Owner Scorecard


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KWY, Kingsway Corporation

Insurance — Property & Casualty financial Unprofitable

Kingsway Corporation owns and operates a collection of high-quality B2B and B2C services companies that are asset-light, growing, and that have recurring revenues.

In this report, the terms "Kingsway," the "Company," "we," "us" or "our" mean Kingsway Financial Services Inc. and all entities included in our Consolidated Financial Statements.

Kingsway Corporation owns or controls subsidiaries primarily in the business services and extended warranty industries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KWY · Kingsway Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$135M
+23.4% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $146M 5-yr avg $104M
Return on equity −86% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
The underwriting result is not cleanly tagged in the filings. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about −17% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$177M$138M$52M$60M$61M$78M$93M$103M$109M$135M$146MRevenueRevenue
$128M$130M$126MPremiums earnedPremiums
$8M$7M$3M$3M$3M$2M$2M$2M$1M$2M$2MInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$238K($17M)($31M)($7M)($8M)($836K)$24M$23M($9M)($12M)($11M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($16M)($14M)($10M)$759K$2M($6M)($15M)($26M)$1M($3K)$2MOperating cash flowOp. cash
($16M)$1M($7M)$957KOwner earningsOwner earn.
0%-41%-247%-790%156%85%-112%-79%-86%Return on equityROE
0%−41%−247%−790%156%85%−112%−79%−86%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$3M$3MFloat (reserves)Float
$758K$13M$378M$22M$452M$476M$286M$198M$187M$231M$232MTotal assetsAssets
$406K$6M$15M$910K$15M$10M$64M$9M$6M$8M$7MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$56M$41M$12M$874K($2M)($6M)$16M$28M$8M$15M$13MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
20.0M21.5M21.7M21.9M22.2M22.5M25.3M26.4M27.2M27.9M28.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.01$-0.79$-1.41$-0.32$-0.35$-0.04$0.96$0.89$-0.35$-0.43$-0.39EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.81$0.07$-0.30$0.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.80$1.92$0.57$0.04$-0.09$-0.25$0.62$1.05$0.31$0.54$0.46Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−6.5%/yr+12.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.7%/yr (5-yr)+2.7%/yr
Book value / share−16.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$135Mlow FY2018
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In the past, we have identified the existence of material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting, which have since been remediated.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 91%

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    Premiums or claims weren't found in the filing data.

  • Loss on equity
    Net income ($12M) ÷ equity $15M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 0.2× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $3M, 0.2× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • earned on investments
    Net investment income $2M
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$78M
  • Cash & short-term investments$7M
  • Receivables$10M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$59M
Current liabilities$85M
  • Debt due within a year$16M
  • Accounts payable$4M
  • Other current liabilities$65M
Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.90×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($7M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$16M due · $7M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+37.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($108M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($122M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$78M$7M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$88Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$121M52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$103Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2M of capital spent building

$1M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2023Mr. Fitzgerald$610k$1.2M$23M
2024Mr. Fitzgerald$637k$592k($9M)
2025Mr. Fitzgerald$638k$2.6M($12M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
HIPOHippo Holdings Inc.$469M107%-43%
ASICAtegrity Specialty Insurance Company Holdings$424M91%59%12%
ACICAmerican Coastal Insurance Corporation$335M62%2%
AMSFAMERISAFE Inc.$317M84%57%18%
NODKNI Holdings Inc.$285M69%3%
AIIAmerican Integrity Insurance Group Inc.$276M66%40%30%
KWYKingsway Corporation$135M-60%
MHLAMaiden Holdings, Ltd.$56M129%73%-15%
Group median2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kingsway Corporation (KWY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KWY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KWR its page in the Manual KYMR →

Industry order: ← KNSL the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter L →