Share count
1.6Bpeak FY2024
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AMD, Advanced Micro Devices
AMD designs high-performance computer chips — the processors and graphics engines, including semi-custom and adaptive system-on-chip parts, that sit at the center of data centers, AI systems, personal computers, game consoles and embedded devices. It sells these designs, together with networking and software, to the cloud operators, equipment makers and device builders who assemble the machines. It does not own the factories; the chips are made by outside foundries, so AMD earns its keep on the gap between what a chip design fetches and what it costs to develop and have built.
AMD technology powers billions of experiences across cloud and AI infrastructure, embedded systems, AI PCs and gaming.
With a broad portfolio of AI-optimized CPUs, GPUs, networking and software, AMD delivers full-stack solutions that help customers turn data into breakthroughs, with the speed and scale needed for a new era of intelligent computing.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$34.6B
+34.3% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $37.5B 5-yr avg $24.6B
Revenue $10.3B +37.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 14.4% yr-ago 10.8%
Net income $1.4B yr-ago $709M
Net margin 13.5% yr-ago 9.5%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The governing question is franchise or commodity: in chips a buyer's loyalty lasts about as long as your part is the fastest, and the filing's own language fixes the burden on delivering the latest and best products to market each cycle — so watch whether AMD can command price, or must re-earn every socket on raw performance against well-armed rivals. Because it designs but does not manufacture, its cost and supply position rest partly on outside foundries and a limited bench of equipment and material suppliers, which is the lever to watch on the downside. The franchise, if there is one, must be paid for with relentless design spending, so the real test is the return earned on that reinvested capital. The figures for margins, returns and the cash position are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →67% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States33%$11.4B
- China22%$7.8B
- Other Countries17%$6.1B
- Taiwan15%$5.2B
- Singapore12%$4.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $4.3B | $5.3B | $6.5B | $6.7B | $9.8B | $16.4B | $23.6B | $22.7B | $25.8B | $34.6B | $37.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 23% | 34% | 38% | 43% | 45% | 48% | 45% | 46% | 49% | 50% | 50% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 10% | 9% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 12% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 23% | 23% | 22% | 23% | 20% | 17% | 21% | 26% | 25% | 23% | 23% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($373M) | $127M | $451M | $631M | $1.4B | $3.6B | $1.3B | $401M | $1.9B | $3.7B | $4.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −8.6% | 2.4% | 7.0% | 9.4% | 14.0% | 22.2% | 5.4% | 1.8% | 7.4% | 10.7% | 11.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($498M) | ($33M) | $337M | $341M | $2.5B | $3.2B | $1.3B | $854M | $1.6B | $4.3B | $5.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | -3% | 8% | — | 14% | — | — | 19% | -2% | 0% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $81M | $12M | $34M | $493M | $1.1B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $1.7B | $3.0B | $7.7B | $9.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $133M | $144M | $170M | $222M | $217M | $296M | $439M | $441M | $454M | $521M | $521M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $360M | ($196M) | ($610M) | ($267M) | ($1.9B) | ($316M) | $725M | ($1.0B) | ($461M) | $1.2B | $2.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $77M | $113M | $163M | $217M | $294M | $301M | $450M | $546M | $636M | $974M | $1.2B | CapexCapex |
| 1.8% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 3.2% | 3.0% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 2.8% | 3.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $4M | ($101M) | ($129M) | $276M | $854M | $3.2B | $3.1B | $1.1B | $2.6B | $7.2B | $9.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.1% | −1.9% | −2.0% | 4.1% | 8.7% | 19.6% | 13.2% | 4.9% | 10.0% | 20.8% | 24.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $4M | ($101M) | ($129M) | $276M | $777M | $3.2B | $3.1B | $1.1B | $2.4B | $6.7B | $8.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.1% | −1.9% | −2.0% | 4.1% | 8.0% | 19.6% | 13.2% | 4.9% | 9.3% | 19.4% | 22.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $1.8B | $3.7B | $985M | $862M | $1.3B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -45% | — | 31% | 31% | 30% | 60% | 2% | 1% | 3% | 6% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| -104% | -6% | 27% | 12% | 43% | 42% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 7% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| −104% | −6% | 27% | 12% | 43% | 42% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 7% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $3.6B | $5.9B | $5.8B | $5.1B | $10.6B | $12.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $372M | $454M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $6.2B | $6.3B | $6.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $691M | $694M | $845M | $982M | $1.4B | $2.0B | $3.8B | $4.4B | $5.7B | $7.9B | $8.0B | InventoryInvent. |
| $440M | $384M | $834M | $988M | $468M | $1.3B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $623M | $764M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $5.4B | $6.6B | $9.5B | $11.3B | $11.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.5B | $4.6B | $6.1B | $8.6B | $15.0B | $16.8B | $19.0B | $26.9B | $28.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $4.2B | $6.4B | $6.7B | $7.3B | $9.5B | $10.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 2.5× | 2.0× | 2.4× | 2.5× | 2.6× | 2.9× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $289M | $289M | $289M | $289M | $289M | $289M | $24.2B | $24.3B | $24.8B | $25.1B | $25.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.3B | $3.6B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $9.0B | $12.4B | $67.6B | $67.9B | $69.2B | $76.9B | $79.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $486M | $330M | $313M | $2.5B | $2.5B | $1.7B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Total debtDebt |
| $171M | $210M | $94M | ($1.0B) | ($2.0B) | ($3.3B) | ($3.4B) | ($3.3B) | ($3.4B) | ($7.3B) | ($9.1B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.4× | 1.0× | 3.7× | 6.7× | 29.1× | 107.3× | 14.4× | 3.8× | 20.7× | 28.2× | 29.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $477M | $596M | $1.3B | $2.8B | $5.8B | $7.5B | $54.8B | $55.9B | $57.6B | $63.0B | $64.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.0% | 1.8% | 2.1% | 2.9% | 2.8% | 2.3% | 4.6% | 6.1% | 5.5% | 4.7% | 4.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 835M | 952M | 1.06B | 1.12B | 1.21B | 1.23B | 1.57B | 1.63B | 1.64B | 1.64B | 1.65B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.17 | $5.52 | $6.09 | $6.01 | $8.09 | $13.37 | $15.02 | $13.96 | $15.75 | $21.17 | $22.70 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.60 | $-0.03 | $0.32 | $0.30 | $2.06 | $2.57 | $0.84 | $0.53 | $1.00 | $2.65 | $3.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.00 | $-0.11 | $-0.12 | $0.25 | $0.71 | $2.62 | $1.98 | $0.69 | $1.58 | $4.39 | $5.58 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.00 | $-0.11 | $-0.12 | $0.25 | $0.64 | $2.62 | $1.98 | $0.69 | $1.47 | $4.12 | $5.20 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.09 | $0.12 | $0.15 | $0.19 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.29 | $0.34 | $0.39 | $0.60 | $0.70 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.57 | $0.63 | $1.19 | $2.52 | $4.84 | $6.10 | $34.85 | $34.40 | $35.17 | $38.51 | $39.07 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +17.0%/yr | +21.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +113.4%/yr | +44.1%/yr |
| EPS | — | +5.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +23.0%/yr | +19.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +59.7%/yr | +51.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
6%low FY2016
Gross margin
50%low FY2016
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$7.2Bowner earningsvs.$4.3Bnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $7.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $521M it takes just to hold its position. It put $453M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $6.7B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $4.3B | $1.6B | $854M | $1.3B | $3.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$521M | +$454M | +$441M | +$439M | +$296M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$1.6B | +$1.4B | +$1.4B | +$1.1B | +$379M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.2B | −$461M | −$1.0B | +$725M | −$316M |
| Cash from operations | $7.7B | $3.0B | $1.7B | $3.6B | $3.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$521M | −$454M | −$546M | −$450M | −$301M |
| Owner earnings | $7.2B | $2.6B | $1.1B | $3.1B | $3.2B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$453M | −$182M | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $6.7B | $2.4B | $1.1B | $3.1B | $3.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 21% | 10% | 5% | 13% | 20% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $521M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $453M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.6B), owner earnings is nearer $5.5B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 28.2×ComfortableOperating income $3.7B ÷ interest expense $131M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $5.5B + ST investments $5.0B − debt $3.2B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $7.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 67 + DIO 165 − DPO 61 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -45%–60%; 6% latest = NOPAT $3.7B ÷ invested capital $60.7BIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High, recently turned positivelatest $7.2B = operating cash $7.7B − maintenance capex $521M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 5%)Industry peers: median 21%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.6B of SBC) leaves $5.5B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $7.7B ÷ net income $4.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $1.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $7.2B
What this means
Of $7.2B Owner Earnings, $1.3B (18%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.3B buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1.6B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.87×ExpandingCapex $974M ÷ depreciation $521M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $34.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.85×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $3.2B vs $17.5B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.40/share (latest year $2.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $38.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 0% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 0% early to 7% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2016 · −8.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Additionally, we may encounter competition from customers who internally develop products to support similar AI workloads to those supported by ours.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$28.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$12.3B
- Receivables$6.0B
- Inventory$8.0B
- Other current assets$2.2B
Current liabilities$10.5B
- Debt due within a year$874M
- Accounts payable$3.0B
- Other current liabilities$6.6B
Current ratio2.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.96×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$18.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$874M due · $12.3B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+37.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$23.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.0B$806M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.0B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Due in the next 12 months$875Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$875Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.0Bin 2031the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$3.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $3.2B of debt in all
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 28, 2026$12.3B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$7.2B
Together, against $875M due next year22.3×
Cash on hand as of Mar 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $19.5B against the $875M due in the twelve months after the Dec 27, 2025 schedule: 22 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 27, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$192Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$937Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$784Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$3.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$784M
Total fixed claims on the business$4.0B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.0B, of which the leases are 20%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 27, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $21.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$3.8B · 18%
- Buybacks$8.6B · 41%
- Retained (debt / cash)$8.8B · 42%
- Returned to owners$8.6B
48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $8.6B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.8B and cash and short-term investments rose $11.1B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$107.03
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 81M shares were bought for $8.6B, about $107.03 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $101.55 (2023) to $146.10 (2024); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $101.98 ($3.7B).
- Net change in share count97.6%
The diluted count rose from 835M to 1650M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained70%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.7B, so each retained $1 added about 0.70 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$41.8B54% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity40%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.8B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Lisa Su | $29.5M | $188.4M | $3.2B |
| 2022 | Lisa Su | $30.2M | −$160.1M | $3.1B |
| 2023 | Lisa Su | $30.3M | $189.8M | $1.1B |
| 2024 | Lisa Su | $31.0M | −$18.7M | $2.6B |
| 2025 | Lisa Su | $55.2M | $146.7M | $7.2B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio341:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$1.6B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 44% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Advanced Micro Devices is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?97.6%
Diluted shares grew 97.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $8.6B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 38% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.1B to $14.1B while revenue grew 767%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVGOBroadcom Inc. | $63.9B | 59% | 25.4% | 13% | 42% |
| AMDAdvanced Micro Devices | $34.6B | 45% | 7.2% | 6% | 7% |
| JBLJabil Inc. | $29.8B | 8% | 3.2% | 18% | 2% |
| AMATApplied Materials Inc. | $28.4B | 46% | 27.9% | 36% | 22% |
| FLEXFlex Ltd. | $27.9B | 7% | 3.3% | 15% | 0% |
| APHAmphenol Corporation | $23.1B | 32% | 20.4% | 18% | 14% |
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 17% | 21% |
| ADIAnalog Devices Inc. | $11.0B | 63% | 27.0% | 8% | 35% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 22.6% | 16% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Advanced Micro Devices has delivered.
Advanced Micro Devices’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Advanced Micro Devices earns about $2.4B on its 6.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+70%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+72%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $8.6B on 1631M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net cash $9.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.2B) runs well above depreciation ($521M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $9.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AMD, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← AMCX its page in the Manual AME →
Industry order: ← AMBQ the Semiconductors chapter AMKR →