1.65 | $2.22 | $4.13 | $3.04 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.36 | $-0.12 | $2.12 | $2.90 | $0.37 | $1.65 | $2.22 | $4.13 | $3.04 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.26 | $0.52 | $0.54 | $0.58 | $0.62 | $0.66 | $0.70 | $0.71 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.00 | $1.55 | $0.63 | $0.77 | $0.84 | $0.84 | $0.86 | $0.87 | $0.86 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $99.63 | $32.43 | $33.05 | $34.23 | $34.92 | $35.17 | $34.18 | $35.43 | $36.17 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.3%/yr | +6.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +14.3%/yr |
| EPS | — | +12.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | +6.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −11.3%/yr | +6.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −13.7%/yr | +1.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.1B of profit into $2.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.1B | $907M | $735M | $1.1B | $1.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.2B | +$1.2B | +$1.2B | +$1.2B | +$1.2B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.1B | +$11M | −$177M | −$1.5B | −$275M |
| Cash from operations | $3.4B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $872M | $2.7B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$591M | −$597M | −$595M | −$605M | −$573M |
| Owner earnings | $2.8B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $267M | $2.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 16% | 9% | 7% | 2% | 14% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $1.8B ÷ interest expense $180M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $4.5B + ST investments $9M − debt $1.7B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 102 + DIO 226 − DPO 175 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -5%–8%; 6% latest = NOPAT $1.2B ÷ invested capital $21.3BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -7%–16%; latest $2.8B = operating cash $3.4B − maintenance capex $591MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.4B ÷ net income $1.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $1.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.8B
What this means
Of $2.8B Owner Earnings, $1.5B (55%) went back to shareholders, $475M dividends, $1.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.49×HarvestingCapex $591M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $17.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.43×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $5.2B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 7 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.36/share (latest year $1.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −12% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −12% early to 9% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −33.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Speed in discovering, developing, protecting and responding to new technologies, including artificial intelligence and new technology-based distribution channels that accelerate Corteva's product development timelines and could facilitate its ability to engage with customers and end users, and bringing related products…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$2.0B
- Receivables$7.3B
- Inventory$5.2B
- Other current assets$3.0B
- Debt due within a year$791M
- Accounts payable$4.2B
- Other current liabilities$6.9B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.1B, of which the leases are 20%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated $14.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.
- Reinvested$6.1B · 42%
- Dividends$2.8B · 19%
- Buybacks$5.1B · 35%
- Retained (debt / cash)$581M · 4%
- Returned to owners$7.9B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.8B as dividends and $5.1B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $4.1B and cash and short-term investments fell $309M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$55.30
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 87M shares were bought for $4.8B, about $55.30 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $45.35 (2021) to $66.39 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($1.1B).
- Net change in share count−10.1%
The diluted count fell from 749M to 674M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.70/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$4.5B written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Collins | $16.9M | $18.9M | $2.2B |
| 2021 | Mr. Magro | $793k | $793k | $2.2B |
| 2022 | Mr. Magro | $14.8M | $17.0M | $267M |
| 2023 | Mr. Magro | $13.2M | $7.9M | $1.2B |
| 2024 | Mr. Magro | $14.5M | $15.2M | $1.5B |
| 2025 | Mr. Magro | $17.5M | $28.5M | $2.8B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio206:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Corteva Inc. Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMREmerson Electric Company | $18.0B | 43% | 15.3% | 17% | 14% |
| GWWW.W. Grainger Inc. | $17.9B | 39% | 11.9% | 29% | 8% |
| MGMMGM Resorts International | $17.5B | — | 12.1% | 13% | 8% |
| CTVACorteva Inc. Common Stock | $17.4B | 41% | 7.4% | 5% | 8% |
| UHSUniversal Health | $17.4B | — | 10.8% | 10% | 7% |
| PHMPulteGroup Inc. | $17.3B | — | 16.3% | 19% | 9% |
| TELTE Connectivity plc | $17.3B | 33% | 16.3% | 15% | 13% |
| DMCDel Monte Corporation | $4.3B | 8% | 3.2% | 5% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 12.0% | 14% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Corteva Inc. Common Stock has delivered.
Corteva Inc. Common Stock’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Corteva Inc. Common Stock earns about $1.4B on its 8.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $2.0B on 669M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net cash $284M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CTSH its page in the Manual CUBB →
Industry order: ← CF the Agricultural Inputs chapter ICL →