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ANDE, Andersons
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 5.8% and operating margin about 0.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −0.6% to 1.8% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →23% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States77%$8.4B
- Other16%$1.7B
- Canada5%$519M
- Mexico3%$334M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.0B | $8.0B | $8.1B | $12.6B | $17.3B | $14.8B | $11.3B | $11.0B | $1.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 9% | 10% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 6% | 6% | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $19M | ($21M) | $53M | $27M | ($3M) | $133M | $171M | $138M | $144M | $118M | $180M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 0.5% | −0.6% | 1.8% | 0.3% | −0.0% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 11.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $12M | $43M | $41M | $18M | $8M | $104M | $131M | $101M | $114M | $96M | $129M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 37% | — | 22% | 33% | — | 22% | 23% | 27% | 21% | 19% | 18% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $40M | $75M | ($36M) | $349M | ($74M) | ($51M) | $287M | $947M | $332M | $177M | $133M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $84M | $86M | $90M | $146M | $189M | $179M | $135M | $125M | $128M | $133M | $133M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($63M) | ($60M) | ($174M) | $168M | ($281M) | ($345M) | $10M | $708M | $76M | ($69M) | ($145M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $78M | $35M | $143M | $165M | $77M | $76M | $108M | $150M | $149M | $233M | $238M | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 0.9% | 4.7% | 2.1% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 1.0% | 1.3% | 2.1% | 15.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($38M) | $41M | ($126M) | $183M | ($152M) | ($127M) | $179M | $796M | $182M | $44M | $248K | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −1.0% | 1.1% | −4.1% | 2.3% | −1.9% | −1.0% | 1.0% | 5.4% | 1.6% | 0.4% | 0.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($38M) | $41M | ($178M) | $183M | ($152M) | ($127M) | $179M | $796M | $182M | ($56M) | ($105M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.0% | 1.1% | −5.8% | 2.3% | −1.9% | −1.0% | 1.0% | 5.4% | 1.6% | −0.5% | −6.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $4M | $2M | $103M | $0 | $11M | $20M | $25M | $29M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $17M | $18M | $19M | $22M | $23M | $24M | $25M | $25M | $26M | $27M | $27M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | $0 | $13M | $2M | $2M | $15M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 1% | -1% | 3% | 1% | -0% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 5% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 1% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 1% | 10% | 11% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 3% | 3% | −0% | −2% | 7% | 9% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $63M | $35M | $23M | $55M | $29M | $216M | $115M | $644M | $562M | $98M | $72M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $683M | $649M | $691M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| $683M | $649M | $691M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.1B | $999M | $1.0B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $2.4B | $2.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $800M | $739M | $833M | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $64M | $6M | $2M | $131M | $132M | $129M | $129M | $128M | $128M | $128M | $128M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $3.9B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $4.6B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $3.7B | $3.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $445M | $473M | $518M | $1.1B | $956M | $633M | $603M | $591M | $644M | $623M | $593M | Total debtDebt |
| $382M | $438M | $495M | $1.0B | $927M | $416M | $487M | ($53M) | $83M | $525M | $520M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $774M | $815M | $830M | $974M | $962M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 1.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $59M | — | — | — | — | — | $686K | — | — | $686K | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 28.4M | 28.3M | 28.5M | 33.1M | 33.2M | 33.9M | 34.4M | 34.4M | 34.3M | 34.3M | 34.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $138.05 | $130.28 | $107.04 | $241.82 | $242.99 | $372.53 | $503.32 | $429.01 | $328.00 | $320.61 | $45.06 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.41 | $1.50 | $1.46 | $0.55 | $0.23 | $3.07 | $3.81 | $2.94 | $3.32 | $2.79 | $3.77 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.34 | $1.44 | $-4.42 | $5.54 | $-4.57 | $-3.75 | $5.20 | $23.16 | $5.31 | $1.27 | $0.01 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.34 | $1.44 | $-6.26 | $5.54 | $-4.57 | $-3.75 | $5.20 | $23.16 | $5.31 | $-1.63 | $-3.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.61 | $0.64 | $0.66 | $0.67 | $0.69 | $0.70 | $0.71 | $0.74 | $0.77 | $0.78 | $0.79 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.73 | $1.22 | $5.01 | $4.99 | $2.32 | $2.24 | $3.15 | $4.38 | $4.35 | $6.79 | $6.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $27.24 | $28.81 | $29.18 | $29.42 | $28.98 | $31.68 | $34.82 | $37.31 | $39.80 | $36.25 | $37.14 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.8%/yr | +5.7%/yr |
| EPS | +23.8%/yr | +64.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +2.8%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +10.6%/yr | +23.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.2%/yr | +4.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $44M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $133M it takes just to hold its position. It put $100M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($56M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $96M | $114M | $101M | $131M | $104M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$133M | +$128M | +$125M | +$135M | +$179M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$17M | +$14M | +$13M | +$11M | +$11M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$69M | +$76M | +$708M | +$10M | −$345M |
| Cash from operations | $177M | $332M | $947M | $287M | ($51M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$133M | −$149M | −$150M | −$108M | −$76M |
| Owner earnings | $44M | $182M | $796M | $179M | ($127M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$100M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($56M) | $182M | $796M | $179M | ($127M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 2% | 5% | 1% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $133M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $100M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $27M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $138M ÷ interest expense $20M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $525M · 3.8× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $98M − debt $623M
What this means
Netting $98M of cash and short-term investments against $623M of debt leaves $525M owed, about 3.8× a year's operating profit (4.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -1%–8%; 6% latest = NOPAT $112M ÷ invested capital $1.8BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $44M = operating cash $177M − maintenance capex $133M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)Industry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $27M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $177M ÷ net income $96M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $42M ÷ Owner Earnings $44M
What this means
Of $44M Owner Earnings, $42M (97%) went back to shareholders, $27M dividends, $15M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($17M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.75×ExpandingCapex $233M ÷ depreciation $133M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $11.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.41×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $623M vs $690M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +225%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.04/share (latest year $2.81), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, 1% lately, median 1%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +65%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 65% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −0.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$72M
- Inventory$1.4B
- Other current assets$1.1B
- Debt due within a year$23M
- Accounts payable$164M
- Other current liabilities$1.7B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.2B · 59%
- Dividends$226M · 11%
- Buybacks$32M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$572M · 28%
- Returned to owners$258M
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $226M as dividends and $32M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$35.86
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $32M, about $35.86 each.
- Net change in share count20.1%
The diluted count rose from 28M to 34M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.78/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained93%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($409M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $382M, so each retained $1 added about 0.93 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Patrick E. Bowe | $5.8M | $11.7M | ($127M) |
| 2022 | Patrick E. Bowe | $6.7M | $6.9M | $179M |
| 2023 | Patrick E. Bowe | $6.8M | $14.9M | $796M |
| 2024 | Patrick E. Bowe | $5.5M | −$34k | $182M |
| 2024 | Patrick E. Bowe | $4.8M | $2.4M | $182M |
| 2025 | Patrick E. Bowe | $5.5M | $11.6M | $44M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio60:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Andersons is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?20.1%
Diluted shares grew 20.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $32M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?17% → 91% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $683M to $1.4B while revenue grew −61%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (17% of revenue then, 91% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $253M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Agricultural Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNFIUnited Natural Foods | $31.8B | 14% | 0.4% | 5% | 1% |
| GLPGlobal Partners LP Common | $18.6B | 6% | 1.4% | — | 1% |
| ANDEAndersons | $11.0B | 6% | 1.0% | 4% | 1% |
| SEBSeaboard Corporation | $9.7B | 8% | 3.5% | 4% | 2% |
| CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common | $3.7B | 8% | 1.8% | — | 2% |
| CENTCentral Garden & Pet | $3.1B | 30% | 7.4% | 10% | 7% |
| ASHAshland | $1.8B | 30% | 3.0% | 2% | 4% |
| MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc. | $536M | 28% | 13.3% | 14% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 11% | 2.4% | 5% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Andersons has delivered.
Andersons’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Andersons earns about $79M on its 0.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($105M) on 34M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $520M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($238M) runs well above depreciation ($133M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $20K, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ANAB its page in the Manual ANDG →
Industry order: ← AGRO the Agricultural Products chapter AVO →