Owner Scorecard


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AFRM, Affirm Holdings

Consumer Finance capital-intensive Capital build-out

Our proprietary technology's ability to price and assess risk at a transaction level provides a unique advantage compared to legacy payment and credit systems.

Our solutions, which are built on trust and transparency, are designed to make it easier for consumers to spend and save responsibly and with confidence, easier for merchants and commerce platforms to convert sales and grow, and easier for commerce to thrive.

We do not profit from consumers' mistakes, and we are transparent in our product offerings.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AFRM · Affirm Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+34.9% YoY · 32% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $711M
Operating margin 24.0% 5-yr avg −103.6%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg −14%
Owner-earnings margin 58% 5-yr avg −3%
Free cash flow margin 58% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Merchant Network (79%) and Card network revenue (21%).
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −89% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 42% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Merchant Network is 79% of revenue, with Card network revenue the other meaningful line at 21%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Merchant Network79%$883M
  • Card network revenue21%$231M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$140M$276M$429M$559M$627M$826M$1.1B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
63%44%89%103%94%64%49%41%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($127M)($108M)($384M)($866M)($1.2B)($616M)($87M)$328MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−90.9%−39.0%−89.3%−154.9%−191.5%−74.6%−7.8%24.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($120M)($113M)($441M)($707M)($985M)($518M)$52M$382MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($88M)($71M)($193M)($162M)$12M$450M$794M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$5M$9M$20M$53M$135M$169M$225M$280MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)$2M($65M)$102M$411M$454M$195M$44MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$19M$21M$20M$86M$121M$159M$192M$223MCapexCapex
13.8%7.6%4.7%15.4%19.3%19.3%17.3%16.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($93M)($81M)($213M)($215M)($109M)$291M$602M$787MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−66.2%−29.2%−49.7%−38.4%−17.3%35.2%54.0%57.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($107M)($92M)($213M)($248M)($109M)$291M$602M$787MFree cash flowFCF
−76.3%−33.4%−49.7%−44.4%−17.3%35.2%54.0%57.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$222M$6M$16M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$3M$19M$800K$86K$109K$0$250MBuybacksBuybacks
-13%-23%-25%-10%-1%3%ROICROIC
-17%-27%-39%-19%2%10%Return on equityROE
−17%−27%−39%−19%2%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$358M$267M$1.5B$1.3B$892M$1.0B$1.4B$1.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$59M$92M$142M$199M$353M$426M$231MReceivablesReceiv.
$59M$92M$142M$199M$353M$426M$231MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1M$1M$517M$540M$543M$533M$534M$529MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$4.9B$7.0B$8.2B$9.5B$11.2B$13.1BTotal assetsAssets
$0$1.2B$1.6B$2.2B$3.2B$7.6B$8.9BTotal debtDebt
($267M)($290M)$372M$1.3B$2.2B$6.3B$7.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
($263M)($367M)$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$2.7B$3.1B$3.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
24.0%10.7%68.1%69.9%72.1%41.7%28.9%22.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
47.3M47.9M159M282M295M310M341M349MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.96$5.77$2.70$1.99$2.12$2.67$3.27$3.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.54$-2.35$-2.77$-2.51$-3.34$-1.67$0.15$1.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.96$-1.69$-1.34$-0.76$-0.37$0.94$1.76$2.26Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.26$-1.93$-1.34$-0.88$-0.37$0.94$1.76$2.26Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.41$0.44$0.13$0.31$0.41$0.51$0.56$0.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-5.56$-7.67$16.17$9.29$8.58$8.82$9.00$10.85Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.33 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.77 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.6%/yr−10.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.5%/yr+5.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Merchant Network+30.8%
    “Merchant network revenue for the year ended June 30, 2025 increased by $208.1 million, or 31%, compared to the same period in 2024. The increase is primarily attributed to an increase of $10.0 billion or 38% in GMV for the year ended June 30, 2025.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
341Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−1%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$602Mowner earningsvs.$52Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2023FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $52M of profit into $602M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$52M
Owner earnings$602M · 54% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$52M($518M)($985M)($707M)($441M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$225M+$169M+$135M+$53M+$20M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$321M+$345M+$452M+$391M+$293M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$195M+$454M+$411M+$102M−$65M
Cash from operations$794M$450M$12M($162M)($193M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$192M−$159M−$121M−$53M−$20M
Owner earnings$602M$291M($109M)($215M)($213M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$34M
Free cash flow$602M$291M($109M)($248M)($213M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue54%35%-17%-38%-50%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $321M), owner earnings is nearer $280M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.4B − debt $7.6B
    What this means

    Netting $1.4B of cash and short-term investments against $7.6B of debt leaves $6.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -25%–-1%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($74M) ÷ invested capital $9.3B
    Industry peers: median -8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $602M = operating cash $794M − maintenance capex $192M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -29%)
    Industry peers: median -42%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 54% of revenue this year, a -29% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $321M of SBC) leaves $280M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $794M ÷ net income $52M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $250M ÷ Owner Earnings $602M
    What this means

    Of $602M Owner Earnings, $250M (42%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $250M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($321M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.85×
    Maintaining
    Capex $192M ÷ depreciation $225M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.45/share (latest year $0.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −73% → −91% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (−91%) sits below the early years (−73%), but the latest year (−8%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −89% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −11%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2023 · −191.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“For example, our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI into their products and services more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $742M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$619M · 83%
  • Buybacks$272M · 37%
  • Returned to owners$272M

    150% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $272M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$150M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $150M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $272M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count636.2%

    The diluted count rose from 47M to 349M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$321M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 29% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Consumer Finance

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AFRMAffirm Holdings$1.1B-89.3%-13%-29%
CLSKCleanSpark Inc.$766M44%-114.4%-12%-82%
RIOTRiot Platforms Inc. Common Stock$647M26%-128.7%-24%-105%
IRENIREN Limited$501M53%-14.5%-3%1%
HIVEHIVE Digital Technologies Ltd.$298M1.8%0%-42%
HUTHut 8 Corp.$235M54%-55.2%-8%-73%
CRCLCircle Internet Group Inc.$110M1102.0%-4%699%
ORBSEightco Holdings Inc.$33M9%-20.7%-39%-33%
Group median-38.0%-10%-37%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Affirm Holdings has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+107%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $787M on 334M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $7.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 349M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($223M) runs well above depreciation ($280M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $817M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Affirm Holdings (AFRM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AFRM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AFL its page in the Manual AGCO →

Industry order: the Consumer Finance chapter ALLY →