Owner Scorecard


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ALLY, Ally Financial Inc.

Consumer Finance financial

Ally Financial Inc. is a financial-services company with $196.0 billion in assets as of December 31, 2025.

Ally Financial Inc. serves customers with deposits and securities brokerage and investment advisory services as well as automotive financing and insurance offerings.

Our primary business lines are Dealer Financial Services, which is composed of our Automotive Finance and Insurance operations, and Corporate Finance.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ALLY · Ally Financial Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.9B
−3.3% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.5B 5-yr avg $8.2B
Return on equity 9% 5-yr avg 10%
Return on tangible equity 9% 5-yr avg 10%
Equity / assets 7.9% 5-yr avg 7.6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 8%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.4B$5.8B$5.8B$6.4B$6.7B$8.2B$8.4B$8.2B$8.2B$7.9B$8.5BRevenueRevenue
$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0B$1.6B$2.0B$2.2B$1.7B$2.2BNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$917M$1.1B$918M$998M$1.4B$523MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$1.1B$929M$1.3B$1.7B$1.1B$3.1B$1.7B$957M$668M$852M$1.4BNet incomeNet inc.
31%38%22%13%23%21%27%13%20%19%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
0.7%0.6%0.7%0.9%0.6%1.7%0.9%0.5%0.3%0.4%0.7%Return on assetsROA
8%7%10%12%7%18%13%7%5%5%9%Return on equityROE
7%6%8%10%5%16%10%4%2%3%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
8%7%10%12%8%19%14%7%5%6%9%Return on tangible equityROTCE
Balance sheet
$163.7B$167.1B$178.9B$180.6B$182.2B$182.1B$191.8B$196.3B$191.8B$196.0B$197.3BTotal assetsAssets
$79.0B$93.3B$106.2B$120.8B$137.0B$141.6B$152.3B$154.7B$151.6B$151.6B$153.2BDepositsDeposits
$240M$240M$240M$393M$343M$822M$822M$669M$551M$190M$190MGoodwillGoodwill
$13.3B$13.5B$13.3B$14.4B$14.7B$17.1B$12.9B$13.7B$13.9B$15.5B$15.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
482M455M428M395M377M365M319M305M310M313M313MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.21$2.04$2.95$4.34$2.88$8.38$5.38$3.14$2.15$2.72$4.46EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.22$0.40$0.57$0.69$0.77$0.89$1.21$1.21$1.20$1.21$1.22Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$27.62$29.63$31.02$36.46$38.99$46.69$40.36$44.91$44.83$49.51$49.83Book value / shareBVPS
$27.12$29.11$30.32$35.29$37.95$44.09$37.47$42.48$42.87$48.90$49.23Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.4%/yr+7.4%/yr
EPS+2.3%/yr−1.1%/yr
Dividends / share+20.6%/yr+9.6%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr+4.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
313Mpeak FY2016
Revenue
$7.9Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $852M ÷ equity $15.5B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $190M − intangibles $0)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 62%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 7.9%
    Modest
    Equity $15.5B ÷ assets $196.0B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $151.6B ÷ assets $196.0B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our future competitiveness could depend in part on our ability to identify where AI can create value, prudently adopt and integrate AI-enabled tools and processes, and maintain appropriate governance, risk management, and controls over such technologies and the data we input into them.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$82M
'27$1.6B
'28$896M
'29$1.8B
'30$793M
'31$5.5B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$82Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$1.7Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$5.5Bin 2031the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$10.7Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $30.7B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$9.5B
Together, against $82M due next year116.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $9.5B against the $82M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 116 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • CEO pay ratio106:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Consumer Finance

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
STTState Street Corporation$13.9B10%15%74%0.9%
MTBM&T Bank Corporation$9.7B9%13%57%3.2%
FCNCAFirst Citizens BancShares Inc.$9.5B12%13%64%3.0%
FITBFifth Third Bancorp$9.0B12%16%58%2.7%
CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc.$8.2B8%11%61%2.6%
HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated$8.2B10%14%62%2.8%
NTRSNorthern Trust Corporation$8.1B12%13%70%1.2%
ALLYAlly Financial Inc.$7.9B8%8%
Group median10%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Ally Financial Inc.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered4%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity8%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $15.4B on 307M shares, a 8% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ally Financial Inc. (ALLY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ALLY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ALLE its page in the Manual ALMS →

Industry order: ← AFRM the Consumer Finance chapter ATLC →