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AII, American Integrity Insurance Group Inc.
Insurance market following the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, in which a number of severe hurricanes resulted in record insured property losses and caused a number of national insurance companies to retreat from writing residential property insurance in the state.
PIF Count (000s) GPW ($MM) 10.4 % CAGR 14.0 % CAGR Florida has a large and growing population with a growing residential property insurance market.
Population growth supports growth in the property insurance market, which creates opportunity for insurance carriers with specialized expertise to profitably underwrite property insurance in the Florida market.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 76% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 24% of premiums before investing the float). The float runs about 0.8× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We previously identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 66%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $161M ÷ premiums earned $243MIndustry peers: median 94%
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 30%StrongNet income $100M ÷ equity $337MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $267M0.8× equityLoss and claim reserves $267M, 0.8× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $22M8.1% on the floatNet investment income $22M, 8.1% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership16.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$11M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOWBowhead Specialty Holdings Inc. | $552M | 96% | 64% | 12% |
| HIPOHippo Holdings Inc. | $469M | 107% | — | -43% |
| ASICAtegrity Specialty Insurance Company Holdings | $424M | 91% | 59% | 12% |
| ACICAmerican Coastal Insurance Corporation | $335M | — | 62% | 2% |
| AMSFAMERISAFE Inc. | $317M | 84% | 57% | 18% |
| NODKNI Holdings Inc. | $285M | — | 69% | 3% |
| AIIAmerican Integrity Insurance Group Inc. | $276M | 66% | 40% | 30% |
| KWYKingsway Corporation | $135M | — | — | -60% |
| Group median | — | 91% | 61% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← AIG its page in the Manual AIN →
Industry order: ← AIG the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter AIZ →